Ryan S Kemp | Wheaton College (original) (raw)

Books by Ryan S Kemp

Either/Or is Kierkegaard’s first major work and arguably his most virtuosic. It introduces many o... more Either/Or is Kierkegaard’s first major work and arguably his most virtuosic. It introduces many of the most important philosophical themes that define the rest of his authorship and showcases – through its several pseudonyms and genres – Kierkegaard’s prodigious literary scope. In this Critical Guide, a diverse group of scholars strikes new ground in our understanding of both this work and Kierkegaard’s authorship as a whole. Their essays highlight the text’s philosophical range, with substantial discussions of issues in aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, phenomenology, and philosophy of religion. The volume will be essential reading for anyone seeking to deepen their understanding of Either/Or and Kierkegaard’s work more generally.

Bloomsbury Academic, 2023

In her five novels and many essays, Marilynne Robinson develops a distinctive Christian vision an... more In her five novels and many essays, Marilynne Robinson develops a distinctive Christian vision animated by a powerfully affirmative and sacramental attitude toward the physical world and everyday human life.

An in-depth philosophical exploration of her work – from Gilead to her extensive non-fiction writing – Marilynne Robinson's Worldly Gospel reads the author's theology as articulating a compelling response to the claim that Christianity is an otherworldly religion whose adherents seek through it to escape the misfortunes of this life. Ryan Kemp and Jordan Rodgers argue that Robinson's work challenges the modern atheistic tradition dating back to Friedrich Nietzsche to present a unique form of contemporary faith that seeks to affirm the world rather than deny its claims.

In his late work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Immanuel Kant struggles to answer... more In his late work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Immanuel Kant struggles to answer a straightforward, yet surprisingly difficult, question: how is radical conversion -- a complete reorientation of a person's most deeply held values -- possible? In this book, Ryan S. Kemp and Christopher Iacovetti examine how this question gets taken up by Kant's philosophical heirs: Schelling, Fichte, Hegel and Kierkegaard. More than simply developing a novel account of each thinker's position, Kemp and Iacovetti trace how each philosopher formulates his theory in response to tensions in preceding views, culminating in Kierkegaard's claim that radical conversion lies outside a person's control. Kemp and Iacovetti close by examining some of the moral-psychological implications of Kierkegaard's account, particularly the question of how someone might responsibly relate to values that have, by their own admission, been acquired in contingent and accidental fashion.

Reviews by Mark Alznauer (Review of Metaphysics), G. Anthony Bruno (Kantian Review), Steven Hoelt... more Reviews by Mark Alznauer (Review of Metaphysics), G. Anthony Bruno (Kantian Review), Steven Hoeltzel (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews), and Dan Watts (British Journal for the History of Philosophy)

Essays for Humans by Ryan S Kemp

The Hedgehog Review, 2022

A critical review of Justin E. H. Smith's book, The Internet is Not What You Think It Is.

The Hedgehog Review, 2023

Some reflections on beauty's role in appreciating the goodness of life (in critical conversation ... more Some reflections on beauty's role in appreciating the goodness of life (in critical conversation with Nick Riggle's "This Beauty: A Philosophy of Being Alive" (2022).)

Zeal: A Journal for the Liberal Arts, 2023

Reflection on what it might look like to teach philosophy (or anything really) with love as one's... more Reflection on what it might look like to teach philosophy (or anything really) with love as one's end.

Zeal: A Journal for the Liberal Arts, 2022

An existentialist critique of David Benatar's anti-natalism.

The Daily Ant

Invited contribution to the blog The Daily Ant for their recurring segment “Philosophy Phridays.”... more Invited contribution to the blog The Daily Ant for their recurring segment “Philosophy Phridays.” See the published version at:
dailyant.com/2017/08/25/philosophy-phriday-the-existential-upshot-of-crazy-ants/

Taking Kierkegaard Personally: First Person Responses , 2020

This essay investigates why Kierkegaard hates professors (particularly of the assistant variety) ... more This essay investigates why Kierkegaard hates professors (particularly of the assistant variety) and asks what might be done to address his worries. I look especially at the issues of job security (particularly the chasing of it) and the academy's distaste for ambiguity. As I consider these topics I interweave gratuitous personal reflections on my own assistant professor-ish experience.

