The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali (original) (raw)
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Fighting for Peace: The Tricky Business of Using Greater Force in UN Peace Operations
The authority granted by the United Nations Charter to use force to protect international peace and security has long lain dormant. The end of the Cold War, the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the 'Brahimi report' put discussions on the need for greater use of force on the UN's agenda in the early 2000s. Much has changed since, but in general the increased political willingness by UN member states to authorise the use of force has developed well ahead of their risk tolerance and matching capabilities. The recent experience of the Force Intervention Brigade in the UN's mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the latest occasion to trigger useful debate about the consequences of the UN mission mandates' progressive authorization of use of force and their increasingly robust application. Unfortunately, much of this debate takes greater use of force for granted, and focuses on the required political and capability improvements for improved effectiveness. Yet, there are three major risks associated with greater use of force as well. First, as the use of force will likely be selective and temporary, it risks reducing the UN's impartiality – with problematic consequences for its status as 'neutral broker'. Second, while the use of force can be a vital component of conflict resolution strategies, it also risks militarization if it is not accompanied by better political strategies and 'civilian capacities', such as stronger policing, intelligence and mediation. Third, greater use of force risks undermining missions' statebuilding tasks where force is applied on behalf of a state that is unwilling or unable to meet the internationally agreed standards of a sovereign government. A thoughtful debate on these issues needs to go hand in hand with any discussion of capability improvements.
Partial Peace: The Politics of Taking Sides in UN Peacekeeping
In recent decisions, the UN Security Council has asked peacekeepers explicitly to take sides in conflictaffected societies, including by authorizing an intervention brigade to 'neutralize' rebel forces in the eastern DRC. But debates about the role of impartiality in peacekeeping are as old as the practice itself. This paper reviews recent Security Council resolutions in their historical context, asking where the legitimacy of impartiality comes from, how it has changed over time, and its implications for peacekeeping policy and practice. Both legitimacy and impartiality are investigated through an empirical approach, which treats them as social facts to be explained. The paper investigates the role of impartiality in the legitimation of peacekeeping-that is, the ways in which the principle of impartiality has served to make peacekeeping acceptable and appropriate to defined audiences. Specifically, it investigates three processes of legitimation: source legitimacy (coherence with rules and norms); procedural legitimacy (processes of decision-making and fairness of practices); and substantive legitimacy (outcomes and effects). The paper applies this legitimation framework to examine recent practice in light of three phases of the impartiality debate, beginning with the first articulation of a peacekeeping doctrine in 1958 and concluding with the contemporary focus on civilian protection, organised crime and counter-terrorism.
Between doctrine and practice: The UN peacekeeping dilemma
Mateja Peter (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 21(3), 351–70
Mandates of recent peacekeeping operations across Africa have shown substantial innovation in the thinking of the UN Security Council. Offensive use of force, use of unmanned aerial vehicles, strategic intelligence and communication, and state-building mandates in the midst of conflicts have all expanded the scope of activities beyond what the UN peacekeepers are accustomed to. The UN is entering a new era of enforcement peacekeeping. Enforcement peacekeeping manifests itself both in enforcement of political solutions through support of a government’s statebuilding ambitions and its attempts to extend state authority in the midst of conflict and in enforcement of military victories through the offensive use of force. These developments further unsettle the basic principles of UN peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force—resulting in a schism between the doctrine and practice. This contribution argues that such fundamental challenges, when not properly acknowledged, create a wall between operational activities and strategic considerations. They preclude a proper debate on the problematic externalities, in particular on political processes and peacebuilding.
An ‘Impartial’ Force? Normative Ambiguity and Practice Change in UN Peace Operations
International Peacekeeping, 2018
Impartiality is a core legitimating norm for United Nations peace operations. Yet beliefs about what that norm requires of UN personnel have shifted dramatically. In 2013, for example, the Security Council created an intervention brigadecomposed of infantry battalions, special forces, and an artillery companyto 'neutralize' non-state armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). According to critics, these activities violate core peacekeeping norms, including impartiality. This criticism elicits a puzzling response from many UN officials. They downplay the novelty of new practices, insisting that they are still 'impartial'. Where does this discursive pattern come from, and what does it tell us about the relationship between day-today practices and the norms that ostensibly guide UN peace operations? Drawing on evidence from the DRC, I argue that norms like impartiality may endureand remain rhetorically powerfulwithout telling us much about how practices on the ground have evolved. Instead, insisting that new practices are impartial can be a way for UN personnel to stabilize a core part of their identity under conditions of normative ambiguity. It can also be a way of glossing over contestation and preempting concerns about partiality in UN peace operations.
This Diploma dissertation aims to understand how the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect influenced the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUSCO. The FIB is an armed branch of MONUSCO with a mandate to neutralize armed groups. This deployment breaks from the principles that have guided prior Peacekeeping operations: neutrality, consent of the parties and non-use of force unless it is to protect the mandate. I will use data from the United Nations meeting records and interviews with diplomats and peacekeepers, trying to cover the UN decision making process. I argue that the RtP doctrine influenced the UN and its member States in their decision to deploy the FIB. In order to prove the influence of RtP I studied the positions of key actors involved in this process. Finally, this work focuses on Pillar II of the RtP doctrine, namely the international community‟s responsibility to assist states when they are unable to meet their duty to protect their populations.
A Blurring of Roles: Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping
Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science
There is a sober paradox involved in the use of oxymoron ‘peace operations’, as these operations, traditionallyanchored on the bedrock principles of UN peacekeeping - consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force exceptin self-defence -, are being increasingly transformed into enforcement operations. Twenty-seven years after the end of theCold War and the rebirth of the United Nations’ (UN) security role, peacekeeping operations are increasingly losing groundto an emerging pattern of more aggressive, offensive operations. They have an essentially hybrid nature, involving elementsof both peacekeeping and enforcement. Although many see them as alternative, non-reconcilable techniques, politicians andpractitioners do not see a sharp dividing line separating non-coercive and enforcement tasks, permitting an easy transitionfrom one to the other.
Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations
When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.