‘Theodicy’ - The Problem of ‘The Problem of Evil’? A Working Paper in Meta-Theology: For the Love of God – Confronting Theological Visions of Evil (original) (raw)
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The term "theodicy," originating from the Greek words "Theos" meaning God and "dike" meaning justice, addresses the challenge of reconciling the existence of evil with the attributes of omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and omniscience attributed to God 1. Alvin Plantinga succinctly defines theodicy as the "answer to the question of why God permits evil." 2 Essentially, theodicy concerns the examination of God's role, whether active or passive, in the world He fashioned, which is confronted with the presence of evil and suffering. Philosophically engaging with theodicy involves grappling with the problem of evil, an inquiry undertaken by figures such as Irenaeus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas who, while acknowledging God as the Creator, confront the challenge of reconciling His existence with the presence of evil. Conversely, others, like Antony Flew and Plato in his Timaeus, either discredit God's role as Creator or question His attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and paternal love.
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In this essay, moral anti-theodicy is characterized as opposition to the trivialization of suffering, defined as the reinterpretation of horrendous evils in a way the sufferer cannot accept. Ambitious theodicy (which claim goods emerge from specific evils) is deemed always to trivialize horrendous evils and, because there is no specific theoretical context, also harm sufferers. Moral anti-theodicy is susceptible to two main criticisms. First, it is over-demanding as a moral position. Second, anti-theodicist opposition to least ambitious theodicies, which portray God's decision to create as an ‘all-or-nothing’ scenario, requires a moral commitment to philosophical pessimism. Thus anti-theodicists should not be quick to take the moral high ground. However, this should not encourage theodicists, since theodicies may well be self-defeating in so far as they attempt to provide comfort.
Theism and the Problem of Evil: A Critical Study
I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie's criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the nonexistence of God. Section two establishes the moral objection ability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral 'anti-theodicists', and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology Religion as a source of evil
The starting point is that there is a structural, although not necessary link between religion and two important expressions of religious evil, religious intolerance and violence. The origin of this link lies in the radicalism that is inherent in all religions. Although this radicalism often has very positive effects, it also can lead to evil. Because religious evil is fueled by eschatological antagonism and the enormous utopian energies that are characteristic of religion, it is often qualified as symbolic. ‘Symbolic’ refers to the fundamental disproportion between the excess of the divine as a groundless ground and the finite capacity of every religion to receive it (Ricoeur). Symbolic violence arises when a religious community yields to the temptation of becoming possessive, forcing the inexhaustible divine mystery to adapt to the limited capacities of this community to grasp this mystery. This leads to the exclusion of internal or external dissenters. The final section examines how the ill-fated bond between religion and evil can be broken. It will be examined if and how a redefinition of tolerance, in particular a disconnection between religious truth and the claim to exclusivism and a commitment to inter-confessional hospitality, can contribute to avoiding that religion becomes evil.