Daniele Fulvi | Western Sydney University (original) (raw)

Books by Daniele Fulvi

Routledge, 2024

This book offers a cutting-edge interpretation of the philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling by criticall... more This book offers a cutting-edge interpretation of the philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling by critically reconsidering the interpretations of some of his “successors”. It argues that Schelling’s philosophy should be read as an ontology of immanence, highlighting its relevance for ongoing debates on ethics and freedom.

The book builds on a key notion from Schelling’s Philosophy of Revelation where he outlines the process through which transcendence must return to immanence in order to be grasped and understood. The author identifies Jaspers, Heidegger, and Deleuze as the main interpreters of Schelling’s philosophical activity, highlighting their relevance for subsequent Schelling scholarship. Heidegger and Jaspers refer to Schelling’s philosophy in negative terms, namely as an incomplete and unviable philosophical system, whereas Deleuze holds the immanent core of Schelling’s ontological discourse in high regard. The author’s analysis demonstrates that reading Schelling’s philosophy as an ontology of immanence not only avoids Heidegger’s and Jaspers’s criticisms but is also more fitting to Schelling’s original meaning. Accordingly, his reading allows us to fully grasp Schelling’s thought in all its strength and consistency: as a philosophy that avoids metaphysical abstractions and maintains the concreteness of concepts like God, nature, freedom by binding them to a solid and material account of Being. Finally, the author uses Schelling to propose an innovative reading of freedom as a matter of resistance, and of philosophy as an activity whose main purpose is that of seeking the actual extent and place of (human) life and freedom within nature. The author originally emphasises the relevance of these conclusions on contemporary debates in Postcolonial Critical Theory and Environmental Ethics.

Schelling, Freedom, and the Immanent Made Transcendent. From Philosophy of Nature to Environmental Ethics will appeal to scholars and advanced students working in 19th-century Continental philosophy, German idealism, and Postcolonial Critical Theory and Environmental Ethics.

Papers by Daniele Fulvi

Futures, 2024

This article critically analyses the imaginary that is emerging from attempts to mitigate planeta... more This article critically analyses the imaginary that is emerging from attempts to mitigate planetary scale climatic change through bioengineering the microbial world, that is, through synthetic biology. We explore how engineering microbial life is put forth by its advocates as a viable means of mitigating climate change and thus conferring benefit for future human and more-than-human life. We discuss how these promises, while far-reaching, translate into a technofix imaginary, whereby a future existence of human and untold more-than-human life is contingent on the realisation of such promises. Moreover, we illustrate how the engineering imaginary of synthetic biology is not limited to life alone, but is rather the byproduct of an aspiration to control global ecosystems and climates, and even the course of evolution, via the manufacturing and control of life at the microbial level. We conclude with a critique of how such an imaginary remains incommensurate with fundamental aspects of life that elude human control, and will arguably continue to do so. Thus, the technofix imaginary of synthetic biology is likely to be scaled down in order to reflect the actual achievements of the field, and not its speculative applications.

The Anthropocene Review

In this article, we critically engage with the risk ethics of attempting to mitigate climate chan... more In this article, we critically engage with the risk ethics of attempting to mitigate climate change via a technofix, namely Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) utilising Synthetic Biology. Now that the IPCC has (belatedly) acknowledged climate overshoot as being inevitable, our dependency on NETs to avert runaway climate change has become critical. Given the scale of unknown unknowns at play when utilising any such technofix, we present gambling as the most apt analogy to communicate the unprecedented realms of risk and uncertainty occasioned by any such action. Hence, we critique traditional normative ethics in order to illustrate how a germane climate ethics must face the largely uncertain and unpredictable risk that any climate change technofix would inevitably represent instead of advocating for outdated risk-averse positions. We conclude by showing that this approach is fundamental to developing impactful future ethics research on climate mitigation, and is required to mark a much-needed new direction for risk ethics in the Anthropocene.

