Mafia State：The Evolving Threat of North Korean Narcotics Trafficking (original) (raw)
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North Korean Review, 2013
IntroductionIt is widely accepted that ups and downs in the abuse of narcotics often follow cycles which are similar to those observed with infectious diseases: a sudden upsurge in the popularity of some addictive substance is followed by the decline. These periods of sudden upsurges in drug use are frequently described as "epidemics."Admittedly, some scholars express their doubts as to whether the term "epidemic" is applicable to the rising levels of drug abuse,1 but the term is used widely and a majority of experts do not see it as problematic.2 Michael Agar, one of the world's most prominent drug anthropologists, says quite unequivocally: "Illicit drug epidemics happen all time. They are 'epidemics' because a fairly constant and low baseline rate of dependence increases dramatically over a short period of time."3 As typical and oft-cited examples of such epidemics one might mention the methamphetamine epidemics in Japan in the period 1945-55 or the crack epidemics in the United States in the period 1984-93.While conducting research on the everyday life of North Koreans in North Korea of the early 2000s, we came across multiple instances of persuasive evidence which indicates that from around 2005 or 2006, the northern areas of the country (or perhaps the country at large) were hit by a dramatic upsurge in methamphetamine abuse which can be described as a "drug epidemic." Recently, this epidemic has reached proportions which are unprecedented for North Korea.The numerous interviews with defectors paint a worrying picture of escalating drug abuse in what once was one of the world's most strictly supervised and controlled societies. This evidence comes from multiple unconnected sources, and in most cases the testimony of refugees is remarkably consistent.The goal of this article is to outline the ongoing methamphetamine epidemic and to trace its origins and the ways in which it has spread throughout North Korean society. This phenomenon is quite recent, and it has remained underreported and understudied (indeed, almost unknown outside a narrow circle of specialists). This article is based on a number of unstructured in-depth interviews with North Korean refugees currently residing in South Korea (most of the informants come from the borderland North Hamgyong province and leftNorth Korea in recent years). We conducted interviews with 21 recently arrived refugees, most of whom leftNorth Korea after 2007. To protect interviewees, we used numbers (B-01 to B-24). The basic biographical data of the refugees can be found in Table 1.The phenomenon of private drug production has been mentioned in an interesting article by Yun Minwoo and Eunyoung Kim.4 This article agrees with their conclusions, but elaborates it further while choosing an anthropological, rather than sociological, approach to the problem, with special attention being paid to the emerging culture of the drug abuse.The present study has some limitations which should be stated clearly. First, our interviewees overwhelmingly come from the northern part of the country. In most cases they are natives of North Hamgyong province. It is not clear to what extent our findings can be applied to other areas of North Korea. Another issue is the nearcomplete absence of statistical data. Due to political and ideological reasons, the very existence of the drug problem cannot be admitted by the North Korean authorities, so no official data-even in the unlikely case that such data is properly collected-has ever been released. Therefore, the research has to be of a qualitative and ethnographic nature. Nonetheless, in spite of all limitations, our findings indicate that new, potentially socially disruptive developments are taking place in North Korean society. We believe that this new phenomenon should be studied, especially because it has some important political and practical implications.The "Old" Drug ProblemNorth Korea is often associated with drugs-one might even say that this association is the impoverished country's second claim to international fame/notoriety (the first being its nuclear program, of course). …
2016
In this presentation I underline the importance of analyzing the illicit trade activities which the North Korean state employees had organized prior to their defection. Their supply chains are not targetted by the control measures which the United Nations Security Council has implemented to counter the state-organized trade activities that have their origins in North Korea. Hence, in case of a system collapse the supply chains of the state employee-organized trade could serve for the purpose of a WMD proliferation. The latter risk neither has been resarched nor openly discussed among scholars yet. My research shall facilitate further research and an open discussion for an adjustment of the UNSC´s sanctions to better tackle the risk of a WMD proliferation in case of a regime instability or a system collapse.
