mirror NeuroNs aNd sympathy iN adam smith: comparisoN betweeN two perspectives of empathy, iN froNt of scieNtific reductioNism (original) (raw)

2014

Abstract

This work presents a comparison between the Adam Smith’s description of sympathy in the book The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TSM) and the empathy understood as a psychological phenomenon in Neuroscience. This comparison is developed in three moments: in that of the genesis of empathy, in the configuration of empathic capacity during human development and in the social and moral implications of empathy. Despite the temporary and epistemic distance of both perspectives, they have common views: the recognition of empathy as a connatural phenomenon to the human being and the modulation or development of empathy in social interaction. These perspectives have differences related to the social and moral implications of empathy. The TSM identifies empathy as a source of morality. Neuroscience understands empathy as part of a functionalistic moral system.

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