Europe v. America: The Transatlantic Divide over International Security (original) (raw)

Europe v. America: The Transatlantic Divide over International Security Paper delivered to the Conference on New Security Agendas in Europe, organized by the Menzies Centre, London, and the Department of War Studies, King's College London, June 2004 Remy Davison School of Government University of Tasmania In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch wrote of a transatlantic ‘security community’ More recently, Barry Buzan (1983) emphasized the profound structural implications for the international system of a ‘fully-developed’ European Union. In the post-Cold War era, both intra-European and transatlantic divisions have emerged over key issues in international security, such as fighting terrorism, and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many players in the new Europe of the post-Cold War era find themselves at significant variance with many of the security doctrines with which traditionally. These include a North Atlantic alliance; the development of Europe as a ‘third force’ in international politics; and a commitment to a wider, deeper process of European integration which sought to implement not only a single European market, but also common foreign, security and defence policies. A multi-track Europe has emerged, comprising proponents of American power; opponents of US unilateralism; and uncommitted neutrals. The newly-expanded EU from 2004 will include east European members of NATO, many of which supported US intervention in Iraq, cohabiting with ‘old Europe’ opponents of the American ‘hyperpower’, such as France and Germany. Russia, together with Germany, has also demonstrated a new willingness to act in opposition to American foreign policy. As Jean Dufourcq of the EU Military Committee argues, the transatlantic divide is ‘no longer a debatable issue; it is a reality that has resulted from a variety of convergent circumstances.’ (Dufourcq, 2004). In a global imbalance of power, three European states - Russia, Germany and France (together with China) - have developed a distinct preference for multilateral initiatives, with a view to ‘diluting’ American power via the development of a multipolar global order. Conversely, a number of the major ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers - the UK and Australia - have supported the US’s anti-terrorist initiatives and pre-emption doctrines strongly. As a consequence of these divisions, the chasm between European and American security policy has rarely been as deep as it is at present. Has this chasm developed as a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s policies, such as NMD/TMD, the ‘war on terror’ and the American-led intervention in Iraq? Asman (2003) argues that ‘One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance - the current rift has been unprecedented in its scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.’ How profound is this rift between the transatlantic allies? What is the likely impact this division will have upon the international security architecture? This paper argues that the division over security policy in Europe represents a profound shift in the dynamics of the international system, as some of the major powers seek to redress the imbalance of a unipolar system dominated by American military power. The paper conjectures that this renewed struggle over the balance of power has not been in evidence since the Cold War.