Ethics, Polucy & Environment, 2023

In this article, we attempt to justify the use of synthetic biology in response to the climate cr... more In this article, we attempt to justify the use of synthetic biology in response to the climate crisis, based on the premise that it is impossible to avert runaway climate change without sequestering sufficient greenhouse gasses (GHG), which could only become possible through Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs). Then, moving from a consequentialist standpoint, we acquiesce to how the consequences of using NETs through synthetic biology are preferable to the catastrophic consequences of runaway climate change. In conclusion, we show how our analysis of synthetic biology resonates with a zoecentric view of climate science and ethics.

Southern Journal of Philosophy

In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected t... more In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected the conception of God as coinciding with the moral order, which they attribute to Fichte; such coincidence, in their view, turned God into a transcendent and merely moral Being. In an effort to demonstrate their distance from Fichte’s view, we contend, Schelling and Hegel advocated for a metaphysical (rather than merely moral) and immanent (rather than transcendent) understanding of God, conceived in its inextricable relation with nature and self-consciousness. We conclude by demonstrating that the cooperation between Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period led them to develop an analogous conception of immanence— which already foreshadows, however, the different directions that Schelling and Hegel will take in their mature works.

Critical Horizons, vol. 23, issue 1, 2022

In this paper, I demonstrate that the concept of resistance (Widerstand) is fundamental in order ... more In this paper, I demonstrate that the concept of resistance (Widerstand) is fundamental in order to understand Schelling’s account of freedom. First, I argue that Schelling, in his early works, contends that the resistance opposed by nature to our individual will is fundamental for human beings to actualise freedom. Moreover, I show that Schelling maintains the centrality of resistance even in his philosophy of nature, and I demonstrate that resistance is that fundamental ontological occurrence which grounds the opposition between the basic forces of matter, and without which matter itself would not exist. Accordingly, resistance is also that material occurrence through which freedom can concretely take place in its being limited and constrained by necessity. Finally, I also show that Schelling reiterates such an understanding in his Freiheitsschrift, namely I argue that resistance is a fundamental occurrence even for the struggle between good and evil, which in turn implies that resistance inevitably influences our individual will and actions. On these grounds, I conclude by arguing that freedom can be understood as a matter of resistance, since it arises and is made possible only through resistance itself.

Sophia, vol. 60, issue 4, 2021

Among the different interpretations of the philosophy of Schelling, there is no doubt that the on... more Among the different interpretations of the philosophy of Schelling, there is no doubt that the ones developed by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers played a prominent role within the most recent Schelling scholarship. Both Heidegger and Jaspers focused on Schelling’s discourse on freedom, pointing out the fundamental incompatibility of its key elements, i.e. ‘ground’ and ‘existence’, as well as the fallacious conception of Seynsfuge that emerges from it. Moreover, Heidegger argues that Schelling’s ontology ultimately falls back into traditional metaphysical subjectivism, ignoring the question of Being as such and in fact paving the way to nihilism. Similarly, Jaspers criticizes Schelling’s arbitrary account of the relation between freedom and existential being and his misleading conception of transcendence. However, I argue against Jaspers that
Schelling’s discourse on freedom must be read as a philosophy of immanence, which aims at maintaining the concreteness of the concepts and at avoiding any form of transcendence. Consequently, I also argue against Heidegger that not only does Schelling’s discourse successfully show the compatibility of ground and existence, but that Schelling’s understanding of the ‘subject’ does not comply with Heidegger’s notion of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ and is immune to Heidegger’s criticism.

Comparative and Continental Philosophy, vol. 14, issue 1, 2022

In this paper I focus on Gianni Vattimo’s and Paolo Diego Bubbio’s notion of kenosis showing that... more In this paper I focus on Gianni Vattimo’s and Paolo Diego Bubbio’s notion of kenosis showing that 1) they both understand kenotic sacrifice in a strongly hermeneutical sense, and connect it with a perspectival account of truth and knowledge; 2) they both emphasize that kenotic sacrifice has a fundamentally ethical aspect; and 3) they both maintain that kenotic sacrifice is an ‘un-natural’ act that is implied in the withdrawal of one’s self. However, I intend to show that nature can be understood positively through the notion of kenosis, and that it is possible to envisage an ethical theory that concretely tackles the self-proclaimed centrality of human agency within nature, therefore implementing an effective and non-anthropocentric form of kenotic sacrifice. In this sense, I conclude by arguing that kenotic sacrifice can primarily be seen as an act of making room for other ways of being.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 26, issue 1, 2021

