AUKUS and Australia–UK Strategic Reconvergence (original) (raw)
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Australias strategic hedging in the Indo Pacific: a 'third way' beyond either China or the US
Australia-China Relations Institute, 2019
Australia’s growing economic relations with Beijing in the past decade, in the midst of the rise of China, has sparked a continuing debate inside Australia about whether China is a friend or foe of Australia and accordingly about the premium that ought to be placed on the Australia-US security alliance. It has given rise to some assessments that Australia is now faced with a choice between the China and the US. This paper, however, puts forward an argument that this binary choice is misplaced and that Canberra should avoid choosing one side at the expense of another. It makes the case that as a middle power, Australia should instead use ‘strategic hedging’, a combination of engagement and indirect/soft balancing strategy, to insure itself against the potential of China’s regional domination amid uncertainty about US strategic commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Australia should continue its economic engagement with China and maintain its robust political and military ties with the US while seeking the opportunity to broaden the breadth and depth of its relations with other regional states. The 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper has, to a certain extent, implicitly adopted this hedging policy by promoting the use of a mixture of balancing and engagement strategies to counter China’s regional domination. However, Australia’s hedging policy has yet to reach its full potential and can currently be described as ‘under-hedging’, i.e., not doing enough to reduce uncertainty about the future and risk. While the Turnbull government (2015-2018) had showed a strong commitment to working with the US, Japan and India in building a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, and the Morrison government has maintained this commitment, the weakest links of Australia’s hedging are in the failure to institutionalise the Quad, the informal strategic dialogue comprising Australia, the US, Japan and India, and to enmesh regional powers, notably India and Indonesia. Without enlisting more partners more firmly to its side, Australia is often sidelined by other three members of the Quad and acts quite alone in the Indo-Pacific region.
AUKUS Alliance: United States Strategic Interest in Indo-Pacific
Jurnal Diplomasi Pertahanan
This research talks about the United States’ interests in Indo-Pacific through an alliance called AUKUS, which consists of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States, as a great power, has its focus on maintaining and strengthening security and alliances in the world. As the conflict in the South China Sea arose, the United States focused its strategy on preventing the conflict in the region; hence, the United States allied with Australia and United Kingdom. The research examines the strategy and national interests of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region through AUKUS. This research uses a qualitative method, exploring national interests, the means and ways of foreign policy, and the decision-making process on the United States' interest through AUKUS in Indo-Pacific.
AUKUS, Japan and the Indo-Pacific : strategic rationales and challenges
2021
The announcement of AUKUS, a new security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, on 15 September 2021 caused shockwaves around the world. France’s fury was understandable as the AUKUS deal meant the cancellation of a 2016 submarine deal between Paris and Canberra. The negotiations were kept strictly secret until the very end. The three countries are now starting an 18-month period of detailing the plan to build “at least 8” nuclear submarines for the Royal Australian Navy using American and British technology. Answers to questions such as when the first boat will become operational and how much the whole project will cost are not known yet. It is commonly estimated that the submarines will not be ready until around 2040, which effectively suggests that this deal is going to be a long-term commitment
Australia, China and the United States: maintaining an equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific
2012
Looking into the increasing economic and political strength of China, this report shows how its relationship with both Australia and the United States will change.As tensions rise in the South China Sea, the world is watching nervously as events unfold. Although not a party to the disputes, Australia nonetheless finds itself uncomfortably near the centre of the geo-strategic dynamics in the broader Indo-Pacific region. It has been balancing the two major players, the United States and China, each of which is critical to Key Points Australia finds itself uncomfortably near the centre of the geo-strategic dynamics in the broader Indo-Pacific region. It has been balancing the two major players, the United States and China, each of which is critical to Australia’s security and economic well-being. Australia is in something of a Catch-22 situation, as even a slight tilt towards either China or the US could be damaging to its relations with the other. Australia’s grand strategy, therefore...
Australia, India and the United States: the challenge of forging new alignments in the Indo Pacific
The rise of Asia’s two giants, China and India, is forcing Australia to re-examine its understanding of the regional order that has existed since the 1940s. There has been much debate about the choices that Australia faces with a rising China, but there has been less discussion about the strategic consequences of India’s emergence. Many are beginning to see a rising India as a major element in the Indo-Pacific strategic balance. Australia’s security relationship with India has been growing much closer over the last decade, driven by concerns about China as well as a host of other shared interests. In the long term, India is likely to become a key security partner in the Indian Ocean and possibly one of Australia’s most important security partners in the Indo-Pacific region. But there has been little consideration how this burgeoning strategic relationship with India will fit with Australia’s core security relationship with the United States or with the US alliance system. India is not a traditional ally or customary partner for Australia. This report looks at the choices faced by Australia in building its strategic relationship with India in a way that fits with the US alliance and the broader regional order.
A ustralia's geostrategic advantage is increasingly compromised by its need to catch the fast-sailing Asian economic ships. Comprehensive ties with nations in the Asia-Pacific are also reshaping its national identity , as well as its perceptions of what constitutes the national interest. How to handle the military rise of China that will inevitably alter the security order of the region, while its economy is so tied up with the rising giant, poses a serious and inescapable challenge. This chapter examines Australia's current defence posture and strategic traditions in the context of China's growing power projection, the Asian pivot of the US, and the role of Japan and the rise of multiple Asian middle powers, in order to shed light on some 'middle-of-the-road' options for Australia. The first section examines how Australia approaches its national interest; special attention is paid to the role of national identity in shaping the perception of the national interest and the resulting strategic tradition. The second section outlines the changing strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and examines how well Australia's strategic tradition serves its changing national interest. It also diagnoses the resulting 'bipolar dis-order' from which Australia is suffering as its political (security) interests and economic interests are pulling the nation in different directions. The final section weighs up the options available to Australia and recommends a new role and a new identity for Australia in the Asia-Pacific region.
