Maria Gallego | Wilfrid Laurier University (original) (raw)
Papers by Maria Gallego
A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election... more A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties ’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge. 122
This edited conference volume is another from Springer on the Studies in Political Economy under ... more This edited conference volume is another from Springer on the Studies in Political Economy under the editorship of Prof. Norman Schofield, the Dr. William Taussig Professor of Political Economy Professor, Department of Political Science at Washington University. Political Economy is a fast growing field that uses the logic of economics to study issues pertaining to politics and governance and of which Prof. Schofield has been one the most prolific contributors over the last four decades. This volume brings together the papers presented at the Political Economy of Governance, Institutions and Elections workshop that took place in Baiona, Spain in April 2014. Political Economy is a vast and growing field as such this volume is only representative of the many issues and the modelling techniques—both theoretical and empirical—used to address them. The topics and issues addressed in this volume span a great variety of subjects covering—as the title indicates—issues dealing with governanc...
Elections - A Global Perspective, Feb 6, 2019
Articles, 2017
Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur le positionnement des partis politiques dans des es... more Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur le positionnement des partis politiques dans des espaces uni- et multidimensionnels. Tout au long de ce document, nous faisons l’hypothèse que deux partis s’affrontent dans le cadre d’une élection et s’engagent à tenir leurs promesses électorales une fois élus. Cette étude souligne l’importance de trois hypothèses de modélisation : (i) l’influence du type d’incertitude sur l’issue électorale, (ii) l’objectif des partis politiques (objectif électoraliste – qui consiste à maximiser l’espérance du nombre de voix reçues ou la probabilité de gagner les élections – objectif idéologique – fondé sur les programmes politiques – ou les deux), et (iii) les préférences des électeurs (dans quelle mesure ceux-ci se soucient de l’identité des partis au-delà de la politique mise en place par le vainqueur).
Equality in the Nordic World, 2021
Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An... more Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. Though agreements favor the legislative representative least willing to compromise, agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.
We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni - and multidimensional po... more We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni - and multidimensional policy spaces. We keep throughout the survey the assumption that there is an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. The survey stresses the importance of three modeling assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in election results, (ii) the parties'objectives (electoral - maximizing their expected vote share, or their probability of winning the elections'policy oriented or both), and (iii) the voters'preferences(if and how they care for parties beyond the policies implemented by the winner).
Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electora... more Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper o¤ers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are di¤erentiated by di¤ering valences-the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a convergence coe¢ cient, de ned in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in reponse to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centri...
We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates use the ... more We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates use the campaign contributions they receive from special interest groups (SIGs) to run their electoral campaign. Prior to the election, candidates announce their policy platforms and advertising (ad) campaigns and use the contributions of SIGs to generate two SIG valences to enhance their electoral valence. Voters have preferences over candidatespolicies relative to their ideal policy and over candidatesad messages relative to their ideal message frequency, their campaign tolerance level. Voterschoices are also inuenced by two endogenous SIG valences: one associated with candidates policy platform, the other with the candidates ad campaign. Citizensvotes also depend on their sociodemographic characteristics and candidatestraits and competences. Candidatescritical policy and ad campaign are a weak local Nash equilibrium (LNE) of the election if the expected vote shares of all candidates ...
Policies in sub-national jurisdictions are the result of bargaining between government formateurs... more Policies in sub-national jurisdictions are the result of bargaining between government formateurs in three-party two-tier parliamentary system. A sub-national election determines the composition of the legislature. The chosen sub-national formateur bargains with its national counterpart over an intergovernmental policy. The agreement is taken to both legislatures for ratification. In equilibrium, policy depends on the identity and majority status of both formateurs, on their preferences and on the status quo policy. Through their choice of sub-national formateurs voters influence the intergovernmental policies. The degree of balancing depends on the chosen formateur and may be closer to the coalition partner’s ideal policy.
