"Ancient Skepticism: The Skeptical Academy," Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 259–266. (original) (raw)

Review of R. Bett, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism

Philosophy in Review , 2010

Ancient scepticism' is a term that standardly encompasses two philosophical traditions stretching from the third century BCE to approximately the second century CE: Pyrrhonism, named after its eponymous founder Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BCE), and Academic scepticism, a sceptical movement which arose in the Platonic Academy around 268 BCE, when Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5-241/0) became its head. The positions and arguments of these two traditions were widely discussed and criticized in antiquity, and historians of philosophy sometimes argue that it was the rediscovery of ancient scepticism in the sixteenth century that shaped the course of modern philosophy. Some of their argumentative strategies still occupy an important place in contemporary debates in epistemology (a typical example are the Agrippan modes). This volume is designed to provide a comprehensive view on the main protagonists, the central issues of contention in recent scholarship, and the transformation of sceptical traditions beyond antiquity.

"Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism," Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 246–258.

Philosophy Compass, 2011

Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three-part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.

Ancient Scepticism And The Contra Academicos

2008

Are we ever justified in being convinced we know something and in acting accordingly? Does our happiness depend upon the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge? Does the good life require a stable relationship to the truth or can it be had apart from this? Is the desire to apprehend truth our central concern as rational beings, the basis of our authentic existence? Is it rather an impediment to happiness, an illusory desire which we must dispel or condemn ourselves to a life of frustration and anxiety? One might simply dismiss this as a dead issue. After all, is not certainty a discredited concept in our supposedly post-philosophical era? Have not we all learned the finite and contingent character of all human discourse? Yet the signs of discomfort with these conclusions are evident in our culture as well. Certain foundations for our beliefs and actions, whether grounded in reason or the authority of revelation, can seem necessary antidotes to the pervasive loss of meanin...

THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT

KRITERION (Revista de Filosofia. Publicación de: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG), 2023

It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.