Taking the mystery away from shared intentionality: The straightforward view and its empirical implications (original) (raw)

Viewing others as equals: The non-cognitive roots of shared intentionality

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2018

( Download final version at https://bit.ly/2uF2SLi ) We propose two adjustments to the classic view of shared intentionality (our capacity to share mental states of various sorts) as based on conceptual-level cognitive skills. The first one takes into account the fact that infants and young children display this capacity, but lack conceptual-level cognitive skills. The second one seeks to integrate cognitive and non-cognitive skills into that capacity. This second adjustment is motivated by two facts. First, there is an enormous difference between human infants and our closest living primate relatives with respect to the range and scale of goal sharing and cooperation. Second, recent evidence suggests that there are hardly any differences in their mental-state attribution capacities. We argue therefore that our distinctively human capacity for shared intentionality is due to the effect on our cognitive skills of a (probably inborn) practical attitude. Accordingly, we propose that cognitive and practical skills, working together, produce our capacity for shared intentionality, and review evidence suggesting that the practical skill in question consists in the ability to adopt an attitude of equality.

The Non-Problem of the Other Minds: A Neurodevelopmental Perspective on Shared Intentionality

Human Development, 2008

In this paper, we combine neurological and developmental evidences in order to differentiate between two levels of sharing: dyadic sharing, virtually present from birth and depending on the activation of shared representation, and triadic sharing, requiring that agents not only share a common representation, but also represent complementary perspectives. Mirror neurons are proposed as a fundamental mechanism to account for dyadic sharing, explaining why infants are able to interact symmetrically and contingently with others from very early on in infancy. In the second part of this paper, we reinterpret the 9-month revolution as a revolution in sharedness: the transition from dyadic sharing to triadic sharing. The neural event which renders this transition possible might be the emergence of a basic mechanism that allows the attribution of actions and intentions to their owner. We suggest two neuronal networks possibly responsible for the shift to triadic sharing.

Rethinking Human Development and the Shared Intentionality Hypothesis

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2020

In his recent book "Becoming Human" Michael Tomasello delivers an updated version of his shared intentionality (SI) account of uniquely human cognition. More so than in earlier writings, the author embraces the idea that SI shapes not just our social cognition but all domains of thought and emotion. In this critical essay, we center on three parts of his theory. The first is that children allegedly have to earn the status of "second persons" through the acquisition of collective intentionality at age 3. We make the case that humans take a second-personal stance toward others even as infants. The second point concerns Tomasello's claim that 3-year-olds are group-minded and think in terms of "us" vs. "them". We doubt both that children this young have a clear overview of their in-and out-groups and that they possess the "agonistic spirit" necessary for inter-group competition. Third, due to his focus on collective intentionality and how it might explain 3-year-olds' difficulties with theory of mind problems, Tomasello appears to pay less attention to the crucial conceptual change that allows 4-to 5-year-olds to master such tasks.

A second-person approach cannot explain intentionality in social understanding

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2013

A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-directed action.

Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant

… of the Twentieth Annual Conference of …, 1998

From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. In order to solve the resulting dilemma, we propose that certain specific components of an agent's cognitive architecture (namely, a peculiar version of sharedness and communicative intention), are necessary and sufficient to explain infant communication in a mentalist framework. We also argue that these components are innate in the human species.

Sharedness and privateness in human early social life

Cognitive Systems Research, 2006

This research is concerned with the innate predispositions underlying human intentional communication. Human communication is currently defined as a circular and overt attempt to modify a partner's mental states. This requires each party involved to possess the ability to represent and understand the other's mental states, a capability which is commonly referred to as mindreading, or theory of mind (ToM). The relevant experimental literature agrees that no such capability is to be found in the human species at least during the first year of life, and possibly later. This paper aims at advancing a solution to this theoretical problem. We propose to consider sharedness as the basis for intentional communication in the infant and to view it as a primitive, innate component of her cognitive architecture. Communication can then build upon the mental grounds that the infant takes as shared with her caregivers. We view this capability as a theory of mind in a weak sense.