In this paper, I focus on Luigi Pareyson’s interpretation of Schelling, arguing that it must be r... more In this paper, I focus on Luigi Pareyson’s interpretation of Schelling, arguing that it must be read in continuity with Pareyson’s early engagement with the philosophies of Heidegger and Jaspers. Firstly, I argue that Pareyson shapes his existentialism on Jaspers’s and Heidegger’s thoughts, and particularly in relation to that which he considers the fundamental question of philosophy, namely ‘why is there Being rather than nothingness?’. Secondly, I demonstrate how Pareyson reads Schelling’s philosophy in light of his interpretations of Jaspers and Heidegger, i.e., in relation to the ‘fundamental question of philosophy’. Finally, I show how Pareyson’s reading of Schelling is centered on the notion of ‘awe of reason’, and how he defines Schelling as a ‘post-Heideggerian thinker’, since Heidegger’s philosophy allows us to innovatively reinterpret Schelling’s philosophy in an existentialist way.

Idealistic Studies, 2020

In this paper, I focus on the concept of intuition (Anschauung) in Schelling’s philosophy. More s... more In this paper, I focus on the concept of intuition (Anschauung) in Schelling’s philosophy. More specifically, I show how Schelling attributes to intuition an ontological value by essentially relating it to freedom and primal Being (Ursein). Indeed, for Schelling intuition is both the main instrument of philosophy and the highest product of freedom, by which we attain the so-called “God’s-eye point of view” and concretely grasp things in their immediate existence. That is, through intuition it is possible to grasp the absolute and original unity of the principles, namely of being and thought, subject and object and freedom and necessity. Accordingly, I argue that Schelling’s conception of intuition, rather being a merely theoretical speculation, is aimed at demonstrating the immanent nature of Being, which is one of the key points in Schelling’s philosophy.

Journal of Italian Philosophy, vol. 5, 2022

In this article, I focus on Pareyson’s conception of evil, which he understands in terms of concr... more In this article, I focus on Pareyson’s conception of evil, which he understands in terms of concrete ontological reality, rather than regarding it as a sheer moral issue. After outlining Pareyson’s existential hermeneutics, which revolves around the concept of person and her constitutive relation with transcendent Being, I also show how Pareyson’s discourse on evil is strictly related to his conception of freedom and transcendence. In particular, he defines freedom as ‘beginning and choice’, that is God’s originary choice of Being over nothingness, rather than as the theoretical foundation of Being itself. Moreover, the idea of transcendence is a constant presence in Pareyson’s reflection, from the early to the mature period, and therefore even his interpretation of the questions of evil and freedom is to be considered within the theoretical framework set by his notion of transcendence. In conclusion, I demonstrate that, according to Pareyson, not only are evil and freedom inscribed in God’s transcendence, but they cannot properly be grasped and understood independently of their deeply religious implications.

L’articolo si propone di analizzare il pragmatismo di Giovanni Papini (indubbiamente il più illus... more L’articolo si propone di analizzare il pragmatismo di Giovanni Papini (indubbiamente il più illustre ed insolito dei pragmatisti italiani), riferendolo in particolar modo al rapporto con il pensiero di William James; nello specifico, si vuole mettere in luce come il rapporto tra Papini e James sia stato tanto di gradevole collaborazione quanto di reciproche influenza ed ammirazione. Per fare ciò, verranno ripercorse le tappe dello sviluppo della teoria pragmatista di Papini, evidenziandone sia il legame con la speculazione jamesiana (senza tuttavia trascurarne la componente bergsoniana) sia l’originalità e rilevanza teoretica, in grado di affermarsi anche oltre i confini nazionali

