The Rise of Western Rationalism: Paul Feyerabend’s Story (original) (raw)
Related papers
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1977
I like to say there is no scientific method as such, but rather only the free and utmost use of intelligence.P.W. BridgmanIt is generally believed—see, for example, Lakatos, Dorling, Koertge, Gellner, and Finnocchiaro—that Feyerabend is committed to the view that science is an essentially irrational enterprise. In this paper, I argue initially that this is so only if Feyerabend is saddled with an unreasonable notion of rationality. Next, I point out, first, that there is a reasonable notion of rationality which is compatible with Feyerabend's non-method ‘anything goes’; and, second, that unless coupled with some form of rationalism this non-method is obviously and trivially false.
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2010
Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On the contrary, I discuss recent developments in philosophy that approach the issue from a number of new directions, changing our understanding of reasoning and rationality. I argue that, in comparing the diviner to the scientist, focusing on reasoning is likely to be a red herring. Instead, I argue that a careful treatment of rationality, paying particular attention to its context-dependence, untangles longstanding confusions. Moreover, it points the way forward to investigating modest but interesting ways for there to be alternative standards of rationality.
Science, Religion, and Rationality: A Neo-Hegelian Approach, Toronto Journal of Theology, 2013
The paper argues that identifying rational action with action undertaken for a reason yields Popper's well-known identification of rationality with criticism. However, it is also shown, pace Popper, to yield a strong form of normative framework dependency of the kind critical rationalists notoriously reject. But deeming rationality to be framework dependent, it argues further, raises the particularly exasperating problem of the very possibility of rational framework replacement. If the normative framework to which one is committed is presupposed in critical reasoning, how can one ever have normative reason to replace it? The first part of the paper briefly discusses the problem and some of the attempts to solve it, while arguing for an alternative approach. The second part, explores some of the consequences of adopting such an approach first for the historiography of scientific framework transitions, and finally for the theology of inter and intra-religious dialogue, with special reference to what might be termed the confrontational theology of the rabbinic literature of late antiquity.
Feyerabend, Critique of Rationality in Science
Draft only, final version in Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 1, Sage Publications: 357-360., 2013
An Encyclopedia entry on Feyerabend which focuses on his critique of rationalist views of science.
Riffing on Feyerabend: Direct Observation, Paraconsistent Logic and a Research Immanent Account of the Rationality of Science, 2023
Feyerabend's work, particularly his early papers contain important insights into the nature of science and scientific progress. I discuss his insights into the limits of empiricist foundationalism and positivism. I explain how the work of a number of philosophers has borne out Feyerabend's claims in startling and interesting ways. Nevertheless, I criticise Feyerabend's move from his attack on universal method to relativism. I point out that Feyerabend never confronted a well-developed research immanent view of the rationality of scientific change, which shows the limitations of the arguments in Against Method.