Studies in Political Economy, 2016
Leadership or Chaos, 2011
It was no accident that the most important cosmologist after Ptolemy of Alexandria was Nicolaus C... more It was no accident that the most important cosmologist after Ptolemy of Alexandria was Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), born only a decade before Martin Luther. Both attacked orthodoxy in different ways.
Leadership or Chaos, 2011
Much discussion in recent years has focused on why North America was able to follow Britain in a ... more Much discussion in recent years has focused on why North America was able to follow Britain in a path of economic development, but Latin America and the Caribbean islands, though generally far richer initially, fell behind in the nineteenth century. In their discussion of Latin American economic development, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) have emphasized the different factor endowments of North and South America.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011
Typescript: Washington University, 2009
Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electora... more Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political diver' gence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where ...
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2015
Many formal models suggest that parties or candidates should locate at the electoral mean. Yet, t... more Many formal models suggest that parties or candidates should locate at the electoral mean. Yet, there is no consistent evidence of such convergence across political systems. Schofield’s (2007) Valence Theorem proves that when valence differences across parties are large, there is non-convergence to the mean. Convergence to the mean depends on the value of the convergence coefficient, c. When c is high there is significant centrifugal tendency acting on the parties and when c is low there is a significant centripetal tendency acting on the parties. In this paper we apply the stochastic valence model of elections in various countries under different political regimes and use the convergence coefficient of these elections to classify political systems. Our results show that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries using the same political system and across political regimes. For countries using proportional representation, namely Israel, Turkey...
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016
An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 2015
ABSTRACT Abstract will be provided by author.
A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election... more A policy is the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. With heterogeneous parties, agreements and electoral outcomes depend on the concavity of the utility functions of negotiators and on the relative location of their ideal policies, i.e., depend on the negotiators willingness to compromise. Agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties ’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge. 122
This edited conference volume is another from Springer on the Studies in Political Economy under ... more This edited conference volume is another from Springer on the Studies in Political Economy under the editorship of Prof. Norman Schofield, the Dr. William Taussig Professor of Political Economy Professor, Department of Political Science at Washington University. Political Economy is a fast growing field that uses the logic of economics to study issues pertaining to politics and governance and of which Prof. Schofield has been one the most prolific contributors over the last four decades. This volume brings together the papers presented at the Political Economy of Governance, Institutions and Elections workshop that took place in Baiona, Spain in April 2014. Political Economy is a vast and growing field as such this volume is only representative of the many issues and the modelling techniques—both theoretical and empirical—used to address them. The topics and issues addressed in this volume span a great variety of subjects covering—as the title indicates—issues dealing with governanc...
Elections - A Global Perspective, Feb 6, 2019
Articles, 2017
Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur le positionnement des partis politiques dans des es... more Cet article passe en revue la littérature sur le positionnement des partis politiques dans des espaces uni- et multidimensionnels. Tout au long de ce document, nous faisons l’hypothèse que deux partis s’affrontent dans le cadre d’une élection et s’engagent à tenir leurs promesses électorales une fois élus. Cette étude souligne l’importance de trois hypothèses de modélisation : (i) l’influence du type d’incertitude sur l’issue électorale, (ii) l’objectif des partis politiques (objectif électoraliste – qui consiste à maximiser l’espérance du nombre de voix reçues ou la probabilité de gagner les élections – objectif idéologique – fondé sur les programmes politiques – ou les deux), et (iii) les préférences des électeurs (dans quelle mesure ceux-ci se soucient de l’identité des partis au-delà de la politique mise en place par le vainqueur).
Equality in the Nordic World, 2021
Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An... more Policy is modeled as the outcome of negotiations between two three-party parliamentary states. An election in jurisdiction A determines the composition of the legislature that selects a representative to negotiate an intergovernmental policy agreement with the representative from the legislature of jurisdiction B. Negotiations are modeled using Nash’s (1950) bargaining framework, modified to account for a simultaneous legislative ratification vote. Though agreements favor the legislative representative least willing to compromise, agreements between the bargainers may not follow the ordering of the parties’ ideal policies. An electoral outcome where support for the center party comes from extreme voters may emerge.
