Effective Selfish Mining Defense Strategies to Improve Bitcoin Dependability (original) (raw)
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Bitcoin Selfish Mining Modeling and Dependability Analysis
International Journal of Mathematical, Engineering and Management Sciences, 2022
Blockchain technology has gained prominence over the last decade. Numerous achievements have been made regarding how this technology can be utilized in different aspects of the industry, market, and governmental departments. Due to the safety-critical and security-critical nature of their uses, it is pivotal to model the dependability of blockchain-based systems. In this study, we focus on Bitcoin, a blockchain-based peer-to-peer cryptocurrency system. A continuous-time Markov chain-based analytical method is put forward to model and quantify the dependability of the Bitcoin system under selfish mining attacks. Numerical results are provided to examine the influences of several key parameters related to selfish miners’ computing power, attack triggering, and honest miners’ recovery capability. The conclusion made based on this research may contribute to the design of resilience algorithms to enhance the self-defense and robustness of cryptocurrency systems.
Countering Selfish Mining in Blockchains
2019 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)
Selfish mining is a well known vulnerability in blockchains exploited by miners to steal block rewards. In this paper, we explore a new form of selfish mining attack that guarantees high rewards with low cost. We show the feasibility of this attack facilitated by recent developments in blockchain technology opening new attack avenues. By outlining the limitations of existing countermeasures, we highlight a need for new defense strategies to counter this attack, and leverage key system parameters in blockchain applications to propose an algorithm that enforces fair mining. We use the expected transaction confirmation height and block publishing height to detect selfish mining behavior and develop a network-wide defense mechanism to disincentivize selfish miners. Our design involves a simple modifications to transactions' data structure in order to obtain a "truth state" used to catch the selfish miners and prevent honest miners from losing block rewards.
On the detection of selfish mining and stalker attacks in blockchain networks
Annals of Telecommunications, 2020
The blockchain technology emerged in 2008 as a distributed peer to peer network structure, capable of ensuring security for transactions made using the Bitcoin digital currency, without the need for third party intermediaries to validate them. Although its beginning was linked to cryptocurrencies, its use has diversified over the recent years. There are various projects using the blockchain technology to perform document validation, electronic voting, tokenization of non-perishable goods, and many others. With its increasing use, concern arises with possible attacks that could threaten the integrity of the consensus of the chain. One of the well-known attacks to the blockchain consensus mechanism is the selfish mining attack, in which malicious nodes can deflect their behavior from the standard pattern by not immediately disclosing their newly mined blocks. This malicious behavior can result in a disproportionate share of rewards for those nodes, especially if they have a significant processing power. The goal of this paper is to present a simple heuristic to detect the presence of selfish mining attack (and variants) in blockchain networks that use the proof-of-work (PoW) consensus algorithm. The proposal is to signal when the blockchain fork height deviates from the standard, indicating when the network is under the influence of such attacks.
IEEE Access, 2021
Blockchain is a technology that ensures data security by verifying database of records established in a decentralized and distributed network. Blockchain-based approaches have been applied to secure data in the fields of the Internet of Things, software engineering, healthcare systems, financial services, and smart power grids. However, the security of the blockchain system is still a major concern. We took the initiative to present a systematic study which sheds light on what defensive strategies are used to secure the blockchain system effectively. Specifically, we focus on blockchain data security that aims to mitigate the two data consistency attacks: double-spend attack and selfish mining attack. We employed the systematic approach to analyze a total of 40 selected studies using the proposed taxonomy of defensive strategies: monitoring, alert forwarding, alert broadcasting, inform, detection, and conceptual research design. It presents a comparison framework for existing and future research on blockchain security. Finally, some recommendations are proposed for blockchain researchers and developers. INDEX TERMS Blockchain, double-spend attack, selfish mining attack, systematic review.
Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2014
A recent result in Bitcoin is the selfish mining strategy in which a selfish cartel withholds blocks they mine to gain an advantage. This strategy is both incentive-compatible and harmful to Bitcoin. In this paper we introduce a new defense against selfish mining that improves on the previous best result, we raise the threshold of mining power necessary to profitably selfishly mine from 25% to 32% under all propagation advantages. While the security of our system uses unforgeable timestamps, it is robust to their compromise. Additionally, we discuss the difficulty a mining conspiracy would face attempting to keep the compromise of our scheme secret and we analyze incentives for getting miners to adopt these changes.