Kierkegaard by Ryan S Kemp

Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook

In a now classic paper, Karen Carr argues that Kierkegaard is a religious “anti-rationalist”: He ... more In a now classic paper, Karen Carr argues that Kierkegaard is a religious “anti-rationalist”: He holds that reason and religious truth exist in necessary tension with one another. Carr maintains that this antagonism is not a matter of the logical incoherence of Christianity, but rather the fact that genuine submission to Christ precludes approaching him through demonstration. In this essay, we argue that while Kierkegaard is in fact an anti-rationalist, the literature has failed to appreciate the full strength of his position. It is not just that reason and obedience are in tension; rather, Kierkegaard holds the stronger view that reason is actively offended by Christianity’s primary claims. Not only is reason incapable of generating any positive evidence for the truth of Christianity, more radically, it provides evidence against it. In order to make this case, we offer a close reading of Practice in Christianity, developing a typology of Kierkegaard’s account of Christ’s “offense.” Finally, having motivated Kierkegaard’s strong anti-rationalism, we consider why, on his account, anyone would want to be a Christian.

Kant and the Possibility of Progress (U. of Penn. Press, eds. Sam Stoner and Paul Wilford)

In this chapter I argue that Kierkegaard offers a unique account of the highest good that combine... more In this chapter I argue that Kierkegaard offers a unique account of the highest good that combines elements from Kant's and Hegel's respective formulations. In short, Kierkegaard thinks that faith in a personal and loving God allows a person to experience " happiness " in the present because only it makes possible deep and stable gratitude for one's life.

The Review of Metaphysics, 2021

Many people seem to think that if a direct connection can be made between a person’s lifestyle an... more Many people seem to think that if a direct connection can be made between a person’s lifestyle and severe depression, then that person has good, perhaps even sufficient, reason to make a radical life change. This very thought has prevailed amongst readers of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or who take it for granted that the aesthetic pseudonym of part one (“A”) announces the failure of his life view precisely in his confession of severe melancholy. This essay challenges this reasoning by showing how, according to Kierkegaard, reflective characters like A actually use their depression to further entrench themselves within aestheticism. They use moods like depression to color their immediate environment, giving rise to an ever-increasing supply of interesting experiences.

The Kierkegaardian Mind (Routledge; eds Buben, Helms, and Stokes), 2018

I argue that (i) an adequate interpretation of Fear and Trembling’s notion of a ‘teleological sus... more I argue that (i) an adequate interpretation of Fear and Trembling’s notion of a ‘teleological suspension of the ethical’ must characterize it as a move that Hegel cannot endorse and (ii) a recent and influential interpretation fails to do this. It fails because it misunderstands the scope of ‘Hegelian ethics’. While the latter is instantiated in concrete historical communities, not all historical communities are ‘ethical’ in the relevant sense. Even Hegel thinks that some people (so-called ‘world historical agents’) can justifiably transgress local ethical norms. This makes the world historical agent an important test case. If Abraham’s suspension of the ethical is not distinct from Napoleon’s, then Hegel can do precisely what the author of Fear and Trembling so vehemently denies: he can account for Abraham.

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2018

Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook

In this essay, I attempt to carve out interpretive space for a so-called “straightforward” readin... more In this essay, I attempt to carve out interpretive space for a so-called “straightforward” reading of Fear and Trembling. Toward this end, I argue that recent attempts to challenge the reliability of Johannes de Silentio and/or emphasize the presence of a “hidden message” succeed, in large part, by: (1) misconstruing the goals and method of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication and (2) relying too heavily on elements of the text that lend only circumstantial support to their interpretation. Given this, interpreters should be considerably more open to the possibility that Kierkegaard means what Fear and Trembling explicitly says.

Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: Volume 17, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series

Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, 2015

Bloomsbury Academic, 2023

The Hedgehog Review, 2022

A critical review of Justin E. H. Smith's book, The Internet is Not What You Think It Is.

