Fine-tuning EU foreign policy: A joint approach between the new Commission and the European External Action Service? (original) (raw)
Related papers
The European External Action Service: Towards a More Coherent EU Foreign Policy
2016
From the inception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the new institutional reforms brought about by the Lisbon Treaty in the European Union (EU)'s external relations realm, the EU has constantly tried to improve its institutional structure in order to enhance its international role. Undeniably, the Lisbon Treaty and its series of institutional reforms can be deemed as a major step to improve the consistency and effective engagement of the Union's external action. However, this engagement often brings in the foreground issues of member states' heterogeneity and EU (in-)cohesion that are extremely relevant to our understanding of the EU's role in the international system. The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) comprises a significant evolution and, perhaps, the most innovative institutional development fashioned by the Lisbon Treaty. Not only does Union now have an independent actor to deal with all issues relating to its external relations: the EEAS᾽ synthesis, with personnel coming from the Commission, the Council Secretariat plus diplomats from the 28 EU member-states, also constitutes a unique body to manage all supranational and intergovernmental aspects of EU foreign policy under the same roof. Hence—almost six years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS genesis—the scope of this paper is threefold: a) to explain the nature, scope and structure of this new institutional actor in the EU's foreign policy system, b) to shed light on its position vis-à-vis all major players of the EU foreign policy system including the European Council, the Commission and the European Parliament (EP), and c) to postulate a preliminary assessment of its function from 2010 onwards. Our analysis is based on official EU documentation, secondary literature and twenty-one semi-structured interviews with officials in Brussels from October 2014 to February 2016.
The EU’s External Action Service: Potentials for a one voice Foreign Policy
2014
With the end of the political and ideological confrontations of the East-West confl ict in 1989/90 and the opening of state borders within Europe, democracy, peace and prosperity EU´s One Voice On the other hand, scholars and practitioners in the fi eld of EU´s external relations proved a standstill in the development especially of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). They also impressively argued the need for an innovative approach towards confl ict resolution and confl ict management. One of the reasons for the standstill is identifi ed in the lack of willingness amongst the EU member states towards the improvement and innovation of European security. As an example, Nicole Koenig analyses the case of Libya, a "fi rst major test for the Union´s High Representative." She argued, that the "Libyan crisis showed that the member states continue hold on to their national sovereignty, particularly in the areas of diplomacy and defence. When faced with a politicised crisis that requires an immediate and forceful reaction, the Heads of State or Government will certainly not ask the High Representative or consult with the EEAS before acting in line with their national preferences, interests, and priorities." The rationale behind these tendencies is the acceleration of national interests and the confi rmation of an engrained need which equally serves as the heritage of the Cold War: the approach to strengthen national sovereignty at maximum with a minimum loss of the ability to act. Nevertheless, the various departments within the EEAS and within the other relevant actors dealing with EU external relations need to continuously and steadily network in all areas of the EU's politico-strategic level. "A number of mid-term challenges remain", say Andrea Frontini and Paul Ivan in their paper. The "full implementation as well as the more substantial consolidation of an EU 'foreign policy identity' will undoubtedly still require a considerable amount of inter-institutional negotiations, resource investment and political commitment by all parties involved." The 2013-review process of the EEAS is crucial in that matter. In their study, Ryszarda Formuszewicz and Dorota Liszczyk call for an "agreement on criteria of how to measure the success of the EEAS in terms of contributing to a more effective EU foreign policy, in particular the use of the full potential of the still relatively new Service."
