Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (original) (raw)

Railroad Building • The Battle for the American System

the end of a decade characterized by the greatest speculation and financial irresponsibility. Financial deregulation, easy money, loose banking oversight, together with the degradation of our system of values have brought about a religion of money and greed ... The financial speculators have turned our country into a casino.''

Accounting for the “railway mania” of 1845— A great railway swindle?

Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1991

This paper explores the functaonmg of accounting m the social, economic and pohttcal contexts surrounding the financing of the early U K. radways The conventional vmw of economm historians is that the early U K. railways were financed by an Irrational stock market "manta", followed by the mevttable crash m which many of the mmal investors were ruined. Here we explore an alternative explanattoft tmphed by a comment by Marx m volume 3, of capital (1981), that these events were elements of a "great radway swindle" m wbach accounting was deeply m~Mg~te~ Marx pro~des no dnxct support for his statement However, the history of the early U IC railways has been extensively researched This work is reexamined to assess the a prior/vahchty of the "swmdle hypothesis" Its acceptance would have Important tmphcauons for accepted views of the nature of capttahsm and accountang m the mtd-mneteenth century Accordmg to economic histotaans, the "manta" was a product of/a/ssez fawe capitalism According to accounting

Of Railroads and Finance: The Making of Market Society in the Pacific Northwest

This paper examines how the development of railroads in the region established enduring ties with financiers on the East coast and Europe, and how these ties facilitated the exercise of power for certain individuals central in their respective social networks. These men of railroads and finance acted in an institutional capacity to transform the region we now understand as the Pacific Northwest so that it was conducive to the generation of financial flows in the machine age. In doing so, they set in motion a process of cumulative development that would render the old provisioning process unviable. That is, the non-market provisioning process embedded in the complex of tribal social relations was destroyed and the peoples who flourished within it were displaced. However, the two systems shared a common thread: each bore some direct relationship with the Columbia River Basin. Hence, I use the river as my entry point in a framework of analysis that seeks to trace out the many relations that account for such radical change.

Organizing Railroad Interests: The Creation of National Railroad Associations in the United States and Prussia

1990

American business history emerged from the 1980s thoroughly permeated by the "new institutional economics," most would agree. But what has not been sufficiently appreciated is the extent to which business historians who focus on institutions must become political historians as well [17]. For institutions are inherently political entities. According to conventional wisdom, they consist of rules, compliance procedures, and norms that order relationships among individuals [10, 25, 39, 49]. In doing so, institutions necessarily spell out a distribution of power, and in that sense they must be considered political. The problem, however, is that the point of departure has proven unduly constraining. Transaction cost economics, for all of the rich insight that it yields into the economic impact of institutions [49], is not necessarily well-equipped to deal with their political dimensions [36]. It is fortunate, therefore, that a "new institutionalism" also emerged in pol...

Railroad Infrastructure Investments and Economic Development in the Antebellum United States

Journal of Economic Development

We measure the overall impact of railroad investment on economic development in the antebellum period in the United States using a vector autoregressive approach. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find bidirectional causality between railroad infrastructure investment and GDP. Second, we estimate a marginal product of $4.2 for railroad investment which corresponds to a 15.5% rate of return when considering a 10-year lifetime for railroad capital. While about two-thirds of this effect stems from the supply side, short run demand side effects also are substantial. Third, given the low effective tax rates practiced in the 1830s and the magnitude of the effects of railroad investment we estimate, it is very likely that these investments were not self-financing and may, therefore, have contributed to the high levels of public indebtedness observed in the period.

Assessing Adequacy of America’s Transportation Policies Lessons from Debate About the Role of Railroads in Development of the American West

This paper compares and contrasts two debates about the role of transportation in the American economy. The contemporary policy debate revolves around adequacy of current transportation infrastructure, whether infrastructure investment should be increased, and how and whether congestion should be addressed by public policy. An earlier debate in the economic history field revolved around whether the rail-roads were indispensable to America’s economic growth and how the building of a rail network affected the shape of that growth. This paper argues that in certain ways the contemporary policy exchange is covering much of the same ground covered by analysts studying the railroads and that the former can be usefully informed by the latter.

Villains or Heroes? Private Banks and Railroads after the Sherman Act

This paper analyzes and measures the value that American private banks added as directors of non financial companies. Using data between 1874 and 1913, and an event study from 1906, I find that bank directors added about 20% of a firm's market capitalization. Collusive practices encouraged by private banks accounted for 65% of this value, and were the equivalent of creating a three player market among railroads. About 35% of the value added by banks came from better governance. I argue that although policymakers were partly right in sidelining private banks as activist investors, this helped entrench managers.