Ontological Pluralism and the Being and Time Project (original) (raw)

2013, Journal of the History of Philosophy

In this paper, I identify a problem, which the project that I will refer to as the ‘Being and Time Project’ (or ‘BTP’ for short) aimed to solve; this is the project within which Heidegger reinterpreted his early thought—and which he unsuccessfully attempted to bring to fruition—in, roughly speaking, the years 1925-28. The problem in question presents several faces: viewed from one angle, it concerns the unity of the concept of “Being in general,” from another, the integrity of the notion of “Dasein,” and from another, the possibility of the perspective from which the philosopher does her work. The solution that the BTP would have offered turns on the claim that time is “the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being” (SZ 1), and what I want to focus upon in particular is why making a claim of this form was a metaphilosophically pressing matter. It is widely believed that the BTP does not work, a view seemingly confirmed by Heidegger’s own failure to complete it; one also encounters the view that the project represented a further, perhaps over-ambitious step that also lacks deep motivation: so Inwood, for example, argues that “[i]t is … not obvious that we need to elucidate Being in general to understand the differences between various modes of Being, between rocks, tools, Dasein, time and world.” While that might be true, my concern will be to make vivid why Heidegger felt he had to elucidate that concept and undertake the associated—and doomed—BTP. In presenting this case, I will juxtapose the issues Heidegger’s work raises with issues raised by Kris McDaniel’s and Jason Turner’s recent attempts to revive what they call “ontological pluralism” (OP), a doctrine of which they see Heidegger as an advocate. Others whom they would recruit to their cause include Aristotle and Russell and both will figure in the following discussion. Section 1 begins with Heidegger’s proposal that many philosophical problems are really pseudo-problems which we encounter solely because of our “ontological indifference,” our failure to recognize the distinct kinds of Being that the entities on which we reflect instantiate. But this same diversity raises questions about the possibility of assertions of the level of generality that we might take to be characteristic of philosophical assertions, a worry which section 2 introduces through a comparison with problems that Russell encounters. It was in the work of Aristotle, however, that Heidegger saw analogous worries arise and section 3 identifies two lines of argument which cast doubt on the possibility of a “science of being qua being.” They do so by casting doubt on the idea that Being might be a genus that subsumes species or kinds of Being. Section 4 explains how the second of these lines of thought finds an echo in a worry about the very possibility of a philosophical perspective: a certain “ontological indifference” seems necessary if ontological claims, such as those that distinguish between kinds of Being as kinds of Being, are to be possible. Section 5 further deepens our concerns, by arguing that the worries identified in sections 3-4 also raise doubts about our grasp on the very notion of “Dasein.” Section 6 turns to how the BTP might be seen as responding to the challenges that sections 2-5 reveal. Heidegger claims that “[w]ithin the horizon of time the projection of a meaning of Being in general can be accomplished” (SZ 235) and I offer an outline sketch of the project for which this claim was the centre-piece, highlighting in particular its metaphilosophical significance: time “enabl[es] … the thematic interpretation of Being and of its articulation and manifold ways,” and “thus make[] ontology possible” (BPP 228). But the BTP ultimately unravels and section 7 suggests that the first Aristotelian line of thought that section 3 presents may help us understand why. The final section considers another way in which one might imagine responding to the issues we consider here, a way that McDaniel and Turner’s presentation of OP suggests; however, I argue that this response fails to meet the challenge of section 3’s second Aristotelian line of thought.