Analysis, Mathematics, and Logic in Russell's Early Philosophy [review of Jolen Galaugher, Russell's Philosophy of Logical Analysis: 1897–1905] (original) (raw)
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Analysis and Logical Form in Russell: The 1913 Paradigm
Dialectica, 2005
In the unpublished work Theory of Knowledge† a complex is assumed to be “anything analyzable, any- thing which has constituents” (p. 79), and analysis is presented as the “discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex” (p. 119). The notion of complex is linked in various ways with the notions of relating relation, logical form and proposition, taken as a linguistic expression provided with meaning. This paper mainly focuses on these notions, on their links and, more widely, on the role of logical form, by offering a new way of understanding what Russell was doing in TK as concerns the logical-ontological matter of this manuscript. In particular, a new account of Russell's theory of judgment will be given, by taking a stand with respect to the main accounts already given, and it will be argued for the presence in TK of a notion of type different from the one applied to propositional functions in ML and PM.
"Russell and Analytic Philosophy" edited by Irvine and Wedeking
Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 61, pp. 1391-1392, 1996
Russell and analytic philosophy, edited by A.D. Irvine and G.A. Wedeking. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 1993, xvi + 424 pp. -therein: R.M. SAINSBURY. Russell on names and communication. Pp. 3-21. SIMON BLACKBURN AND ALAN CODE. The power of Russell's criticism of Frege. Pp. 22-36. MICHAEL PAKALUK. The interpretation of Russell's "Gray's Elegy" argument. Pp. 37-65. FRANCISCO A. RODRÍGUEZ-CONSUEGRA. The origins of Russell's theory of descriptions. Pp. 66-96. STEPHEN NEALE. Grammatical form, logical form, and incomplete symbols. Pp. 97-139. MICHAEL DETLEFSEN. Logicism and the nature of mathematical reasoning. Pp. 265-292. JEAN-PIERRE MARQUIS. Russell's logicism and categorical logicisms. Pp. 293-324. JUDY PELHAM. Russell's early philosophy of logic. Pp. 325-341. PETER HYLTON. Functions and propositional functions in Principia Mathematica. Pp. 342-360. GREGORY LANDINI. Reconciling PM's ramified type theory with the doctrine of the unrestricted variable of the Principles. Pp. 361-394.
Cambridge Philosophers IX: Bertrand Russell
Philosophy, 1999
This paper attempts to summarise the philosophical career of Bertrand Russell, concentrating in particular on his contributions to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. It takes as its starting point Russell's conception of philosophy as the search for foundations upon which certain knowledge might be built, a search which Russell, at the end of his career, declared to be fruitless. In pursuing this search, however, Russell was led to develop lines of thought and techniques of analysis that have had a profound and lasting influence on the philosophy of the twentieth century.
The Tenability of Russell's Early Philosophy
Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 1988
WINCHESTER: I'm hoping this will be a very informal session. Our panelists will, of course, feel free to say anything that they feel like, that they want to get off their chests, and then the audience will take it upon themselves to make comments. AYER: I think I'd like the audience to interrupt if they feel like it-if we say anything outrageous or platitudinous, or both. I'll start off by saying a few words. I noticed that early on we had a very well-known, typical Russell quotation, namely, that, where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. But an interesting one that passed unquoted occurs in The Problems of Philosophy, namely that every proposition we can understand must be composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. It seems to me-and this is something I would like my companions to discuss-that this ties Russell very closely to phenomenalism, because he argued as early as The Problems of Philosophy that the only particulars we are acquainted with in addition to our Selves are sense-data; and he excludes Selves by the time he gets to The Analysis of Mind. Otherwise, he allows us to be acquainted with universals. Now if you interpret the theory of definite descriptions in the way that Quine does (and I agree with Quine), Russell should be interpreted as permitting-not only permitting but encouraging-the elimination of singular terms. This means that all the stuffing, as it were, in your statements gets into the predicates, and there's nothing left to be a value of the existentially quantified variable except something that requires no connotation, namely the object of a demonstrative. If that is so, and if the object of demonstratives for Russell can be only sense-data-something he maintained throughout his career right up to Inquiry into Meaning (J.nd Truth-it means that you are only referring to sense-data and to what properties they can have. This leaves you no other alternative but phenomenalism. * In passing two series of proofs of the discussion, the panelisls and "olher voices" nol infrequently revised the wording ascribed to them. The result offered here. while nol a verbatim transcript of the discussion that took place on 24 June 1984, is what each speaker wishes printed. Editorial thanks for assistance with the transcription are extended to
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