A Heideggerian approach to non-indicative moods (original) (raw)
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Defending a Heideggerian Account of Mood
Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Routledge), Ed. D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, W. Hopp, 2015
This paper undertakes a critical analysis, development, and defense of Heidegger’s account of mood with the larger aim of showing why his account is worth holding onto, especially outside the context of his fundamental ontology in which it was advanced. In order to make my case, first I summarize his account of mood. I then raise four problems that befall his account, followed by some suggestions as to how they can be resolved. I conclude by highlighting the importance of a Heideggerian account of mood within the context of some of the shortcomings in the empirically-based accounts of mood.
Subjunctive vs. indicative: A new perspective
The paper discusses some peculiar Early and Late Modern English instances of the subjunctive and indicative moods found in close proximity in present tense conditional and concessive clauses which do not differ in modality and therefore would be expected to be with forms of the same mood. These instances appear either in clauses of the same type in successive sentences or in reduced coordinations sharing the same conjunction. The discussion uses examples provided by Late Modern English grammarians, who noted and criticised these instances, and examples collected through reading Early and Late Modern English texts. It proposes a discourse interpretation of the use of mood in such cases: the subjunctive appears to be used in a clause related to introducing something new into discourse, while the indicative is found in a clause that is a continuation of what has already been introduced.
Protosociology, Cognitive Semantics I: Conceptions of Meaning, 10, (1997): 19-66. Reprinted in Concepts of Meaning: Framing an Integrated Theory of Linguistic Behavior, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003., 1997
Object of this study is the analysis of the Indicative and Subjunctive morphological mood marking on verbs in Italian, with some references also to other Romance languages. I claim that the occurrence of these moods triggers a presupposition of assertibility and non-assertibility of the clauses that contain them, with respect to the input context in which they are assessed. And the formal translations of these presuppositions amount to applying to an intrasentential level the considerations that Robert Stalnaker devoted to felicitous assertions: a clause counts as assertible just in case it leads to an effective elimination of possible worlds from the input context it gets added to; it results as non-assertible when it does not lead to any change or when it has as outcome the empty set. I aim at showing how these considerations can correctly account for the contribution that morphological mood marking makes for the interpretation of hypothetical statements (that is, for the meaning difference displayed by Indicative versus Subjunctive mood marked conditionals), and, moreover, how they can also predict the mood alternation in the domain of subordinated clauses (that is, for the fact that some predicates, as volitionals, select for a Subjunctive mood clause, whereas others, like verba dicendi, are usually followed by an Indicative mood subordinated clause).
A Philosophical State of Mind - Moods in Heidegger's thought and their place in thinking and life
What is the proper mood for philosophy, for thinking? To ask a question, any question and defiantly “the question of Being”, we must first situate our self in the world, among beings and Being. This situating happens instantly and constantly through moods, alongside understanding and discourse. We are always already in a mood that calls us to our self. When we turn away from our moods we give birth to the unauthentic self – to all different feelings and understanding of our everyday life, along with our common conception of time, and every scientific and metaphysical discourse. When allowing moods to genuinely reveal our essence we dwell in authenticity - we give meaning to things, encounter the true nature of our being, of time and of nothing and we can engage the question of Being. I will explore the notion of moods in Heidegger’s writing, elaborate on the four fundamental moods, which will help me bring forward a notion of what authenticity means and does and finally I will claim that, although it is not so named in Heidegger's writings, for genuine revelations to take place, to be at home in Being, we must establish our self in equanimity.