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Scientific Polysemy, Semantic Detoxification, and Sophisticated Operationalism *

2022

Two commonplace phenomena of scientific practice have been taken to challenge operationalism. I provide a version of operationalism that, in fact, explains these phenomena: scientific polysemy and semantic detoxification. Scientific polysemy is generated by cases of semantic extension: the extension of the usage of old terminology in new theoretical or experimental regimes. The changes in the usage of that terminology result in polysemy. Semantic detoxification follows semantic extension’s resul-tant polysemy; it is a reconciliation of novel and past usages. The new usage takes priority over older uses in the novel context, correcting and circumscribing old usages in their native contexts. Focusing on the case of quantity terms, I present a holist operationalism that explains both phenomena: Multiple meanings arise because of differences in the relation of some quantity to other quantities; Multiple meanings are unified into one term because the functional roles determined by these ...

Scientific theories, models, and the semantic approach

Principia, 2007

The world science describes tends to have a very strange look. We can't see atoms or force fields, nor are they imaginable within visualizable categories, so neither can we even imagine what the world must be like according to recent physical theories. That tension, between what science depicts as reality and how things appear to us, though it is more striking now, has been with us since modern science began. It can be addressed, and perhaps alleviated by inquiring into how science represents nature. In general, representation is selective, the selection is of what is relevant to the purpose at hand, and success may even require distortion. From this point of view, the constraint on science, that it must 'save the phenomena', takes on a new form. The question to be faced is how the perspectival character of the appearances (that is, contents of measurement outcomes) can be related to the hidden structure that the sciences postulate. In the competing interpretations of quantum mechanics we can see how certain traditional ideals and constraints are left behind. Specifically, Carlo Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics offers a probative example of the freedom of scientific representation. Abstract Bas van Fraassen endorses both common-sense realism -the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do existand constructive empiricism -the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common-sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a mental monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common-sense realism or would want to give up science.

Two Styles of Reasoning in Scientific Practices: Experimental and Mathematical Traditions

This article outlines a philosophy of science in practice that focuses on the engineering sciences. A methodological issue is that these practices seem to be divided by two different styles of scientific reasoning, namely, causal-mechanistic and mathematical reasoning. These styles are philosophically characterized by what Kuhn called ‘disciplinary matrices’. Due to distinct metaphysical background pictures and/or distinct ideas of what counts as intelligible, they entail distinct ideas of the character of phenomena and what counts as a scientific explanation. It is argued that the two styles cannot be reduced to each other. At the same time, although they are incompatible, they must not be regarded as competing. Instead, they produce different kinds of epistemic results, which serve different kinds of epistemic functions. Moreover, some scientific breakthroughs essentially result from relating them. This view of complementary styles of scientific reasoning is supported by pluralism about metaphysical background pictures.

A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding

Synthese, 2005

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions. Synthese (2005) 144: 137-170

Scientific Detoxification, Semantic Detoxification, Sophisticated Operationalism

Two commonplace phenomena of scientific practice have been taken to challenge operationalism. I provide a version of operationalism that, in fact, explains these phenomena: scientific polysemy and semantic detoxi- fication. Scientific polysemy is generated by cases of semantic extension: the extension of the usage of old terminology in new theoretical or ex- perimental regimes. The changes in the usage of that terminology result in polysemy. Semantic detoxification follows semantic extension’s resul- tant polysemy; it is a reconciliation of novel and past usages. The new usage takes priority over older uses in the novel context, correcting and circumscribing old usages in their native contexts. Focusing on the case of quantity terms, I present a holist operationalism that explains both phe- nomena: Multiple meanings arise because of differences in the relation of some quantity to other quantities; Multiple meanings are unified into one term because the functional roles determined by these meanings all share analogous positions in the different contexts, specified by the quantity dimension.

