The interactive effect of empathy and motor cortex stimulation on hand gesture comprehension (original) (raw)

The interaction between embodiment and empathy in facial expression recognition

Previous research has demonstrated that the Action-Observation Network (AON) is involved in both emotionalembodiment (empathy) and action-embodiment mechanisms. In this study, we hypothesized that interfering with the AON will impair action recognition and that this impairment will be modulated by empathy levels. In Experiment 1 (n ¼ 90), participants were asked to recognize facial expressions while their facial motion was restricted. In Experiment 2 (n ¼ 50), we interfered with the AON by applying transcranial Direct Current Stimulation to the motor cortex. In both experiments, we found that interfering with the AON impaired the performance of participants with high empathy levels; however, for the first time, we demonstrated that the interference enhanced the performance of participants with low empathy. This novel finding suggests that the embodiment module may be flexible, and that it can be enhanced in individuals with low empathy by simple manipulation of motor activation.

Motor empathy is a consequence of misattribution of sensory information in observers

Frontiers in human neuroscience, 2014

Human behavior depends crucially on the ability to interact with others and empathy has a critical role in enabling this to occur effectively. This can be an unconscious process and based on natural instinct and inner imitation (Montag et al., 2008) responding to observed and executed actions (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007). Motor empathy relating to painful stimuli is argued to occur via the mirror system in motor areas (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001). Here we investigated the effects of the location of emotional information on the responses of this system. Motor evoked potential (MEP) amplitudes from the right first dorsal interosseus (FDI) muscle in the hand elicited by single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) delivered over the left motor cortex were measured while participants observed a video of a needle entering a hand over the FDI muscle, representing a painful experience for others. To maintain subjects' internal representation across different viewing dist...

Neural mechanisms of empathy in humans: A relay from neural systems for imitation to limbic areas

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2003

How do we empathize with others? A mechanism according to which action representation modulates emotional activity may provide an essential functional architecture for empathy. The superior temporal and inferior frontal cortices are critical areas for action representation and are connected to the limbic system via the insula. Thus, the insula may be a critical relay from action representation to emotion. We used functional MRI while subjects were either imitating or simply observing emotional facial expressions. Imitation and observation of emotions activated a largely similar network of brain areas. Within this network, there was greater activity during imitation, compared with observation of emotions, in premotor areas including the inferior frontal cortex, as well as in the superior temporal cortex, insula, and amygdala. We understand what others feel by a mechanism of action representation that allows empathy and modulates our emotional content. The insula plays a fundamental r...

Functional imaging of face and hand imitation: towards a motor theory of empathy

NeuroImage, 2004

Empathy requires the ability to map the feelings of others onto our own nervous system. Until recently, there was no plausible mechanism to explain how such a mapping might occur. The discovery of mirror neurons, however, suggests that the nervous system is capable of mapping the observed actions of others onto the premotor cortex of the self, at least for reaching and grasping movements. Is there a mirroring system for emotive actions, such as facial expression? Subjects (N = 15; all right-handed; eight men, seven women) watched movies of facial expressions (smile or frown) and hand movements (move index or middle finger) while brain activity was imaged using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Subjects watched the movies under three different conditions: passive viewing, active imitation, and an active motor control. Subjects also performed a verb generation task to functionally identify language-processing areas. We found evidence for a common cortical imitation circuit for both face and hand imitation, consisting of Broca's area, bilateral dorsal and ventral premotor areas, right superior temporal gyrus (STG), supplementary motor area, posterior temporo-occipital cortex, and cerebellar areas. For faces, passive viewing led to significant activation in the right ventral premotor area, whereas imitation produced bilateral activation. This result is consistent with evidence for right hemisphere (RH) dominance for emotional processing, and suggests that there may be a right hemisphere mirroring system that could provide a neural substrate for empathy.