Down Under and In Between: Australian Security Perspectives in the ‘Asian Century’
Doing More and Expecting Less: The Future of US Alliances in the Asia Pacific. Issues and Insights , 2013
This chapter provides an overview of Australian perspectives on the US alliance in light of ongoing and emerging challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. After a brief discussion of the motivations behind the signing of the ANZUS treaty, the first part of the chapter examines the historical context of the alliance, with a particular focus on the long-standing and ongoing tussle in Australia between independence in foreign policy making vis-à-vis broader structural constraints. While this debate has been a constant feature of the political scene in Australia, it has come into particular focus since the US withdrawal from Vietnam, which marked a turning point in Australian perspectives with regard to its own role in Asia. The collision of ideas surrounding Australian identity and Australian national interest has been reflected in policy approaches as successive governments have sought to strike a balance between the two exigencies and thus, most optimally ensure Australia’s strategic future. The chapter concludes by examining current perspectives through the lens of an ongoing debate taking place in Australian academic circles about what the rise of China means for Australia and its commitment to the US alliance, and considers options for caucus-style cooperation with fellow US allies beyond the hub-and-spokes model.
Beyond the Quasi-Alliance? An Analysis of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership
the rest: journal of politics and development, 2024
This article examines a pathway of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” in recent years. Both countries have developed a special strategic partnership, referred to as a “quasi-alliance”. Hence, the purpose of this research is to contextualise the development of the Australia-Japan quasi-alliance from global, regional, and bilateral perspectives. Globally, the quasi-alliance has been influenced by power transition and hegemonic competition in global politics. Regionally, the quasi-alliance has been embedded into the trilateral and multilateral strategic frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Bilaterally, the quasi-alliance has been shaped by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). Nonetheless, close security ties were temporarily adrift over Australia’s submarine deal and realigned by tangible milestones, such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the new JDSC signed off in 2022. While investigating these footsteps of the quasi-alliance formation, this article considers whether both countries have moved beyond the quasi-alliance toward a full military alliance in the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.
Australia - India Relations and the Asia Pacific: A Strategic Shift or A Long Term Policy Goal
Australia - India Relations and the Asia Pacific: A Strategic Shift or A Long term Policy Goal ABSTRACT When one considers the present state of India –Australia diplomatic relations,it strikes any observer that India has been rather treated with benign neglect within Australia's foreign policy framework in cultivating its robust relations with the outer world.This is rather strange when the world’s much talked about centre of gravity comprising of political, military, economic influence, is now rapidly moving onto the Asia-Pacific,following the rise of China and the rise of India,which now are slowly becoming the defining element in this shift . Besides the assertive role of the United States, and the combined economic strength of the stronger ASEAN economies, in addition to that of Japan, Korea and Indonesia, the region is likely to acquire more strategic importance. With Beijing’s focus on increasing its military expenditure,its engagement in a series of naval skirmishes, with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines ,this year over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, the worried neighbours, including Australia, wary of China’s expanding role now are left with no other option but to seek India as a balancer to hedge the security threats arising out of China’s actions ,though not as a counterweight. Hence India is being called upon to play a greater role in the security of Asia Pacific. This feeling was echoed by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton,who during her recent visit to India,in July 2011,called for India to positively shape Asia's future,as India's robust economic growth, its size and its revered status as the world's largest democracy,has contributed towards increasing its global influence in todays world. Australia’s last Rudd Labour government,which had abandoned the quadrilateral dialogue with India, Japan and the US in 2008,which was perceived to be in consonance with its proChina policy ,is now poised for a closer shift towards a closer relationship with India as Australia is forced to realize now that it may be in its interests to kowtow to India for using India’s increased strategic clout in ensuring the security and stability of the region. The security scenario becomes much more curiouser when the West is engaged with India to use its influence with India to act strongly as a hedge against China's rapid military build-up, India decidedly has adopted the role that of a reluctant superpower, hesitant about complicating its own ties with its powerful Asian neighbour. In the aforesaid background,in my proposed paper,I seek to analyse the existing security scenario in the Asia pacific region and also examine the various moves that are being made by Australia and the West to enhance their engagement with India and the countries of the Indian Ocean rim in the arena of politics,economy and trade relations as merely a strategy or a long term measure and finally will map out the consequences for the asia pacific region and international politics as a whole.
CLOSER AUSTRALIA-CHINA DEFENCE RELATIONS: AN ALLIANCE FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF CHINESE-AUSTRALIANS
2015
Maintaining national security is important for all states, and is an area of difficulty for Australia in recent years. Australia looks to the US for national security by way of the Australian New Zealand United States Treaty, and to China for economic advantage via bilateral trade. Closer defence ties with China could allow for less security reliance on just one state, and it could also help in maintaining strong Australia-China trade relations. This thesis will look at the Australia-China relationship, what impacts upon it, and in particular the defence ties that the states already share. This will be achieved by looking at what Chinese-Australians think about a potential Australia-China defence alliance, and what impact they may have on both the ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ policies of both China and Australia. It concludes that Chinese-Australians in general see closer Chinese-Australian defence ties as a positive for both states. Moreover, it argues that Chinese-Australians only have a very minimal amount of influence on economic related aspects of ‘hard power’, which gives little to no power over the ‘hard power’ policies of both states. Chinese-Australians are however argued to have a stronger influence on ‘soft power’ policy, especially in Australia, via Chinese-Australian business groups.