Local Public Funding of Higher Education when Students and Skilled Workers are Mobile (original) (raw)

Local public funding of higher education when skilled labor is mobile

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 1997

The interregional mobility of high skilled workers might induce an underinvestment in local public higher education when sub-federal entities independently decide on education expenditures to maximize local output. This well-known result is due to interregional spillovers and provides a justification for coordinated education policy or rather a federal intervention. However, things might change completely when taking into account the interregional mobility of students. Now, local education expenditures not only affect labor migration (through wage differentials) but also student migration

Local public funding of higher education when skilled labor is imperfectly mobile

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2000

If higher education is publicly funded by local (sub-federal) jurisdictions, while skilled labor is heterogeneous in responding to wage differentials between jurisdictions, the spillovers that result give rise to a disparity between the centralized output-maximizing allocation of resources to higher education and decentralized equilibria. Generally, decentralization leads to under-provision, which can be offset by inter-jurisdictional subsidies based on gross migration flows. But the extent of the discrepancy depends on the local balance of political forces. Indeed, when the welfare of native-born emigrants is highly valued while new immigrants carry little political weight, over-provision in equilibrium is possible.

Competition for the International Pool of Talents: Education Policy with Student Mobility

2010

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition fees, and the quality and tuition fee differential between the countries increase with the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay rates of foreign students lead to more ambiguous results. In particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in tuition fees. Furthermore, international competition for students can give rise to a brain gain in ROW.

Education, unemployment and migration

Journal of Public Economics, 2010

This paper studies a two-region model in which unemployment, education decisions and interregional migration are endogenous. The poorer region exhibits both lower wages and higher unemployment rates, and migrants to the richer region are disproportionally skilled. The brain drain from the poor to the rich region is accompanied by stronger incentives to acquire skills even for immobile workers. Regional shocks tend to affect both regions in a symmetric fashion, and skilled-biased technological change reduces wages of the unskilled. Both education and migration decisions are distorted by a uniform unemployment compensation, which justifies a corrective subsidization.

Educational Investments in a Spatially Varied Economy

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be denied admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or handicap.

Student and Worker Mobility under University and Government Competition

2011

We provide a normative analysis of endogenous student and worker mobility in the presence of diverging interests between universities and governments. Student mobility generates a university competition effect which induces them to overinvest in education, whereas worker mobility generates a free-rider effect for governments, who are not willing to subsidize the education of agents who will work abroad. At equilibrium, the free-rider effect always dominates the competition effect, resulting in underinvestment in human capital and overinvestment in research. This inefficiency can be corrected if a transnational transfer for mobile students is implemented. With endogenous income taxation, we show that the strength of fiscal competition increases with human capital production. Consequently, supranational policies aimed at promoting teaching quality reduce tax revenues at the expense of research. JEL-Code: H770, I220, I230, I280.

Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility

International Tax and Public Finance, 2010

In this paper we analyze the effect of increasing labor (i.e. graduates'/academics') and student mobility on net tax revenues when revenuemaximizing governments compete for human capital by means of income tax rates and amenities offered to students (positive expenditure) or rather tuition fees (negative expenditure). We demonstrate that these instruments are strategic complements and that increasing labor mobility due to ongoing globalization not necessarily implies intensified tax competition and an erosion of revenues. On the contrary, the equilibrium tax rate even increases in mobility.

Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011

Migration And Education Decisions In A Dynamic General Equilibrium Framework

Policy Research Working Papers, 2008

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

Local Public Funding of Higher Education when Students and Skilled Workers are Mobile (original) (raw)

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