Changes in brain activity following the voluntary control of empathy

NeuroImage, 2020

In neuroscience, empathy is often conceived as relatively automatic. The voluntary control that people can exert on brain mechanisms that map the emotions of others onto our own emotions has received comparatively less attention. Here, we therefore measured brain activity while participants watched emotional Hollywood movies under two different instructions: to rate the main characters' emotions by empathizing with them, or to do so while keeping a detached perspective. We found that participants yielded highly consistent and similar ratings of emotions under both conditions. Using intersubject correlation-based analyses we found that, when encouraged to empathize, participants' brain activity in limbic (including cingulate and putamen) and somatomotor regions (including premotor, SI and SII) synchronized more during the movie than when encouraged to detach. Using intersubject functional connectivity we found that comparing the empathic and detached perspectives revealed widespread increases in functional connectivity between large scale networks. Our findings contribute to the increasing awareness that we have voluntary control over the neural mechanisms through which we process the emotions of others.

Greater involvement of action simulation mechanisms in emotional versus cognitive empathy

Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 2018

Empathy is crucial for successful interpersonal interactions, and it is impaired in many psychiatric and neurological disorders. Action-perception matching, or action simulation mechanisms, have been suggested to facilitate empathy by supporting the simulation of perceived experience in others. However, this remains unclear, and the involvement of the action simulation circuit in cognitive empathy (the ability to adopt another's perspective) versus emotional empathy (the capacity to share and react affectively to another's emotional experience) has not been quantitatively compared. Presently, healthy adults completed a classic cognitive empathy task (false belief), an emotional empathy task, and an action simulation button-pressing task during fMRI. Conjunction analyses revealed common recruitment of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), thought to be critical for action-perception matching, during both action simulation and emotional, but not cognitive, empathy. Furthermore, ac...

Empathy: shared circuits and their dysfunctions

Neurocircuitry of Cognition, Emotion, and Behavior, 2010

Observing another individual acting upon an object triggers cerebral activity well beyond the visual cortex of the observer in areas directly involved in planning and executing actions. This we will call action simulation. Importantly, the brain does not solely simulate the actions of others but also the sensations they feel, and their emotional responses. These simulation mechanisms are most active in individuals who report being very empathic. Simulation may indeed be instrumental for our understanding of the emotional and mental state of people in our sight, and may contribute heavily to the social interactions with our peers by providing a first-person perspective on their inner feelings. Simulation mechanisms are at work at an early stage of social development and might be defective in young individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). However, the results to date regarding ASD are not clearcut, and an equal number of studies report positive and negative findings.

The Neural Correlates of Empathy: Experience, Automaticity, and Prosocial Behavior

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2012

■ Empathy is a critical aspect of human emotion that influences the behavior of individuals as well as the functioning of society. Although empathy is fundamentally a subjective experience, no studies have yet examined the neural correlates of the self-reported experience of empathy. Furthermore, although behavioral research has linked empathy to prosocial behavior, no work has yet connected empathy-related neural activity to everyday, realworld helping behavior. Lastly, the widespread assumption that empathy is an automatic experience remains largely untested. It is also unknown whether differences in trait empathy reflect either variability in the automaticity of empathic responses or the capacity to feel empathy. In this study, 32 participants completed a diary study of helping behavior followed by an fMRI session, assessing empathic responses to sad images under three conditions: watching naturally, under cognitive load, and while empathizing. Across conditions, higher levels of self-reported experienced empathy were associated with greater activity in medial PFC (MPFC). Activity in MPFC was also correlated with daily helping behavior. Self-report of empathic experience and activity in empathy-related areas, notably MPFC, were higher in the empathize condition than in the load condition, suggesting that empathy is not a fully automatic experience. Additionally, high trait empathy participants displayed greater experienced empathy and stronger MPFC responses than low trait empathy individuals under cognitive load, suggesting that empathy is more automatic for individuals high in trait empathy. These results underline the critical role that MPFC plays in the instantiation of empathic experience and consequent behavior. ■

The Social Neuroscience of Empathy

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 2009

Empat hy is a complex psychological response in which observation, memory, knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of others . There is broad agreement about two primary components of empathy: (1) an affective response to another person, which may (but not always) entail sharing that person's emotional state; and (2) a cognitive capacity to take the other person's perspective (e.g., . Definitional variations on these general statements abound. However, virtually all empathy researchers agree that empathy requires making a link between the self and other, but without confusing the self and other. With this point in mind, our goal in this chapter is to bridge social psychological studies of empathy with findings from neuroscience in order to identify the fundamental neural mechanisms that could serve as the basis for empathy.