Pensatore eclettico ed irrequieto, tra gli scritti più noti di Giuseppe Rensi va indubbiamente an... more Pensatore eclettico ed irrequieto, tra gli scritti più noti di Giuseppe Rensi va indubbiamente annoverata la monografia su Spinoza, oggetto di diverse ricerche, le quali ne hanno principalmente messo in luce la genuina immediatezza e completezza ed il sincero coinvolgimento intellettuale da parte di Rensi. Questo articolo, invece, si propone di mostrare come l’analisi rensiana del pensiero di Spinoza sia a tratti imparziale ed inesatta, se non addirittura strumentalizzata da parte dello stesso Rensi, probabilmente al fine di conferire prestigio ai risultati da lui raggiunti tramite l’autorevolezza spinoziana. Si tratta quindi non di una misinterpretazione, quanto piuttosto di una sovrainterpretazione in virtù della quale Rensi, anziché riconoscere la presenza di elementi razionalisti nel suo ensiero, tenta di individuare dei fattori irrazionalisti nel pensiero di Spinoza, senza tuttavia apportarvi degli inopportuni e sostanziali stravolgimenti.

This article explores the moral philosophies of Giuseppe Rensi and Giovanni Papini, focusing par... more This article explores the moral philosophies of Giuseppe Rensi
and Giovanni Papini, focusing particularly on their existential features. In fact, both of them think that moral is not a rational product, but an irrational instinct; as such, the moral instinct is an existential exigency which impels human beings to act against the common sense's rationality and utilitarianism. In other words, because of its irrational nature, the moral instinct is a kind of madness and a virtue of genius.

Book chapters by Daniele Fulvi

L’Angelo e il Terremoto. Proposte di lettura sull’idealismo inattuale di Giuseppe Rensi, a cura di S. Ricciardelli, Roma, Aracne, 2018

Il volume ricostruisce, mediante un approccio critico–storico, la fase idealista di Giuseppe Rens... more Il volume ricostruisce, mediante un approccio critico–storico, la fase idealista di Giuseppe Rensi (1871–1941). Si ritiene che lo studio del suo idealismo sia momento essenziale per la comprensione della successiva fase scettica, alla luce della rilettura rensiana dell’idealismo hegeliano. La raccolta di lettere che Rensi ricevette da illustri corrispondenti completano la presentazione della sua figura, nel duplice intento di mostrare la vivacità intellettuale del filosofo e di valorizzare il ricco patrimonio presente nel Fondo Giuseppe Rensi, custodito presso l’Università degli Studi di Milano.

Conference Presentations by Daniele Fulvi

• Thinking at The Limit: Philosophy’s Futures, Department of Philosophy, Duquesne University, 2023

7th MAP-PENN Conference on Climate Justice, University of Pennsylvania, 2023

Organisation and coordination of the symposium and podcast series “At Risk in the Climate Crisis”... more Organisation and coordination of the symposium and podcast series “At Risk in the Climate Crisis”, at the Institute for Culture and Society at Western Sydney University (February 25, 2022)
https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/ics/events/@risk

Green Marble 2022 International Meeting on Anthropocene Studies and Ecocriticism

Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy meeting, 2021

In this talk, I show that the concept of resistance is fundamental in order to understand Schelli... more In this talk, I show that the concept of resistance is fundamental in order to understand Schelling’s early account of freedom. First, I identify resistance with Widerstand, namely with a concept implying the definition of a way of being, of an ineluctable ontological status.
Hence, I begin my analysis by focusing on Schelling’s early works – and particularly on his Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism (1795) and New Deduction of Natural Right (1796) – in order to demonstrate that the concept of resistance plays a key role in the interplay between freedom and necessity; that is, Schelling clearly argues that the resistance opposed by nature to our individual will is an essential and fundamental occurrence for us to actualise our freedom and to perform our actions and choices. Moreover, I intend to show how Schelling maintains the centrality of resistance even in his philosophy of nature, by arguing that resistance is that fundamental ontological occurrence which grounds the opposition between the basic forces of matter, and without which matter itself would not exist. Accordingly, resistance is also that material occurrence through which freedom can concretely take place in its being limited and constrained by necessity.
On these grounds, I conclude by arguing that freedom can be defined as a matter of resistance, since it arises and is made possible only through resistance itself, in the very ontological meaning of Widerstand. Indeed, such definition embodies both that freedom in its concrete occurrence cannot be separated from resistance, and that resistance operates as the ontological groundwork of both freedom and matter.