We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni - and multidimensional po... more We survey the literature on the positioning of political parties in uni - and multidimensional policy spaces. We keep throughout the survey the assumption that there is an exogenous number of parties who commit to implement their policy proposals once elected. The survey stresses the importance of three modeling assumptions: (i) the source of uncertainty in election results, (ii) the parties'objectives (electoral - maximizing their expected vote share, or their probability of winning the elections'policy oriented or both), and (iii) the voters'preferences(if and how they care for parties beyond the policies implemented by the winner).
Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electora... more Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper o¤ers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are di¤erentiated by di¤ering valences-the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a convergence coe¢ cient, de ned in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in reponse to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centri...
We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates use the ... more We provide a stochastic electoral model of the US Presidential election where candidates use the campaign contributions they receive from special interest groups (SIGs) to run their electoral campaign. Prior to the election, candidates announce their policy platforms and advertising (ad) campaigns and use the contributions of SIGs to generate two SIG valences to enhance their electoral valence. Voters have preferences over candidatespolicies relative to their ideal policy and over candidatesad messages relative to their ideal message frequency, their campaign tolerance level. Voterschoices are also inuenced by two endogenous SIG valences: one associated with candidates policy platform, the other with the candidates ad campaign. Citizensvotes also depend on their sociodemographic characteristics and candidatestraits and competences. Candidatescritical policy and ad campaign are a weak local Nash equilibrium (LNE) of the election if the expected vote shares of all candidates ...
Policies in sub-national jurisdictions are the result of bargaining between government formateurs... more Policies in sub-national jurisdictions are the result of bargaining between government formateurs in three-party two-tier parliamentary system. A sub-national election determines the composition of the legislature. The chosen sub-national formateur bargains with its national counterpart over an intergovernmental policy. The agreement is taken to both legislatures for ratification. In equilibrium, policy depends on the identity and majority status of both formateurs, on their preferences and on the status quo policy. Through their choice of sub-national formateurs voters influence the intergovernmental policies. The degree of balancing depends on the chosen formateur and may be closer to the coalition partner’s ideal policy.
Studies in Political Economy, 2016
Leadership or Chaos, 2011
It was no accident that the most important cosmologist after Ptolemy of Alexandria was Nicolaus C... more It was no accident that the most important cosmologist after Ptolemy of Alexandria was Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), born only a decade before Martin Luther. Both attacked orthodoxy in different ways.
Leadership or Chaos, 2011
Much discussion in recent years has focused on why North America was able to follow Britain in a ... more Much discussion in recent years has focused on why North America was able to follow Britain in a path of economic development, but Latin America and the Caribbean islands, though generally far richer initially, fell behind in the nineteenth century. In their discussion of Latin American economic development, Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) have emphasized the different factor endowments of North and South America.
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011
Typescript: Washington University, 2009
Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electora... more Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political diver' gence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where ...
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2015
Many formal models suggest that parties or candidates should locate at the electoral mean. Yet, t... more Many formal models suggest that parties or candidates should locate at the electoral mean. Yet, there is no consistent evidence of such convergence across political systems. Schofield’s (2007) Valence Theorem proves that when valence differences across parties are large, there is non-convergence to the mean. Convergence to the mean depends on the value of the convergence coefficient, c. When c is high there is significant centrifugal tendency acting on the parties and when c is low there is a significant centripetal tendency acting on the parties. In this paper we apply the stochastic valence model of elections in various countries under different political regimes and use the convergence coefficient of these elections to classify political systems. Our results show that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries using the same political system and across political regimes. For countries using proportional representation, namely Israel, Turkey...
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016
An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource, 2015
ABSTRACT Abstract will be provided by author.