Price dispersion in the private health insurance industry: The case of Catalonia (original) (raw)

Health Insurance and Competition in Markets for Differentiated Medical Products

2015

I study duopolistic market for differentiated medical products. Medical providers decide whether to sell on the spot market to sick consumers or to sell through competitive insurance market to healthy consumers. While shopping for insurance consumers know only the distribution of possible medical needs they may have if they get sick. Only when getting sick their actual medical need reveals and diagnosed. Hence consumers on the insurance market have lower taste differentiation than the sick consumers who are shopping on the spot market. I find that in equilibrium providers sell only on the insurance market, even though this intensifies competition because of lower taste differentiation. Competition between providers under insurance sales brings premiums low enough to motivate consumers buying insurance for both products. Insurance sales generate effi cient horizontal product differentiation, lower prices, and effi ciently higher quality. JEL Classification: : I11, I13, L1 Key-words: ...

Competition in Health Care Markets

2011

This paper reviews the literature devoted to studying markets for health care services and health insurance. There has been tremendous growth and progress in this field. A tremendous amount of new research has been done in this area over the last 10 years. In addition, there has been increasing development and use of frontier industrial organization methods. We begin by examining research on the determinants of market structure, considering both static and dynamic models. We then model the strategic determination of prices between health insurers and providers where insurers market their products to consumers based, in part, on the quality and breadth of their provider network. We then review the large empirical literature on the strategic determination of hospital prices through the lens of this model. Variation in the quality of health care clearly can have large welfare consequences. We therefore also describe the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of market structure on quality of health care. The paper then moves on to consider competition in health insurance markets and physician services markets. We conclude by considering vertical restraints and monopsony power.

Insurer Market Structure and Variation in Commercial Health Care Spending

Health Services Research, 2013

Objective. To examine the relationship between insurance market structure and health care prices, utilization, and spending. Data Sources. Claims for 37.6 million privately insured employees and their dependents from the Truven Health Market Scan Database in 2009. Measures of insurer market structure derived from Health Leaders Inter study data. Methods. Regression models are used to estimate the association between insurance market concentration and health care spending, utilization, and price, adjusting for differences in patient characteristics and other market-level traits. Results. Insurance market concentration is inversely related to prices and spending, but positively related to utilization. Our results imply that, after adjusting for input price differences, a market with two equal size insurers is associated with 3.9 percent lower medical care spending per capita (p = .002) and 5.0 percent lower prices for health care services relative to one with three equal size insurers (p < .001). Conclusion. Greater fragmentation in the insurance market might lead to higher prices and higher spending for care, suggesting some of the gains from insurer competition may be absorbed by higher prices for health care. Greater attention to prices and utilization in the provider market may need to accompany procompetitive insurance market strategies.

Can insurer competition improve health system performance? Evidence from Western Europe

This article considers the potential for insurer competition to improve health system performance by strengthening purchasing. Economic theory suggests that insurer competition will enhance efficiency if: (1) people have free choice of insurer, (2) competition is based on price and quality rather than risk selection and (3) insurers have tools to influence health care costs and quality. The article assesses the extent to which these assumptions hold in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. It finds that health insurance market reforms in these countries have had mixed results in fulfilling these assumptions. In spite of significant investment in risk equalisation, incentives for risk selection remain. Consumer mobility is lower among older and chronically ill people, possibly due to close interaction between statutory and voluntary coverage. Although insurers in some countries increasingly have tools to enhance value, they may not always use them. The analysis suggests that the instrumental value of insurer competition rests on multiple assumptions that can only be upheld through frequently complex interventions often requiring elusive data. Making it work therefore requires action on several fronts, particularly to ensure incentives are aligned across the health system, and awareness of the political nature of some barriers to success.

Statutory health insurance competition in Europe: A four-country comparison

Health Policy, 2013

This paper explores the goals and implementation of reforms introducing choice of and competition among insurers providing statutory health coverage in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In theory, health insurance competition can enhance efficiency in health care administration and delivery only if people have free choice of insurer (consumer mobility), if insurers do not have incentives to select risks, and if insurers are able to influence health service quality and costs. In practice, reforms in the four countries have not always prioritised efficiency and implementation has varied. Differences in policy goals explain some but not all of the differences in implementation. Despite significant investment in risk adjustment, incentives for risk selection remain and consumer mobility is not evenly distributed across the population. Better risk adjustment might make it easier for older and less healthy people to change insurer. Policy makers could also do more to prevent insurers from linking the sale of statutory and voluntary health insurance, particularly where take-up of voluntary coverage is widespread. Collective negotiation between insurers and providers in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland curbs insurers' ability to influence health care quality and costs. Nevertheless, while insurers in the Netherlands have good access to efficiency-enhancing tools, data and capacity constraints and resistance from stakeholders limit the extent to which tools are used. The experience of these countries offers an important lesson to other countries: it is not straightforward to put in place the conditions under which health insurance competition can enhance efficiency. Policy makers should not, therefore, underestimate the challenges involved.

The effect of physician and health plan market concentration on prices in commercial health insurance markets

International Journal of Health Care Finance & Economics, 2008

The objective of this paper is to describe the market structure of health plans (HPs) and physician organizations (POs) in California, a state with high levels of managed care penetration and selective contracting. First we calculate Herfindahl–Hirschman (HHI) concentration indices for HPs and POs in 42 California counties. We then estimate a multivariable regression model to examine the relationship between concentration measures and the prices paid by HPs to POs. Price data is from Medstat MarketScan databases. The findings show that any California counties exhibit what the Department of Justice would consider high HHI concentration measures, in excess of 1,800. More than three quarters of California counties exhibit HP concentration indices over 1,800, and 83% of counties have PO concentration levels in excess of 1,800. Half of the study counties exhibited PO concentration levels in excess of 3,600, compared to only 24% for plans. Multivariate price models suggest that PO concentration is associated with higher physician prices (p ≤0.05), whereas HP concentration does not appear to be significantly associated with higher outpatient commercial payer prices.

Competition among Health Plans: A Two-Sided Market Approach

2009

We set-up a two-sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other side. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two-sided framework allows to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of competition mainly depends on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO gets a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that our model, by highlighting the two-sided market structure of the health plans' competition, provides new insights to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share observed during the last decade in the US.