Routledge, 2024

Futures, 2024

The Anthropocene Review

Ethics, Polucy & Environment, 2023

Southern Journal of Philosophy

Critical Horizons, vol. 23, issue 1, 2022

Sophia, vol. 60, issue 4, 2021

Comparative and Continental Philosophy, vol. 14, issue 1, 2022

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 26, issue 1, 2021

Idealistic Studies, 2020

Journal of Italian Philosophy, vol. 5, 2022

L’Angelo e il Terremoto. Proposte di lettura sull’idealismo inattuale di Giuseppe Rensi, a cura di S. Ricciardelli, Roma, Aracne, 2018

• Thinking at The Limit: Philosophy’s Futures, Department of Philosophy, Duquesne University, 2023

7th MAP-PENN Conference on Climate Justice, University of Pennsylvania, 2023

Green Marble 2022 International Meeting on Anthropocene Studies and Ecocriticism

Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy meeting, 2021

Society of Italian Philosophy Conference, 2021

I critically discuss Pareyson’s interpretation of Schelling, referring specifically to Pareyson’s... more I critically discuss Pareyson’s interpretation of Schelling, referring specifically to Pareyson’s 1979 essay “Lo stupore della ragione in Schelling”. In this essay, Pareyson argues that, within Schelling’s late philosophy, the concept of awe of reason represents the moment of transition between negative and positive philosophy, i.e., between that philosophy which deals only with pure and abstract concepts and that philosophy which deals with existence in its very concreteness.
Therefore, the awe of reason has to be related to the “fundamental question of philosophy”, namely “Why is there being rather than nothingness?” However, such a relation is not to be understood in terms of sheer marveling at the mere existence of Being, but as that act through which reason discovers the pure existing being as something other than reason itself. Accordingly, Pareyson argues that for Schelling “God is the transcendent made immanent”, further remarking the transcendence of the pure existing being.
However, I argue that Pareyson’s understanding of Schelling is partial and does not grasp the meaning of Schlling’s speculation, for the following reasons. First, the concept of awe of reason is a secondary one within Schelling’s late philosophy: indeed, he grounds his discourse on negative and positive philosophy on the concept of “true being” and on the following interplay between potency and act. That is, I argue that the awe of reason can supply only a partial understanding of the ontological process that Schelling outlines throughout his entire philosophical reflection, since it essentially emphasises the ecstatic feature of Schelling’s late philosophy (which is undoubtedly a very important moment of his reflection), but without integrating it with its material aspects.
On top of that, it has to be acknowledged that Schelling defines God as “the immanent made transcendent”, that is in the exact opposite way of Pareyson’s understanding. By so doing, Pareyson inverts the terms of the question, in fact giving his statement an opposite meaning. That is, it is one thing to move from the immanent and make it transcendent (as Schelling does), and another thing to move from the transcendent and make it immanent (as Pareyson does). In the first case, it is possible to understand transcendence in an absolute sense, since it is not given in its relation with the transcended object but in its sheer existence; in the second case, conversely, transcendence cannot but be relative, since it makes sense only in its relation with that which is transcended and therefore assuming it as an absolute starting point is nothing but an arbitrary statement.
In the final analysis, I aim at showing that Schelling’s late philosophy has to be understood in continuity with his early philosophy and as an immanent ontology of nature, rather than a transcendent and religious account of being.

Daily Philosophy, 2024

Winner of the Third Prize for the 2024 Daily Philosophy Global Essay Contest. Topic: How can phil... more Winner of the Third Prize for the 2024 Daily Philosophy Global Essay Contest. Topic: How can philosophy help ensure of humanity?