Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense (original) (raw)

Lockean dispositionalism about color, as I will understand it, is the view that the colors of objects are dispositions of their surfaces to produce perceptions of certain sorts, under standard conditions, in normal perceivers, 1 and thus are more relative, or perceiverdependent, than "primary" qualities such as motion and shape. My aim in this paper is to defend this account against a recent groundswell of arguments that charge it with violating certain important precepts of common sense. Locke's own distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and his treatment of color as secondary, was based upon an amalgam of scientific and intuitive considerations, 2 but he was criticized, most famously by Berkeley, for not paying sufficient attention to the claims of common sense. In particular, he was criticized for violating our common sense intuitions about the parity of shape and color, and about what goes on when color is perceived. These are the prime complaints of many recent critics of dispositionalism as well. I will argue, however, that dispositionalism about color not only coheres well with our scientific theories, but also, at least upon reflection, provides an intuitively satisfying account of what colors are and how they are perceived. In doing so, I'll endorse yet another view that is at least implicit in Locke's Essay, namely, that common sense and scientific considerations are, and should be, mutually influential and inextricably intertwined. I will first address some recently expressed worries about the incompatibility of dispositionalism with an intuitively satisfying account of color perception, and then discuss some more global doubts about the adequacy of any view that takes color to be more