The Hedgehog Review, 2023

Zeal: A Journal for the Liberal Arts, 2023

Zeal: A Journal for the Liberal Arts, 2022

An existentialist critique of David Benatar's anti-natalism.

The Daily Ant

Taking Kierkegaard Personally: First Person Responses , 2020

Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook

Kant and the Possibility of Progress (U. of Penn. Press, eds. Sam Stoner and Paul Wilford)

The Review of Metaphysics, 2021

The Kierkegaardian Mind (Routledge; eds Buben, Helms, and Stokes), 2018

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2018

Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook

Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: Volume 17, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources series

Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, 2015

British Journal for the History of Philosophy , 2017

European Journal of Philosophy, 2018

In this essay I argue that Kant holds one of the following two theses: a promise to do something ... more In this essay I argue that Kant holds one of the following two theses: a promise to do something that violates the moral law (i) is impossible or (ii) can be conscientiously broken. On this issue I put Kant in dialogue with Moses Mendelssohn in order to show, against recent suggestions, that Kant’s account is distinctly Mendelssohnian.

European Journal of Philosophy, 2018

In the final section of the Groundwork Kant famously declares that “a free will and a will under ... more In the final section of the Groundwork Kant famously declares that “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” Though this claim is put to use in Kant’s eventual deduction of the moral law, it appears to introduce a difficulty of its own: it complicates Kant’s ability to describe immoral action as free action. Over the last three decades, no scholar has done more to exonerate Kant from this apparent problem than Henry Allison. Allison’s chief strategy has been to show (i) that the volitional apparatus (i.e., the executive will) Kant develops in his late Religion is present from the beginning of the critical project and (ii) that this apparatus dissolves the apparent worry. In this paper I argue that even if Allison succeeds in establishing (i), it puts him no closer to establishing (ii). In doing so, I revive a version of the so-called “no-bad-action problem” by showing that Kant is committed to the idea that agents never act out of character.

European Journal of Philosophy , 2018

In the A-preface of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant kindly warns his readers to pay special atte... more In the A-preface of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant kindly warns his readers to pay special attention to the chapter on the “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.” Looking to mitigate the reader’s effort, Kant goes on to explain the chapter’s methodology, suggesting that the inquiry will have “two sides.” One side deals with the “objective validity” of the pure categories of the understanding; he calls this the “objective deduction.” The other deals with the powers of cognition on which the understanding rests; he calls this the “subjective deduction.” Having gone to such great lengths to outline his method ahead of time, it comes as no small surprise that the actual chapter offers no clear indication of where the two deductions are located. In this essay, I address this puzzle. On the way, I engage with both traditional and recent interpretations of the subjective deduction, arguing that they fail—in one way or another—to satisfy the criteria that Kant develops in the preface.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy , 2017

In Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant claims that all human beings are originall... more In Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant claims that all human beings are originally and radically evil: they choose to adopt a ‘supreme maxim’ that gives preference to sensibility over the moral law. Because Kant thinks that all agents have a duty to develop good character, part of his task in the Religion is to explain how moral conversion is possible. Four years after Kant publishes the Religion, J. G. Fichte takes up the issue of conversion in slightly different terms: he is interested in how people he characterizes as ‘dogmatists’ (those who minimize or deny their status as free agents) become ‘idealist’ (those who recognize and exercise their freedom). Against recent interpreters, I argue that Fichte characterizes the choice to convert from dogmatism to idealism as one that is grounded in a non-rational choice. Along the way, I consider Daniel Breazeale's and Allen Wood’s recent arguments to the contrary, alternative accounts of what it might mean for a conversion to count as ‘rational’, and how well my conclusion harmonizes with Fichte’s views on education.

Rethinking Kant: Volume 3

In this paper I explore how three seemingly incompatible Kantian theses–a libertarian notion of f... more In this paper I explore how three seemingly incompatible Kantian theses–a libertarian notion of freedom, the inscrutability of one’s fundamental moral maxim, and the ubiquity of evil–can each be maintained without contradiction. I do this by arguing against the popular notion that in his 'Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,' Kant attributes 'radical evil' to all human beings.

