Commentary: “An Evaluation of Universal Grammar and the Phonological Mind”—UG Is Still a Viable Hypothesis (original) (raw)
Related papers
The controversial nature of Universal Grammar
There are plenty of theories that attempt to address a number of issues on first language acquisition. However, only one has dominated language acquisition research for decades and set the direction in every respect, namely, the Universal Grammar theory. It has become the most widely used linguistic theory, which has influenced the research not only on the first language acquisition but also on second language acquisition and linguistics in general. And yet we have little or rather no straightforward evidence whatsoever and, strictly speaking, it remains a hypothesis, which is difficult to cope with. Moreover, its nature is more than questionable in many respects. The aim of this paper is to tackle the controversial nature of first language acquisition that has puzzled and will puzzle many of us for a long time. The paper is laid out in the following way. First, I will provide a brief overview of the Universal Grammar theory, its main principles and assumptions. Second, I will try to outline the major proposition that drives such a theory, which will eventually come under closer scrutiny. Furthermore, I will try to provide my own insights and shed some light on the differences between first language acquisition and second language acquisition that are also crucial for the generative grammar theory. In the end, I will try to draw some conclusions and queries for further discussions. Please note that given the space limitations of this paper I will be necessarily selective and brief.
Phonology in Universal Grammar
The Oxford Handbooks of Universal Grammar, 2017
In order to investigate the phonological component of Universal Grammar (UG), we must first clarify what exactly the concept of UG involves. 1 The terms 'Universal Grammar' and 'Language Acquisition Device' (LAD) are often treated as synonymous, 2 but we believe that it is important to distinguish between the two. We take a grammar to be a computational system that transduces conceptual-intentional representations into linear (but multidimensional) strings of symbols to be interpreted by the various physical systems employed to externalize linguistic messages. It thus includes the traditional syntactic, morphological, and phonological components, but not phonetics, which converts the categorical symbols output by the grammar into gradient representations implementable by the body. Bearing the above definition of 'grammar' in mind, we take 'Universal Grammar' to refer specifically to the initial state of this computational system that all normal humans bring to the task of learning their first language (cf. Hale and Reiss 2008:2; and chapters 5, 10, and 12). The phonological component of this initial state may contain, inter alia, rules (the 'processes' of Natural Phonology Stampe 1979), violable constraints (as in Calabrese's 1988, 1995 marking statements or Optimality Theory (OT)'s markedness and
Phonology without universal grammar
Frontiers in Psychology, 2015
The question of identifying the properties of language that are specific human linguistic abilities, i.e., Universal Grammar, lies at the center of linguistic research. This paper argues for a largely Emergent Grammar in phonology, taking as the starting point that memory, categorization, attention to frequency, and the creation of symbolic systems are all nonlinguistic characteristics of the human mind. The articulation patterns of American English rhotics illustrate categorization and systems; the distribution of vowels in Bantu vowel harmony uses frequencies of particular sequences to argue against Universal Grammar and in favor of Emergent Grammar; prefix allomorphy in Esimbi illustrates the Emergent symbolic system integrating phonological and morphological generalizations. The Esimbi case has been treated as an example of phonological opacity in a Universal Grammar account; the Emergent analysis resolves the pattern without opacity concerns.
Cognition, universal grammar, and typological generalizations. Lingua 130 (2013) 50--65
We consider here two potential arguments for Universal Grammar other than that based on poverty of the stimulus. One stems from the limited number of notions that are grammatically encoded in the languages of the world. The other rests on the fact that of all mathematically possible orders of constituents only a subset is actually attested. Neither limitation appears to follow naturally from cognitive, historical, cultural, processing, or other factors; which makes it plausible to think of them as forced upon us by Universal Grammar, perhaps as a consequence of how it crystallized at some distant point of the evolution of our species.
Cognition, universal grammar, and typological generalizations
Lingua, 2013
We consider here two potential arguments for Universal Grammar other than that based on poverty of the stimulus. One stems from the limited number of notions that are grammatically encoded in the languages of the world. The other rests on the fact that of all mathematically possible orders of constituents only a subset is actually attested. Neither limitation appears to follow naturally from cognitive, historical, cultural, processing, or other factors; which makes it plausible to think of them as forced upon us by Universal Grammar, perhaps as a consequence of how it crystallized at some distant point of the evolution of our species.
Cognition, typological generalizations, and Universal Grammar 1
We consider here two potential arguments for Universal Grammar other than that based on poverty of the stimulus. One stems from the limited number of notions that are grammatically encoded in the languages of the world. The other rests on the fact that of all mathematically possible orders of constituents only a subset is actually attested. Neither limitation appears to follow naturally from cognitive, historical, cultural, processing, or other factors; which makes it plausible to think of them as forced upon us by Universal Grammar, perhaps as a consequence of how it crystallized at some distant point of the evolution of our species.
Two case studies in phonological universals: A view from artificial grammars
2010
This article summarizes the results of two experiments that use artificial grammar learning in order to test proposed phonological universals. The first universal involves limits on precedence-modification in phonological representations, drawn from a typology of ludlings (language games). It is found that certain unattested precedence-modifying operations in ludlings are also dispreferred in learning in experimental studies, suggesting that the typological gap reflects a principled and universal aspect of language structure.
This article is an analysis of the claim that a universal ban on certain (‘anti-markedness’) gram- mars is necessary in order to explain their nonoccurrence in the languages of the world. Such a claim is based on the following assumptions: that phonological typology shows a highly asym- metric distribution, and that such a distribution cannot possibly arise ‘naturally’—that is, without a universal grammar-based restriction of the learner’s hypothesis space. Attempting to test this claim reveals a number of open issues in linguistic theory. In the first place, there exist critical as- pects of synchronic theory that are not specified explicitly enough to implement computationally. Second, there remain many aspects of linguistic competence, language acquisition, sound change, and even typology that are still unknown. It is not currently possible, therefore, to reach a definitive conclusion about the necessity, or lack thereof, of an innate substantive grammar module. This article thus serves two main functions: acting both as a pointer to the areas of phonological theory that require further development, especially at the overlap between traditionally separate subdomains, and as a template for the type of argumentation required to defend or attack claims about phonological universals.