Has the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Done Enough to Meet Its Legislated Objectives and Prepare Australia for the Next Financial Crisis? (original) (raw)
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Australian Prudential Regulation Before and After the Global Financial Crisis
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
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Australian Financial Prudential Supervision: An Historical View
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 2000
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Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans
2011
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xa.yimg.com, 2012
The regulation or non-regulation of finance and its extent and forms has always been an issue in the historical development of capitalism. This issue is crucial for the system's modus operandi since in capitalism money (and its provision, i.e. finance) operates as capital (i.e. the provider of the means for entrepreneurial activities), whereas its importance in previous socioeconomic systems was significantly less. This paper argues that there is an inherent insoluble contradiction between capitalism's tendency to unleash finance and its need to rein in the resulting instabilities. The paper argues that although the crisis shows the need for re-regulation, there are significant vested interests that deny this need. The rampant internationalization of money and capital markets in recent decades has created a global power structure that favours internationalized finance. This global power structure has promoted national reforms that have curtailed regulation and led to extreme open-market practices (i.e. the model of private banking). The crisis signifies the failure of this model. However, the global power of international finance remains and thus blocks any moves to circumvent it. The paper ends with a call for public banking as a means of reforming the financial aspects of the current crisis to the benefit of labour.
The Limits of Prudential Supervision: Economic Problems, Institutional Failure and Competence
1993
Bank supervision typically receives little if any attention when banks are operating without difficulty. But when banks fail in large numbers, or large banks fail, and the system itself is threatened, supervision becomes a focal point for criticism and reform (see, for example, Conference Report, 1989, Title I, IX; Pecchioli, 1987, pp. 11 ff.; and Comptroller General of the U.S., 1977).2 On such occasions, institutional changes may take equal billing with the "improvement" of supervision. But as often as not, the only thing Congress can agree on is that supervision needs to be better. This usually translates into more supervisors operating with more authority, The repeated augmentation of bank supervision may give the impression that it is a solution rather that a symptom of