(A cura di) The power state is back? The evolution of russian political thought after 1991 (original) (raw)
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The Power State is Back? The Evolution of Russian Political Though After 1991
2016
Almost 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of‘re-composition’ of a Moscow-dominated political space is still under way. Under the influence of different traditions, factors, events and interests, Russia seems to have developed a new version of the ‘power state’ that dominated European history until the 20th century's tragedies. What was the weight of the Soviet legacy and of the crises of the 1990s in this development? What has been the influence of political leaders and intellectuals, siloviki, and economic elites on the current Russian political thought? To what extent have external factors contributed to shape this thought? What place for minorities and cultural differences does this political trend leave? This volume is based on the proceedings of ‘The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 1991 workshop organized by Reset-Dialogues on Civilizations (Berlin, 22-23 June 2015) and collects the essays written by Pavel K. Baev, Giancarlo Bosetti, Timothy J. Colton, Riccardo Mario Cucciolla, Alexander Golts, Lev Gudkov, Stephen E. Hanson, Mark Kramer, Marlene Laruelle, Alexey Miller, Olga Pavlenko and Victoria I. Zhuravleva.
Special Issue -Contemporary Russia in International Relations -Introduction
estudos internacionais, 2024
The Russian launching of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine in February 2022 brought Russia back to the agenda of international politics. Due to the unprecedented nature of what was instantly called a "full scale invasion" or a "war of aggression" by NATO allies, the irrelevance conferred to Russia in the last decades gave place to a prominent role in world affairs. Like it or not, it seems that Russia's continental size, abundant wealth in natural resources, military prowess and long history as a diplomatic broker are once again making the headlines of mainstream media and filling the pages of specialized journals worldwide. This is the context of this special issue of Estudos Internacionais. After the end of the USSR, President Boris Yeltsin and his minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, strove to assure the international society that Russia had a western lineage. All in all, Russia adopted human rights discourse, defended the advantages of multilateralism, and reassured members of the "global community" that free markets were needed to guarantee political freedom. The leaders even affirmed that the communist period was a gap in the Soviet countries' history of learning with the West. Nonetheless, in spite of these efforts, Russia's conciliatory discourse was not recognized by the West. The Western State's lack of political will to solve Russia's economic problems and continuing worries about the country's military revival ensured that the self-image Russia was trying to sell about herself was not convincing. The consequent lack of support for Russia's leaders resulted in social animosity against the West. Neocommunists and ultranationalists, both political groups with clear
Studies in East European Thought, 2019
In an already famous interview with the Financial Times on June 27, 2018, Russia's president Vladimir Putin has declared the liberal idea dead, thus riding the same wave as Hungary's Viktor Orbán and other leaders. This position has obviously been criticized by Western pundits and politicians, but it also fits into ongoing discussions in Russia, where the economic shock therapy of the 1990s has turned the words 'democrat' and 'liberal' into words of abuse among large parts of the population. In a recent column in Literaturnaya gazeta, Yuri Boldyrev [identified in the book under review as a 'center-left liberal' (p. xxxi)] takes issue with the president's claim: 'Has the liberal idea really outlived itself, as Russia's president declared in an interview in the Financial Times? Maybe it has indeed, someplace, outlived itself, but clearly not in Russia, where under the accompaniment of that kind of declaration the most vulgar "reforms" continue to be introduced-exactly under the dictate of the global centers of neoliberalism.' 1 There seem to be at least two different ideas of liberalism. The book under review is the third in a series of publications based on discussions in the "Russia Workshop" set up by Reset DOC. Reset DOC is an Italy-based high-level international think tank and research organization that fosters dialogue between different cultures, focusing on international relations, philosophy, religion, etc. Among others, it functions as a platform for free debate on contemporary Russia. While the first two volumes, The Power State is Back? The Evolution of Russian Political Thought After 1991 (2016), and The State and Political Discourse in Today's Russia (2017), both published by Reset DOC itself, focused on post-Soviet Russia, this third volume broadens the historical scope considerably. Divided into four parts of three or four chapters each, it addresses, in chronological order, * Evert van der Zweerde
2018
The foreign policy of Russia in the near abroad is the continuation of its domestic policy, which includes the consolidation of the population around a leader by means of creating an image of an enemy, especially at times when the economic situation in the country is deteriorating. When interpreting the inner processes in the country, political scientists usually apply the decomposition of the totalitarian Soviet regime as a framework. This paper suggests a broader framework through an analysis of historical structures anchored in Russian civilization. The key to understanding Russia's foreign policy, I argue, is rooted in the imperial syndrome associated with the country’s history, whether one considers the tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet periods. At present, Russia’s desire to restore its status as a world power, as in the past, requires it to develop a foreign policy secured by control of its nearest neighbors. For centuries, it purchased their loyalty and fealty with natural...
Master's Research Paper Russia Vs. The West.doc. Final Dissertation.
