Contingency, Arbitrariness, and the Basis of Moral Equality (original) (raw)

The basis of human moral status

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2010

When philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species -in this case, human beings -over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status.

On the Basis of Moral Equality: A Rejection of the Relation-First Approach

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2019

The principle of moral equality is one of the cornerstones of any liberal theory of justice. It is usually assumed that persons’ equal moral status should be grounded in the equal possession of a status-conferring property. Call this the property-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This approach, however, faces some well-known difficulties: in particular, it is difficult to see how the possession of a scalar property can account for persons’ equal moral status. A plausible way of circumventing such difficulties is to explore another avenue for the justification of persons’ equal moral status: moral equality should be grounded in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors. Call this the relation-first approach to the basis of moral equality. This paper aims at providing some reasons as to why this approach should be rejected and clarifying why the property-first approach still represents the most promising way of justifying the commitment to moral equality. Two objections will be pressed against the relation-first approach: first, grounding moral equality in the wrongness of treating others as inferiors gives rise to some disturbing normative implications; second, relation-first accounts cannot vindicate the idea that a range of beings has equal fundamental rights. This, however, is precisely what an account of moral equality is meant to justify. The paper, then, concludes that the relation-first approach fails to provide a plausible answer to the question of the basis of moral equality. Property-first accounts, whatever problems they encounter, are still more viable in principle.

A Pluralist Account of the Basis of Moral Status

Philosophical Studies, 2021

Standard liberal theories of justice rest on the assumption that only those beings that hold the capacity for moral personality (CMP) have moral status and therefore are right-holders. As many pointed out, this has the disturbing implication of excluding a wide range of entities from the scope of justice. Call this the under-inclusiveness objection. This paper provides a response to the under-inclusiveness objection and illustrates its implications for liberal theories of justice. In particular, the paper defends two claims: first, it argues that both the CMP and the potential capacity for moral personality (PCMP) are bases of moral status. This pluralist account of the basis of moral status can broaden the scope of justice and provide a solid philosophical justification for the common-sense intuition that almost all human beings have a moral status that is different and superior to that of nonhuman animals. Second, contra what is commonly suggested, it contends that potential and actual moral persons have different and unequal rights, other things being equal.

Why the Concept of Moral Status Should Be Abandoned

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2017

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value (either final or intrinsic, or instrumental) of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether.

Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status

Clarke, S., Zohny, H. and Savulescu, J. (eds.) Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-19., 2021

Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future require us to try to think clearly about what it is to have moral status and about when and why we should attribute moral status to beings and entities. What should we say about the moral status of human non-human chimeras, human brain organoids, artificial intelligence, cyborgs, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into a computer, or onto the internet? In this introductory chapter, we survey some key assumptions ordinarily made about moral status that may require rethinking. These include the assumptions that all humans who are not severely cognitively impaired have equal moral status, that possession of the sophisticated cognitive capacities typical of human adults is necessary for full moral status, that only humans can have full moral status, and that there can be no beings with higher moral status than ordinary adult humans. We also need to consider how we should treat beings and entities when we find ourselves uncertain about their moral status.

On the Idea of Degrees of Moral Status

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2023

A central question in contemporary ethics and political philosophy concerns which entities have moral status. In this article, I provide a detailed analysis of the view that moral status comes in degrees. I argue that degrees of moral status can be specified along two dimensions: (i) the weight of the reason to protect an entity’s morally significant rights and interests; and/or (ii) the rights and interests that are considered morally significant. And I explore some of the complexities that arise when we link degrees of moral status to the weight of reasons to protect bundles and/or the content and size of these bundles, in particular regarding the attribution of moral status to nonparadigmatic entities (e.g. people with severe cognitive disabilities, children, embryos and foetuses, robots, non-human animals, ecosystems, and rivers).

Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2008

Some people contend that fetuses have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sentient animals have moral status but less than that of persons. These positions suggest that moral status admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral status and presenting two models of degrees of moral status. It then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. Despite the political polarization of the abortion issue, there has been considerable attention in recent decades to the moderate thesis that human fetuses, or at least some fetuses, have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons. 1 If this thesis is correct, there are degrees of moral status; the latter isn't all-or-nothing. Also in recent decades, the claim that sentient nonhuman animals deserve moral consideration on account of their interests or welfare-and not merely for humancentered reasons-has become much more widely accepted. 2 Many who embrace this claim, however, would deny that animals' moral status equals that of human persons. Their position, too, suggests that moral status admits of degrees.

Simulating the Substance View: A Lightweight Case for Human Moral Equality

2018

A key premise of one standard argument for the view that abortion is immoral (and for many other "conservative" views in bioethics) is that all human beings are equal in moral status, so that it is morally permissible to kill a given unborn human being under a given set of circumstances only if it would be morally permissible to kill a normal, adult human being under equivalent circumstances. This, many critics charge, seems unmotivated: Why should the mere fact that I am a member of the species homo sapiens carry any moral significance? One relatively recent strand of thought, which has been dubbed "the substance view of human persons" (or simply "the substance view"), seeks to answer this objection by arguing, very roughly, that all human organisms have rational natures, and that this is what endows them with their moral status. However, the substance view comes prepackaged with a controversial, Aristotelian metaphysics, and will therefore not do much to convince the many who do not already accept such a metaphysics. This work outlines a case for human moral equality which is analogous to that given by proponents of the substance view, but premised on more modest, less controversial metaphysical assumptions. Instead of grounding human moral equality in the claim that all human organisms have rational natures, it argues, we may ground it in the less controversial claim that all human organisms have what I call the genetic basis for rationality. First, I explain and defend the claim that all or nearly all human organisms have the genetic basis for rationality. Then, I argue that if, as seems very plausible, rationality itself is a sufficient condition of the sort of moral status had by fully-developed human persons like you or me, then having the genetic basis for rationality is sufficient for that same sort of moral status. Finally, I investigate what does-and doesn't-follow from the conclusion that all human organisms are moral equals. Along the way, I also address questions about dispositions, personal identity, and the nature of rationality. First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisors, Morten Magelssen and Bjørn Ramberg. Their thorough and insightful feedback has spurred many of the best ideas that are found in the coming pages, and gently steered me away from countless bad ones. Thanks also to Øyvind Johannes Vardenaer Evenstad and Patrick Winther-Larsen, who both took the time to read and comment on an earlier draft of this thesis, and to Dag August Schmedling Dramer and Øystein Linnebo for helpful comments on a presentation of what would eventually become its third chapter. And, last but not least, thanks to my family for their constant encouragement and support. 4 The Genetic Criterion 55 4.1 Why not the Genetic Criterion? 55 4.11 Why not human moral equality? 55 4.12 The Mix-Up 60 4.13 Interests 62 4.2 Why the Genetic Criterion? 64 4.21 How does first-order rationality generate rights? 64 4.211 Rationally specific goods 65 4.212 How rationally specific goods generate rights 67 4.22 (How) does second-order rationality generate rights? 71 4.221 The consequentialist account again 71 4.222 General morals 80