Avinoam Rosenak, Sharon Leshem Zinger & Alick Isaacks, (2014), "Human Rights: On the Political, The Dynamic and the Doctrine of Unity of Opposites", Yedidyah Stern and Shachar Lifshitz (eds.), Religion and the Discourse of Human Rights, The Israel Democracy Institute, pp. 463—499 (original) (raw)

Three significant questions arise when we consider the compatibility of religion and human rights. Each of these questions is at the heart of the encounter between religion and the State. More specifically, in the context of this discussion, the question of human rights is tested against the two poles of Judaism and of Israel’s secular democracy. The first question is to what extent religion (or religious practice) is entitled to protection as a matter of human rights? Conversely, what price can religious practice be expected to pay (in terms of sacrificing its norms) in order to earn that protection? Furthermore, what potential threat to human rights does the Jewish religion pose? Can a Jewish state contain that threat, and under what conditions? Finally, to what extent is it reasonable to view religion as a full-fledged foundation for human rights? In other words, can religious norms be fully compatible with the value systems that control humanistic discourse? If, from the point of view of religion, they indeed are, what limitation will this impose on the values and concerns of human rights? These questions are all expressions of a “clash of cultures,” made especially acute by the effort to build a humanist democratic state on Jewish traditional foundations. In what follows, we will take a bird’s-eye view of these problems in the hope of singling out what strikes us as the core of the tension between the politics of Judaism and the politics of human rights. We wish to make it clear, however, that this tension does not arise simply from specific issues or cases. Neither is it the product of the great confrontation between “religion” and “state” or between “Judaism” and “democracy.” Rather, in more preliminary terms, this is a conflict between opposing forces. Our interest is in how clashes between opposing forces are constructed and how these conflicts are to be dealt with. The different ways in which opposites come into being and relate to each other say something very deep about the nature of dialogues, the problems of the “political,” and, finally, the concept of “truth,” which does not seem to accept the coexistence of stark contradictions. By showing the interconnection between these concerns we hope to offer a new Jewish perspective on the specific clash or opposition between religion and human rights. Religion and human rights may perhaps be seen to advance opposing concerns. If we go beyond the specifics of this clash, however, religion and human rights seem to propose two very different kinds of discourse, each of which treats the conflict or opposition between them very differently. Being aware of the differences in the discourses is a necessary prerequisite for trying to overcome them. However, this is not easily accomplished. Consider the setting in which this paper is being given. We are at a conference, in a room where scholars have come together to share and debate their ideas. Presumably, this gathering would appear to present an optimal or neutral context for free investigation, deliberation, and clarification of ideas. However, it is clear that this setting is itself constructed according to a particular world view. It adheres to the conventions that are typical to the settings best suited to the discussion of human rights (conventional perhaps to those engaged in clarifying the legal boundaries of human rights). It is precisely those conventions that we mean to call into question. All of us sitting around the table are intellectuals committed to “democratic discourse.” The invitation to participate in this discussion in the particular way it is being conducted can be seen as a statement that seeks to bolster democratic discourse—or at least ensure its survival—in the face of an ostensible religious opposition to it. The nature of the discussion is reflected in the phrasing of its questions, which clearly single out religion as an adversary, either to be tolerated or not. The opposition created between religion and democratic discourse does not view religion as a partner capable of shaping a discourse of its own in which its capacity to tolerate the discourse of democratic rights is also being evaluated. In what follows, we will attempt to confront the questions this situation raises, on two levels. First, we will describe in detail how opposition and adversity are dealt with in conventional diplomatic, political, or academic discourse; then we will attempt to set out the foundations of our proposed alternative to it