America's Oil Problem (original) (raw)

2008, Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization

In times of war, military issues necessarily dominate America's national security consciousness. As a country, we worry about the readiness of our troops, the strength of our equipment, and often when, rather than whether the next attack will come. These are understandable and necessary concerns. Yet, the exigency of military affairs can eclipse other important facets of U.S. national security. Just as surely as failed states and radicalism can pose a threat to the United States, so too can domestic concerns have an impact on security, as U.S. energy policy has done since the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. Although the U.S. recognized the connection between these issues by the end of WWII, the embargo solidified and intensified the linkage. Thirty-five years later, this relationship still shapes U.S. foreign policy, and oil producing nations continue to hold the power to influence the economic well-being, and thus the security of the U.S. and the international community. By the time of the embargo, Americans had well-established security interests in the Middle East. The U.S. built an airfield in Saudi Arabia as early as 1946, supported the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and played the key role in resolving the 1956 Suez Crisis. It also had growing economic interests in the region. By 1973, of the 6.2 million barrels of imported oil the U.S. consumed per day, about 1.1 million came from Arab states. 1 Although compared to Europe and Japan this was a relatively small percentage, the U.S.'s expanding appetite for oil ensured the importance of all current and future sources. In 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took the first steps toward acknowledging the connection between U.S. security and economic interests in the Middle East. He met with Saudi Arabia's King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and committed to protect the monarch's country in order to ensure that the U.S. would receive the Saudi oil supply. Twelve years later, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, deepened U.S. commitments to the Middle East by asking Congress for the authority to use military force against any Communist incursion into the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was predicated on the idea that hostile forces in the Middle East could lead "to near strangulation" of the economies of the U.S. and its allies. 2 The 1973 embargo solidified and enhanced the initial connection between