Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction (original) (raw)
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Hegel and Phenomenology, 2019
In this paper I trace the revival of Hegel in France and Germany in the early twentieth century and point especially to the crucial role of phenomenology (both Husserl and Heidegger, as well as their students, e.g. Fink, Landgrebe and Marcuse) in incorporating Hegel into their mature transcendental philosophy. Indeed, Martin Heidegger was responsible for a significant revival of Hegel studies at the University of Freiburg, following his arrival there in 1928 as the successor to Husserl. Similarly, Husserl's student, Fink characterised Husserl's phenomenology in explicitly Hegelian terms as "the self-comprehension of the Absolute". The late Husserl seems to embrace the Hegelian vision when he presents his approach in the Crisis itself as a "teleological historical reflection".
Edmund Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology
We remember Edmund Husserl as a philosopher who had a great influence on known phenomenologists like Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, among others. These abovementioned followers acknowledged their indebtedness to Husserl despite their being unrecognized by Husserl himself. In fact, Stein, as Husserl's "secretary," was treated like a slave. Husserl considered Scheler's phenomenology as fool's gold. And not only that, Scheler and Heidegger were referred to as antipodes. Husserl created an opening to Continental philosophy. This opening is called phenomenology-a work that would eventually take philosophy beyond the older, tired alternatives of psychologism and formalism, realism and idealism, objectivism and subjectivism. 1 In this paper, I shall attempt to critically expose Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and explore some implications to real-life situations.
Dialogue, 2013
Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 195 Any interesting answer has to be accompanied by an explanation of why this is the right answer." [p. 135]. One does not have to embrace foundationalism (in any form), of course, but in that case it must be clear what the alternative is (as an infi nite regress is, presumably, unacceptable); might coherentism, e.g., be considered a viable approach? One may appeal to the intersection of philosophical and scientifi c issues [pp. 196, 197], but that raises the question: which matters are specifi cally philosophical? Perhaps Cappelen is drawn to a position such as naturalized epistemology. In addition, if no appeal may be made to intuitions, it is unclear how Cappelen would deal with cases in philosophy that resemble axioms in mathematics. At present, few cases are generally accepted to have such a status compared to previous periods in (Western) philosophy, when it was attempted to resolve epistemological (and metaphysical) issues by appealing to self-evident starting points, but a proposition such as '¬ (p ∧ ¬ p)' (the principle of contradiction) is still considered by some to have such a quality; would Cappelen support it by arguments and thus avoid an appeal to an intuition? He does appear to suggest that logic may have to be considered to be something separate from philosophy [p. 229], but this seems to be an argumentum ad consequentiam : 'if something needs to be supported by an intuition, it cannot be qualifi ed as philosophy'. It is of course unacceptable (or at least unproductive) to operate from one's own private notion of what constitutes 'philosophy', especially if no arguments to use that private notion are offered. To conclude, Cappelen has shown that intuitions are not decisive elements in a number of cases, but he has failed to efface their role in the justifi cation process. On the basis of the foregoing, I would answer the question of what the relevance of this work is as follows. Apart from the merit that it presents a forceful criticism of those who too easily resort to intuitions, or who don't even refl ect on their position, it must be considered a propaedeutic work in the sense that it primarily serves as a springboard for the crucial questions to come to the fore. This observation in no way derogates from the author's meticulous and elucidative analysis, which is impressive and must be commended, but merely indicates what the next step must be, whether to be undertaken by the author or others.