This work aims to study the EEAS as an attempt by the EU to implement its common foreign policy. It will try to answer the main question that follows: Is the creation of the European External Action Service a successful step in the path of the attempt to implement the European common foreign policy? At a first look, this paper will deal with the EEAS as an effective attempt to implement the common foreign policy through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially regarding the need of consistency and coherence explained by several scholars. While, in a second part, the relative failure of this attempt will be demonstrated, in particular regarding the institutional weakness and the domination of the national interests of the EU member states.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the new quasi-EU foreign ministry established by the Treaty of Lisbon. It may be the next big player in Europe’s external relations, depending on the will of all actors involved to enable the EEAS with the necessary means. Especially the European institutions played a major part in this instance, as they bargained over the setup of the new Service. Their expectations towards the behavior of the EEAS in international relations, or external role perceptions, matter to a special degree. The European institutions represent quite different ideas with regard to the new Service. While the Commission tried to tie it as close as possible to the supranational sphere and to keep the most important foreign policy fields under the control of the College of Commissioners, the Council wanted to attach the Action Service to the member states and the intergovernmental sphere. The European Parliament as the third major actor gained access to the negotiations not until it threatened to block the financial and staff regulations regarding the Service. It made far-reaching demands on the setup of the EEAS. The Parliament envisaged the ‘foreign ministry’ as an institution, equal to those named in art. 13 TEU with close connections to the Commission and extensive responsibilities in the Union’s foreign policy. In the end, the decision establishing the EEAS illustrates a compromise between all players’ preferences.
2014
With the end of the political and ideological confrontations of the East-West confl ict in 1989/90 and the opening of state borders within Europe, democracy, peace and prosperity EU´s One Voice On the other hand, scholars and practitioners in the fi eld of EU´s external relations proved a standstill in the development especially of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). They also impressively argued the need for an innovative approach towards confl ict resolution and confl ict management. One of the reasons for the standstill is identifi ed in the lack of willingness amongst the EU member states towards the improvement and innovation of European security. As an example, Nicole Koenig analyses the case of Libya, a "fi rst major test for the Union´s High Representative." She argued, that the "Libyan crisis showed that the member states continue hold on to their national sovereignty, particularly in the areas of diplomacy and defence. When faced with a politicised crisis that requires an immediate and forceful reaction, the Heads of State or Government will certainly not ask the High Representative or consult with the EEAS before acting in line with their national preferences, interests, and priorities." The rationale behind these tendencies is the acceleration of national interests and the confi rmation of an engrained need which equally serves as the heritage of the Cold War: the approach to strengthen national sovereignty at maximum with a minimum loss of the ability to act. Nevertheless, the various departments within the EEAS and within the other relevant actors dealing with EU external relations need to continuously and steadily network in all areas of the EU's politico-strategic level. "A number of mid-term challenges remain", say Andrea Frontini and Paul Ivan in their paper. The "full implementation as well as the more substantial consolidation of an EU 'foreign policy identity' will undoubtedly still require a considerable amount of inter-institutional negotiations, resource investment and political commitment by all parties involved." The 2013-review process of the EEAS is crucial in that matter. In their study, Ryszarda Formuszewicz and Dorota Liszczyk call for an "agreement on criteria of how to measure the success of the EEAS in terms of contributing to a more effective EU foreign policy, in particular the use of the full potential of the still relatively new Service."
2016
Since 2010, the EU`s External Action Service (EEAS) is the permanent chair of the Council working groups on the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus terminating the procedural rule of EU member states alternatingly holding the presidency of such working groups for a period of sixmonths. This thesis aims therefore at exploring the consequences of the EEAS taking over the chairmanship of CFSP Council working groups, with special focus on the bearing it has had on EU Member states´ abilities to influence decisions taken in such areas. Using the theoretical framework of role theory, this thesis will highlight the importance of the interplay between role conceptions from EEAS officials and role expectations from EU member states´ delegates in order to understand how such abilities have been affected. The concepts of role conflict and role conformity will have a particular significance in this matter. The material that forms the base of this study is produced through semi-structured interviews, and will be analyzed through the lenses of mixed methods, with both quantitative and qualitative tools. The outcome of this study shows that EU member states´ abilities to influence CFSP decision-making has decreased for roles related to two fundamental dimensions, "management" and "strategic guidance", but has not been affected for roles related to the dimension of "brokerage".