Christophe Barbier, 2017
Abstract My research will focus on Russia’s relations versus the Western world from the past to the present day. Russia's vision and perception of the West since the end of the Cold War have changed the world substantially, and as a result, the idealism for the West and Russia to be strong allies have rather distanced themselves both diplomatically and politically on the international stage. For viewers to understand the implication of this research analysis, I will examine Russia’s brutal past, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the post-WWII Soviet era, the unending Cold War’s with renewing tensions today and the fall of Communism which precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. These historical events are thematically linked as early as the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 in which Russians defeated the Mongols by creating a surprising attack hidden from view. This ideological mechanism of Maskirovka in Russian (Маскировка), meaning ‘masking’ is a deceptive psychological apparatus used in Russian’s technical warfare during previous wars to deceive its enemies from within in a mastery art of wars. This psychological framework of deception is still present today in a series of recent international events about the attempt at reacquiring the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia as a sovereign state within the former Soviet Union Republics now known today as Russia. The invasion of Crimea, followed by the annexation of Ukraine in 2014 and the military intervention in Syria in 2015 not only reinserted Russia as a superpower, but also demonstrated these geopolitical moves were carried out to counter-attack NATO aggressive policy of containment toward the Baltic States and along the Russian national borders. Russia also views the West with the propagation of pro-liberalism, the promotion of democracy, human rights, international law, and the global war on Islamic terrorism carrying some significant caveats. The West places Russia on a pedestal of being an antagonist player, nonconformist and rebellious in contradiction with the West’s foreign policy which dictates liberal values and liberties. All of these historical events corroborate with consistency and conformity with the current cold war tensions and frustrations between Russia and the West in a battle of disinformation, cyber warfare attacks and impartial truths. This Russian doctrine also magnifies why Russia does not correlate to the West in a same diplomatic and political manner as the West does. As a result, it creates more geopolitical differences and political divisions. In this Master’s research paper, I will analyze the underlying causes of diplomatic tensions such as the historical, ideological, geopolitical, and political nuances that Russia’s past battles, wars, attacks, and foreign invaders from the West hemisphere have led Russia to be both fearful and defensive toward the Western world. Russia’s tumultuous and dramatic past has cast an overshadowing net over unconstructive ties with the West and deteriorating relations that continue to exacerbate any diplomatic relations from leading to successful outcomes. That has prevented both hemispheres from reaching encouraging and promising mutual footings in world affairs. Is there a way to mollify the renewed tensions between the West and Russia? Yes, and I will demonstrate that both the West and Russia can mend their differences and reset their partnerships. However, the latter is also true that increasing strains during the investigation will bring forth to the readers tangible evidence that Russia and the West will continue for years to come to be suspicious and skeptical of one and another. East-West’s problematic political discourses compounded by distrustful and complicated bilateral relations within the crossfire NATO and the European Union could potentially destabilize peace and security and as a result, reshape the world itself between the East and the West.
Russia's Europe International Affairs FINAL.docx
Russia defines itself as a great power in relation to Europe and the West. The first part of the article traces how, since 1991, a story about greatness centred on being part of contemporary European civilization has given way to a story of how Russia is great by being superior to a Europe that is now seen as rotten and decadent. The former story spelled cooperation with Europe and the West, where the latter spells confrontation. The second part argues that Russia’s superiority complex is unsustainable. It is hard to see how, in the face of the formative structural pressure of the state system, Russia will be able to sustain its superiority complex. A state that does not order itself in such a way that it may either gain recognition as a great power by forcing its way and/or by being emulated by others, is unlikely to maintain that status. The costs of maintaining great-power status without radical political and economic change seem to be increasing rapidly. If Russia wants to maintain its status, an about-turn is needed. Such a turn may in itself be no solution, though, for if Russia does not do anything about the root causes of its perceived inferiority to Europe, , then the Russian cyclical shifting from a Westernizing to a xenophobic stance will not be broken.
A Window on Russian Geopolitical Thought 5 May 2023 Rev
This article provides "A Window on Russian Geopolitical Thought" in two parts. The first part contextualizes Aleksandr Dugin's 2011 book Geopolitika; the second gives an English translation of its detailed analytic table of contents. No English translation of the book itself has yet been published. Part I contrasts Russian and American politics, their current economic and spiritual rivalry in Ukraine, and a sketch of four of Dugin's books contextualizing his geopolitical project, which maps out his multi-polar vision of the world in opposition to the Anglo-American maritime unipolar vision. He relies upon the classic rivalry between sea power in the form of NATO and land power based upon the Eurasian heartland. Biographical Note. E. M. Macierowski earned his B.A. from St. John's College in Annapolis, his Licentiate in Mediaeval Studies from the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, and his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Toronto. He also studied at the then-Imperial
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN RESHAPING A POST-COLD WAR ORDER
Politeja No. 5(62), 2019, pp. 161-174, 2019
Russia has became a revisionist power. Challenging the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia’s international standing, however. This strategy is undoubtedly ambiguous as Russia challenges the West, particularity the United States, and looks for a rapprochement at the same time. The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of a annexation of the Crimean Peninsula what was a breaking of international low, and engagement into the war in the East Ukraine. Nevertheless 2014 was not a milestone, but 2008 when Russia had decided for the first time to use its military force against Georgia and indirectly against a growing Western military and political presence in this post-Soviet republic. This game changer was rather not a surprise, because several signals of a desire to challenge the Western-led word order had appeared in the past at least twice in president Putin’s speeches in 2007 in Munich Security Conference and in 2014 during Valdai Club session in Sochi. This article seeks to provide a take in a discussion about the way Russia has been trying to reshape the post-Cold War order. This paper probes the notion that Russia became a revisionist state trying to shape a post-Western world order. Besides there are a few questions to be answered, first of all whether anti-Westernism is in fact a goal or rather an instrument in regaining more effective impact on the international politics and how it is able to influence the post-Cold War order despite its reduced political and economic potential?