Marc Becker’s ¡Pachakutik! Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in Ecuador.” Latin American Politics and Society 55:3 (Winter 2013): 200-203. (original) (raw)

The Origins and Durability of Democracy

The option between democracy and its alternatives has been a central axis of political confl icts in Latin America since the early twentieth century. A prelude to these confl icts was the process of state formation, which occupied the center stage of political life in the wake of the attainment of independence by Latin American countries roughly 200 years ago. But, inasmuch as the process of state formation resulted in a recognized center of political power and hence a semblance of political order, the struggle between forces in favor and opposed to subjecting political power to democratic control moved to the fore.

Dismantling the Fragile Latin American Democracy -Notes About the Second Decade of the 21 st Century

ATINER CONFERENCE PRESENTATION SERIES No: POL2022-0255, 2022

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed a considerable number of countries expanding their democracy, legitimating social sectors historically relegated as protagonists of the decision-making process. In the midst of this process there has been a significant distribution of income, and an increase in access to public policies. Gender, race, and indigenous demands have taken place – with different levels of intensity – in the institutional environment; even though still marginal to the neoliberal offensive. Nonetheless, from the beginning of the second decade of the century, a progressive longings reversal has gained strength in the wake of a noticeable international situation. Under the neoliberal-conservative erspective, institutional access to popular demands has been reduced, and the governments have naturalised the economic inequalities and the legitimisation of violence as a prevailing method of dealing with differences. Although this scenario stands national particularities, usually related to historical and geopolitical aspects and to the correlation of forces in each country, most of the contemporary governments have been supported against republican legal foundations and the colluded media. These institutional apparatus have reinforced the state’s repressive arm with the help of a myriad of evangelical churches that corroborate them. With the conservative’ notions spreading, the neoliberal individualism enhances the proscription of social solidarity and tolerant perspectives of diversity, which are premises for contemporary democracy. This critic conjuncture demands to re-examine the debates between economic inequalities and political participation, along with the exigency for direct growing democracies.

Joe Foweraker and Dolores Trevizo, eds., Democracy and Its Discontents in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016. Tables, figures, appendixes, bibliography, index, 325 pp.; hardcover $75

Latin American Politics and Society, 2018

Democracy is the default means of organizing government in Latin America, and since the beginning of the twenty-first century, though especially during the commodity boom of 2003-2011, the region saw considerable poverty and inequality reduction. Joe Foweraker, in his introduction to this excellent volume, identifies the above as on the good side of the balance sheet. Prominent on the other side are the concentration of power in the executive branch and the persistence or increase in corruption and citizen insecurity. Each defect, for Foweraker, represents a concern for democracy's core: accountability (in his introduction and chapter 2). The book explores this by examining how "much" democracy, what "kind" of democracy, and how the formation of the state impacts current democratic performance in Latin America. Never far in the background is the Guillermo O'Donnell corpus, particularly his work in the 1990s (e.g., Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization, 1999), on delegative democracy, horizontal accountability, and brown spots. Indeed, Democracy and Its Discontents in Latin America echoes O'Donnell's mission to make sense of the puzzle of democracy's uneven success. The most explicit response to O'Donnell's work comes from Foweraker's chapter 2, which focuses on accountability, because it corresponds to the "lived experiences" of citizens (15). David Doyle follows this with a long-term perspective on the relationship between institutions, state capacity, and rule of law (chap. 3). He focuses on state capacity-such as between the citizen and policy effectiveness (34)-in an institutional analysis that highlights how institutions lengthen time horizons and produce more efficiency, fewer incentives for predation, and more credibility. But Latin American institutions often miss the mark. Will Barndt's analysis of political parties offers an innovative and severe explanation (chap. 12). Barndt disentangles the resources available to political parties (core capacity and abilities to recruit, self-finance, produce, and divulge publicity and to network, 205) and considers these in relation to changing demands in contemporary electoral politics. Demands outstrip inherent capacity, which leads to a structural transformation toward "corporation-based parties," parties that cohere to corporations and favor large, organized special interests to resolve resource shortcomings (such as running expensive campaigns). Political parties may enhance governability, and indeed, when Mexico's PRI signed a pact with its rivals (PAN and PRD), it improved governability, a persistent problem in that country since its democratization in the late 1990s. Yet Roderic Ai Camp (chap. 13) finds that as governability increased, public support for democracy

Building Democracy … Which Democracy? Ideology and Models of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America

Politics in Latin America continued to be about democracy after the democratic transitions in Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. An old concern – securing the minimal standard of democracy that had served as the goal of democratic transitions – remained relevant. But a new concern – the attainment of more than a minimal democracy – transformed politics about democracy. Actors who supported and opposed neoliberalism – the key axis of ideological conflict – advocated and resisted political changes in the name of different models of democracy. And the conflict over which model of democracy would prevail shaped Latin America’s post-transition trajectories, determining how democracy developed and, in turn, whether democracy endured.

Democracy and Political Institutions in Latin America: Reconciling Approaches

Latin American Research Review, 2004

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Special Issue of Democratization: On the State of Democracy, Julio Faundez (ed

2009

The debate between modernization theory and its opponents is over. Neither evidence nor argument can support the claim that authoritarianism is necessary for economic development. However, is democracy necessary for development, as opposed to obviously being desirable on other grounds? The evidence on how democracy actually operates in developing countries raises important questions about the relationship between markets, states, and democracies. In particular, the role of patron-client networks in these countries questions the relevance of the standard arguments made for the positive economic effects of democracy in developing countries. There is, however, an argument from the neo-Weberian school that claims that democratization can begin to undermine the patron-client relationships (neo-patrimonialism) that impede development. But in fact, there are powerful structural reasons why this is not likely to happen. Economic characteristics of developing countries make patron-client politics both rational for redistributive coalitions and effective as strategies for achieving the goals of powerful constituencies within these coalitions. These are unlikely to be affected by democratization. The evidence strongly supports our analysis. If this is right, and if many types of patron-client politics are damaging for development, democratization is unlikely