On Subversive Miner Strategies and Block Withholding Attack in Bitcoin Digital Currency
Bitcoin is a "crypto currency", a decentralized electronic payment scheme based on cryptography. Bitcoin economy grows at an incredibly fast rate and is now worth some 10 billions of dollars. Bitcoin mining is an activity which consists of creating (minting) the new coins which are later put into circulation. Miners spend electricity on solving cryptographic puzzles and they are also gatekeepers which validate bitcoin transactions of other people. Miners are expected to be honest and have some incentives to behave well. However. In this paper we look at the miner strategies with particular attention paid to subversive and dishonest strategies or those which could put bitcoin and its reputation in danger. We study in details several recent attacks in which dishonest miners obtain a higher reward than their relative contribution to the network. In particular we revisit the concept of block withholding attacks and propose a new concrete and practical block withholding attack ...
Spy Based Analysis of Selfish Mining Attack on Multi-Stage Blockchain
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2019
In this paper, we present selfish mining attack on the multi-stage blockchain proposed by Palash Sarkar. We provide detailed analysis of computational wastage of honest miners and biased rewards achieved by the selfish pool. In our analysis, we introduce a spy inside an honest pool which is a trivial task. Our spy is responsible for leaking the information of the stage mining from the honest pool to the selfish pool. In our analysis, we consider all the possible configurations of mining namely sequential, parallel and pipelining. In all of these configurations, we show through our mathematical equations as to how a selfish miner can succeed in wasting the computation power of the honest miner and how he can influence the reward of mining. For completeness, we provide an algorithm for performing a selfish mining attack on all the scenarios on multi-stage blockchain. To thwart selfish mining on multi-stage blockchain we redesign the original verification algorithm by introducing a new...
2018 IEEE International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData), 2018
Bitcoin is the first secure decentralized electronic currency system. However, it is known to be inefficient due to its proof-of-work (PoW) consensus algorithm and has the potential hazard of double spending. In this paper, we aim to reduce the probability of double spending by decreasing the probability of consecutive winning. We first formalize a PoW-based decentralized secure network model in order to present a quantitative analysis. Next, to resolve the risk of double spending, we propose the personalized difficulty adjustment (PDA) mechanism which modifies the difficulty of each participant such that those who win more blocks in the past few rounds have a smaller probability to win in the next round. To analyze the performance of the PDA mechanism, we observe that the system can be modeled by a high-order Markov chain. Finally, we show that PDA effectively decreases the probability of consecutive winning and results in a more trustworthy PoW-based system.
Contra-∗: Mechanisms for countering spam attacks on blockchain's memory pools
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have seen on the rise in their popularity and value, making them a target to several forms of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and calling for a better understanding of their attack surface from both security and distributed systems standpoints. In this paper, and in the pursuit of understanding the attack surface of blockchains, we explore a new form of attack that can be carried out on the memory pools (mempools), and mainly targets blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. We study this attack on Bitcoin's mempool and explore the attack's effects on transactions fee paid by benign users. To counter this attack, this paper further proposes Contra-*, a set of countermeasures utilizing fee, age, and size (thus, Contra-F, Contra-A, and Contra-S) as prioritization mechanisms. Contra-* optimize the mempool size and help in countering the effects of DoS attacks due to spam transactions. We evaluate Contra-* by simulations and analyze their effectiveness under various attack conditions.
Computers & Security, 2019
Besides supporting smart contract, another Ethereum distinct feature lies in the improvement of running efficiency achieved by the uncle block mechanism. To mitigate network congestion, an orphan block has a chance to be referenced by a regular block as an uncle block rather than being abandoned directly. In this paper, we use a Markov state machine to model selfish and stubborn mining in an imperfect Ethereum network with natural forks. The security threshold against selfish mining, which indicates how difficult an attacker could gain more than he deserves, decreases to 23.8% in an uncle block rate of 11%. Two advanced selfish mining strategies, trail stubborn mining and equal fork combined with trail stubborn mining, are also analyzed with different uncle block rates in this paper. In different feasible regions, strategies that bring about the optimal reward vary from each other. All evaluations in this paper are carried out in an analytic method, which is more flexible and scalable than a numeric method if it combines multiple attacks or extends to several attackers.