The Black Markets of North Korea
Modern Economy, 2019
The aim of this paper is to provide insight into the foreign and domestic economies of North Korea, particularly concerning illicit black market activities. Regime doctrine of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been adamant about the country's sustained self reliance, often making claims of this nature through public broadcasts to its citizens. However, through sources demonstrated in this essay North Korea has been shown to be engaging in black markets across the globe, including high quality currency counterfeiting, arms dealing and drug production and trafficking. North Korea's goal of obtaining nuclear weaponry as a means of deterrent against "imperialist" invasion has lead to numerous sanctions imposed by the United Nations in an attempt to obstruct these ambitions. As a result, North Korea has pursued illicit means of gaining funds for their nuclear program, namely the black market. Within the country itself, there has been a growing lack of trust of its citizens towards the state's Public Distribution System in accommodating for their welfare. A nationwide famine which occurred in the mid to late 90s left the country destitute with millions dying of starvation. Following this, catastrophe black markets have emerged throughout the country offering a wide range of products previously unavailable through the state's rationing system. Although North Korea maintains its claim to be a functioning communist state, this paper aims to dispute this through demonstrating the rise of the country's participation in both internal and external commercial black markets. This paper consists of an introduction giving a brief overview of the paper's aims and the divergence of regime rhetoric compared to reality. The following section outlines North Korea's emergence as a sovereign state, the ideologies which define this regime; then to the difficulties the country has faced throughout the 20th century and the measures (sanctioned or otherwise) taken to address them. The final section before the conclusion addresses how North Korea has come to depend on Black Markets as a means of financially supporting itself. This is both in relation to its citizens who depend on black markets for day to day living, as well as the regime which has used international black markets to fund the ambitions of the military state.
2009
With Compliments This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to: • Conduct research on security, strategic and international issues. • Provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, international relations, defence management and defence technology. • Promote joint and exchange programmes with similar regional and international institutions; organise seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific. Constituents of IDSS include the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and the Asian Programme for Negotiation and Conflict Management (APNCM). Research Through its Working Paper Series, IDSS Commentaries and other publications, the Institute seeks to share its research findings with the strategic studies and defence policy communities. The Institute's researchers are also encouraged to publish their writings in refereed journals. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The Institute has also established the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies (named after Singapore's first Foreign Minister), to bring distinguished scholars to participate in the work of the Institute.
National Narcotics Agencies in Southeast Asia: Relics of the Regional 'War on Drugs'
Drug Laws in Asia (Chan, Hor and Sato eds.), 2024
The four most prominent national narcotics agencies within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations grouping are the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) in Singapore, the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) in Thailand, the Badan Narkotika Nasional (BNN, National Narcotics Board) in Indonesia, and the Agensi Antidadah Kebangsaan (AADK) in Malaysia. Adopting a comparative perspective, this chapter focuses on the role played by these national narcotics agencies in drug policy and enforcement in the region, extending at the most severe extent to law enforcement for crimes attracting a sentence of capital punishment. While drawing out comparative trends, two hypotheses that the chapter assesses are that a) these four national narcotics agencies are, counterintuitively given their public prominence, mere ‘cogs in the wheel’ of national drug policymaking, the direction of which is instead determined by political actors. At the same time, b) both Southeast Asian national narcotics agencies and their staff support the death penalty for narcotics crimes and more generally espouse a punitive approach towards drug offenders, reflecting the agencies’ standing as institutional relics of the region’s ‘War on Drugs’, beginning in the 1970s. While there is some nuance from country to country, overall, both assumptions are supported by the available sources.
Transnational Drug Trafficking Across the Vietnam-Laos Border
Transnational Drug Trafficking Across the Vietnam-Laos Border, 2019
This bold and innovative series provides a much needed intellectual space for global scholars to showcase criminological scholarship in and on Asia. Reflecting upon the broad variety of methodological traditions in Asia, the series aims to create a greater multi-directional, cross-national understanding between Eastern and Western scholars and enhance the field of comparative criminology. The series welcomes contributions across all aspects of criminology and criminal justice as well as interdisciplinary studies in sociology, law, crime science and psychology, which cover the wider Asia region including China,