Conceptual Analysis in the Philosophy of Science

Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Conceptual analysis as a method of inquiry has long enjoyed popularity in analytic philosophy, including the philosophy of science. In this article I offer a perspective on the ways in which the method of conceptual analysis has been used, and distinguish two broad kinds, namely philosophical and empirical conceptual analysis. In so doing I outline a historical trend in which non-naturalized approaches to conceptual analysis are being replaced by a variety of naturalized approaches. I outline the basic characteristics of these approaches with illustrative examples, arguing that recent developments in the philosophy of science show that in order to achieve a more adequate understanding of scientific endeavour we need to prioritize the naturalized accounts of the method.

Understanding Scientific Practices: The Role of Robustness Notions

Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2012

This article explores the role of 'robustness-notions' in an account of the engineering sciences. The engineering sciences aim at technological production of, and intervention with phenomena relevant to the (dis-)functioning of materials and technological devices, by means of scientific understanding thereof. It is proposed that different kinds of robustness-notions enable and guide scientific research: (1) Robustness is as a metaphysical belief that we have about the physical world-i.e., we believe that the world is robust in the sense that the same physical conditions will always produce the same effects. (2) 'Same conditions-same effects' functions as a regulative principle that enables and guides scientific research because it points to, and justifies methodological notions. (3) Repetition, variance and multiple-determination function as methodological criteria for scientific methods that justify the acceptance of epistemological and ontological results. (4) Reproducibility and stability function as ontological criteria for the acceptance of phenomena described by A→B. (5) Reliability functions as an epistemological criterion for the acceptance of epistemological results, in particular lawlike knowledge of a conditional form: "A→B, provided C device , and unless other known and/or unknown causally relevant conditions." The crucial question is how different kinds of robustnessnotions are related and how they play their part in the production and acceptance of scientific results. Focus is on production and acceptance of physical phenomena and the rule-like knowledge thereof. Based on an analysis of how philosoophy of science tradtionally justified scientific knowledge, I propose a general schema that specifies how inferences to the claim that a scientific result has a certain epistemological property (such as truth) are justified by scientific methods that meet specific methodological criteria. It is proposed that 'same conditionssame effects' as a regulative criterion justifies 'repetition, variation and multipledetermination' as methodological criteria for the production and acceptance of (ontological and epistemological) scientific results.

On Inter-Theoretic Relations and Scientific Realism

This thesis addresses three contemporary debates in the philosophy of science: namely, scientific realism, emergence, and theoretical equivalence. The thesis brings logico-semantic tools of the analytic tradition--about syntactic and semantic construals of theories, and about extensions and intensions--to bear on these debates. The thesis has two parts: Part I (Chapters 1-3) lays out the overall framework about scientific theories, scientific realism, and emergence. Part II (Chapters 4-6) develops more detailed themes. Part I first gives a conception of a scientific theory (Chapter 1), using logico-semantic tools that will be used in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 then brings these tools to bear on the debate about scientific realism, by construing the continuity of theories as a matter of extensions. The resulting position is a modest scientific realism, according to which one is justified in believing what confirmed theories say about extensions but not, in general, about intensions. I dub it 'extensional scientific realism'. Chapter 3 proposes an account of the distinction between ontological and epistemic emergence, based on an explication of the notion of 'novel reference'. The ontological emergence of one theory from another is defined as the failure of an appropriate linkage map between the two theories to "mesh" with the two theories' interpretations. In Part II, Chapter 4 first develops a notion of theoretical equivalence, and introduces duality in physics, as an appropriate isomorphism between theories. The Chapter discusses the relation between duality and theoretical equivalence in philosophy of science. Chapter 5 discusses the heuristic roles of dualities in theory construction. It develops a distinction between the theoretical and heuristic functions of scientific theories, and illustrates the heuristic function of duality in theory construction. Chapter 6 discusses how theories without a spacetime can lead to scientific understanding. To this end, the Chapter describes three theoretical tools that are often used in theory construction and which lead to understanding, both in cases with and cases without straightforward spacetime visualisation.