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The Marshallian theory of the firm contains previously unrecognised mathematical contradictions which render the theory meaningless. Perfect competition and the welfare ideal of price equal to marginal cost are incompatible with profit maximising behaviour, the comparison of a competitive industry to a monopoly is invalid, and the static profit maximisation principle is false in a dynamic setting. Economics must abandon the theoretical analysis of production based on diminishing marginal productivity, and instead build an empirical microeconomics based on the substantial literature on the behaviour of actual firms.
This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. We categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrøm and Milgrom's theory of the firm as an incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon) as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy). We argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems to be emerging. JEL classification: K22, L22
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This chapter is a survey of modern theories of the firm. We categorize these as belonging either to the principal-agent or the incomplete contracting approach. In the former category fall, for example, the Alchian and Demsetz moral hazard in teams theory as well as Holmstrøm and Milgrom's theory of the firm as an incentive system. Belonging to the incomplete contracting branch are theories that stress the importance of the employment relationship (for example, Coase and Simon) as an adaptation mechanism, theories that stress the importance of ownership of assets for affecting incentives when contracts must be renegotiated (Williamson, Grossman and Hart, Hart and Moore), and some recent work on implicit contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy). We argue that these different perspectives on the firm should be viewed as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive and that a synthesis seems to be emerging. JEL classification: K22, L22