History of Philosophy Quarterly , 2017

In § 38 of the third Critique, Kant provides a deduction for judgments of taste that purports to ... more In § 38 of the third Critique, Kant provides a deduction for judgments of taste that purports to ground the universal validity of aesthetic judgments. The deduction is remarkably brief and—if Kant’s own evaluation can be trusted—relatively “easy.” Recently, some have worried that Kant’s deduction may be rather too easy, suggesting that it is not sufficient to prove that particular objects must always produce the same response in those who encounter them (sometimes called the “particularity problem”). In this essay, I argue that Kant’s deduction is sufficient on its own, that is, valid without appeal to any premises not explicitly employed in the deduction itself.

Educational Theory, 2020

In this essay, I make an unlikely case for a certain kind of value stability, arguing that people... more In this essay, I make an unlikely case for a certain kind of value stability, arguing that people should almost never aspire to become radically different and that, given this, some people should be reluctant to pursue educational experiences that wildly broaden their life possibilities. My account is developed and structured around two borrowed examples, one literary and the other historical. Wendell Berry, his novel Hannah Coulter in particular, is the source of the first example; Jonathan Lear, specifically the case of Native American resettlement he develops in Radical Hope, provides the second. The essay contains three parts structured around three related ideas. Part one explores the rationality of wanting to be a different person. Part two explores the rationality of wanting to be the same person while doing entirely different things. And part three explores the rationality of desiring an education that teaches you to be suspicious of being anything in particular.

Res Philosophica, Apr 2015

In this paper, I argue that cases of radical self- transformation (cases in which an agent willfu... more In this paper, I argue that cases of radical self- transformation (cases in which an agent willfully changes a foundational element of their motivational structure) constitute an important philosophical puzzle. Though our inclination to hold people responsible for such changes suggests that we regard radical transformation as (in some sense) self-determined, it is difficult to conceive how a transformation that extends to the heart of an agent’s practical life can be attributed to the agent at all. While I contend that the best way to solve this puzzle is to deny that radical transformations are in fact self-determined, many maintain the opposite. The defense of my thesis involves showing how the conditions that must be met in order to coherently attribute transformation to an agent are not satisfied in cases of radical transformation. Radical transformation is, thus, something that happens to an agent, not something that is done by her.

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Philip Kitcher has recently worried that the New Atheists, by mounting an attack against religion... more Philip Kitcher has recently worried that the New Atheists, by mounting an attack against religion tout court, risk alienating a large swath of ‘religious’ people whose way of life is, to Kitcher’s mind, innocuous. Encouraging a more moderate response, Kitcher thinks certain non-threatening modes of religious existence should be protected. In this paper, I argue that while Kitcher’s attempt to provide balance to the secularism debate is a great service, he ultimately fails to distinguish innocuous modes of religious belief from more threatening modes, a failing that allows the debate to return to its previous extremes. In drawing attention to the shortcomings of Kitcher’s approach, I make the humanist’s argumentative burden explicit: the defender of a ‘moderate’ secular humanism must show that people who arrange their lives around belief in a transcendent being are more likely to do ethical harm than those that don’t.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ABSTRACT Hegel famously accuses Christianity of ‘unhappy consciousness’: it has a normative goal ... more ABSTRACT Hegel famously accuses Christianity of ‘unhappy consciousness’: it has a normative goal – union with the divine – that it cannot, in principle, satisfy. Kierkegaard was intimately aware of this criticism and, unlike some of Hegel’s other accusations, takes it seriously. In this paper my co-author and I investigate the way in which Kierkegaard addresses this issue in two texts published in 1843: Fear and Trembling and ‘The Expectancy of Faith’. We are especially interested in how the two texts describe faith’s relationship to finitude: for instance, whether the person of faith is permitted to expect that God will bless her in particular and concrete ways. My co-author and I offer competing interpretations. I argue that there is a deep tension in the way faith is described in the two texts; my co-author argues that there is consonance.