Husserl and Other Phenomenologists
Husserl and othe Phenomenologists , 2016
This article addresses a basic question: what elements in Husserl’s phenomenology can account for the variety of post-Husserlian phenomenologies? The answer, I suggest, is that Husserl’s idea of reality, particularly his notion of givenness vis-à-vis self-givenness, facilitated the work of his followers by offering them at once a firm ground and a point of departure for their inquiries. However, adopting Husserl’s phenomenology as their starting point did not prevent his followers from developing their own independent phenomenological theory. Moreover, despite the elusive particulars that shape one’s individual experience of the world, so it transpires, Husserl’s thinking which was different and beyond their own observations and actual experiences, namely, transcendent, appears to have been a genuine guide along their path to achieve meaning. This interpretation thus gives precedence to a metaphysical point of departure, that is, to Husserl’s idea of reality as ‘givenness’, in launching phenomenological investigation—over any specific aspect of his work—as that which continues to sustain phenomenological discourse. (This article appears in a special issue "Husserl and other Phenomenologists" which i edited for The European Legacy: Towards New Paradigms, 21, 5-6, 2016)
Philosophical Inquiries X/2 , 2022
Dan Zahavi's latest book on Husserl has many merits. Not only does it offer a clear, sharp, and detailed reconstruction of the Husserlian phenomenological project, but it also stands out for its ambitious aim of highlighting the usefulness of a sound reading of historical texts to address theoretical questions. To do this, Zahavi choses to focus less on the analyses Husserl devoted to various concrete topics than on the general "methodological and metaphilosophical" (p. 2) aspects of his philosophy. These latter correspond to the three topics evoked in the book's subheading, which one might summarize into three questions: What does a phenomenological method amount to? Is phenomenology necessarily a transcendental philosophy? And what (if any) metaphysical implications does it entail? Despite the massive interpretative work that Husserlian scholarship has been undertaking during the last decades, a great deal of unjustified prejudices and misunderstandings on these issues remains. Thus, for instance, Husserl's approach is often misinterpreted as introspectivist, internalist, representationalist, phenomenalistic, solipsistic, Cartesian-to mention only a few. Throughout the book, Zahavi sweeps away many of them one by one, by showing them as baseless when compared with a cautious reading of Husserl's theses. Admittedly, not all the controversies faced in the book derive from such superficial and rough readings. Quite the contrary, most of them have challenged appreciable scholars, and even the phenomenologists who worked close to Husserl himself. This is chiefly the case for the question as to how to understand Husserl's claim of idealism. And, as I perceive it, the several reflections carried on are basically different steps to address and settle this issue and discuss its main implications, in the light of contemporary philosophy. In this sense, the core of the book is represented by chapter 4, in which Zahavi illustrates the kind of idealism Husserl was committed to. The three forerunning chapters deal with the methodological role of reflection to carry phenomenological investigation (ch. 1) and with Husserl's conceptions of phenomenology before (ch. 2) and after (ch. 3) the so-called transcendental turn.
Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl.
This volume brings together essays by leading phenomenologists and Husserl scholars in which they engage with the legacy of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. It is a broad anthology addressing many major topics in phenomenology and philosophy in general, including articles on phenomenological method; investigations in anthropology, ethics, and theology; highly specialized research into typically Husserlian topics such as perception, image consciousness, reality, and ideality; as well as investigations into the complex relation between pure phenomenology, phenomenological psychology, and cognitive science. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Preface by U. Melle PART I The Nature and Method of Phenomenology 1 Husserl on First Philosophy by R. Sokolowski 2 Le sens de la phénoménologie by M. Richir 3 Transzendentale Phänomenologie? by R. Bernet 4 Husserl and the ‘absolute’ by D. Zahavi 5 Husserls Beweis für den transzendentalen Idealismus by U. Melle 6 Phenomenology as First Philosophy: A Prehistory by S. Luft 7 Der methodologische Transzendentalismus der Phänomenologie by L. Tengelyi PART II Phenomenology and the Sciences 8 Husserl contra Carnap : la démarcation des sciences by D. Pradelle 9 Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse by D. Lohmar 10 Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl’s early Criticism of Brentano by D. Fisette 11 Mathesis universalis et géométrie : Husserl et Grassmann by V. Gérard III Phenomenology and Consciousness 12 Tamino’s Eyes, Pamina’s Gaze: Husserl’s Phenomenology of Image-Consciousness Refashioned by N. de Warren 13 Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity by H. Jacobs 14 Husserl’s Subjectivism: The “thoroughly peculiar ‘forms’” of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Mind by S. Crowell 15 “So You Want to Naturalize Consciousness?” “Why, why not?” – “But How?” Husserl meeting some offspring by E. Marbach 16 Philosophy and ‘Experience’: A Conflict of Interests? by F. Mattens PART IV Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy 17 Self-Responsibility and Eudaimonia by J. Drummond 18 Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Handelns: Überlegungen zu Davidson und Husserl by K. Mertens 19 Husserl und das Faktum der praktischen Vernunft:Anstoß und Herausforderung einer phänomenologischen Ethik der Person by S. Loidolt 20 Erde und Leib: Ort der Ökologie nach Husserl by H.R. Sepp PART V Reality and Ideality 21 The Universal as “What is in Common”: Comments on the Proton-Pseudos in Husserl’s Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence by R. Sowa 22 Die Kulturbedeutung der Intentionalität: Zu Husserls Wirklichkeitsbegriff by E.W. Orth 23 La partition du réel : Remarques sur l’eidos, la phantasia, l’effondrement du monde et l’être absolu de la conscience by C. Majolino 24 Husserl’s Mereological Argument for Intentional Constitution by A. Serrano de Haro 25 Phenomenology in a different voice: Husserl and Nishida in the 1930s by T. Sakakibara 26 Thinking about Non-Existence by L. Alweiss 27 Gott in Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie by K. Held"