Recovering the Resurrection (original) (raw)

Surviving Resurrection

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.

Liberty University is Resurrection Atemporally Simultaneous with Death? Using Aquinas’s Theory

2010

In debates on the metaphysics of resurrection, it seems that philosophical theolog y is often arguing on the wrong fronts. While some philosophers and theologians spend their time arguing the feasibility of a person’s bodily numerical identity at resurre ction, whether or not a human being can exist apart from their body, or whether the resurrection is phys ical at all (among many other points of view) this thesis seeks to argue a more foundational iss ue: God’s eternal/atemporal existence and how it affects the resurrection of mankind. If it can be shown that God’s eternal/atemporal existence allows for a person to experience s multaneity in their death and future resurrection, then physical resurrection can be affirmed along w ith umerical identity between the “body sown” and “body raised,” and further arguments conce rning a possible disembodied existence can be declared irrelevant (among other ramific ations). Motivated by two vexing passages of Scripture, Matthew 22:29-33 and L...

Rethinking Resurrection: Choosing Interdisciplinary Dialogue Over Dualism

2016

Christianity is plagued by two dualistic concepts: first, an ontological dualism that divides the human person into body and soul, and second, an epistemological dualism that claims science and theology are incompatible. However, these polarized (and polarizing) theological frameworks are no longer sufficient, especially as scientific research provides new understanding about the brain and human identity. The existence of the nonphysical soul has long been called into question, thereby creating a theological crisis at the very core of Christian belief: the resurrection. This thesis will examine the crisis as it manifests itself in contemporary Christian society, pointing to the perpetuation of dualistic philosophies as the source of a theological impasse. Finally, it will propose an interdisciplinary solution, revisiting resurrection theology in dialogue with modern science, and providing a way forward for those who seek a way both to participate in the resurrected life, and to proc...

Thomas Aquinas on human persistence between death and the resurrection

MPHIL Thesis KULeuen, 2010

I argue that neither Robert Pasanau nor Eleanor Stump have it right concerning Aquinas on Human Persistence during the Intermediate State. Rather, I show that in the Summa Theologica, Thomas is best interpreted as holding to a predicative principle of a 'Principle-part as the whole' or (PAW). When using PAW, Thomas is 'loosely speaking' of the disembodied soul as the person. 'Strictly speaking' is when Thomas is being precise. 'Strictly Speaking', the soul is not the person between death and the resurrection. I support this interpretation noting that neither Pasanau nor Stump's approaches are explicitly used by Thomas. Rather, Thomas explicitly uses PAW. I buttress PAW with a philosophical argument against Stump's' 'constitution is not identity' view.

The doctrine of “the resurrection of the same body” in early modern philosophy

Religious Studies 46 (2010), 163-183.

The Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity, but prior to the advent of such concerns there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body. Although this latter issue has exercised scholars of various ages, concern with it was particularly keen in early modern times. In this paper I chart the various ways bodily identity was conceived by early modern thinkers in connection with the resurrection, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in response.

“‘Thus Saith the Lord’: Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism and the Physicalist Problem of Resurrection Identity” in TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2.1 (2018)

Abstract: The doctrine of bodily resurrection is a core tenet of Christian faith, yet it is a doctrine fraught with several philosophical problems, the most significant of which concerns the persistence of personal identity. This is especially true for physicalist accounts of human nature. Here I put forth a possible solution to the problem of resurrection identity. Turning to the theology of the 18th century American colonial theologian, Jonathan Edwards, as a resource, I argue for what I am calling “Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism.” This is a form of anti-criterialism in which pre- and post-resurrection bodies are identical because God treats these bodies a metaphysically one. After providing a sketch of this view I defend Edwardsean Anti-Criterialism from two objections and provide three reasons why Christians might be inclined to accept this proposal. Keywords: Anti-Criterialism; Identity; Jonathan Edwards; Metaphysics; Resurrection