Doom-loops: The Role of Rating Agencies in the Euro Financial Crisis (original) (raw)
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Journal of International Money and Finance, 2017
During the euro-area financial crisis, interactions among sovereign spreads, sovereign credit ratings, and bank credit ratings appeared to have been characterized by self-generating feedback loops. To investigate the existence of feedback loops, we consider a panel of five euro-area stressed countries within a three-equation simultaneous system in which sovereign spreads, sovereign ratings and bank ratings are endogenous. We estimate the system using two approaches. First we apply GMM estimation, which allows us to calculate persistence and multiplier effects. Second, we apply a new, system time-varying-parameter technique that provides bias-free estimates. Our results show that sovereign ratings, sovereign spreads, and bank ratings strongly interacted with each other during the euro crisis, confirming strong doom-loop effects.
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This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission's science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication.
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Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks' and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to moral hazard and liquidity risk (sudden deposit withdrawals): banks invest in risky government bonds as a form of capital buffer against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk. JEL classification: E5, G3, E6.
Systemic risk, sovereign yields and bank exposures in the euro crisis
Economic Policy, 2014
Since 2008, eurozone sovereign yields have diverged sharply, and so have the corresponding credit default swap (CDS) premia. At the same time, banks' sovereign debt portfolios have featured an increasing home bias. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between these two facts, and its rationale. First, we inquire to what extent the dynamics of sovereign yield differentials relative to the swap rate and CDS premia reflect changes in perceived sovereign solvency risk or rather different responses to systemic risk due to the possible collapse of the euro. We do so by decomposing yield differentials and CDS spreads in a country-specific and a common risk component via a dynamic factor model. We then investigate how the home bias of banks' sovereign portfolios responds to yield differentials and to their two components, by estimating a vector error-correction model on 2007-13 monthly data. We find that in most countries of the eurozone, and especially in its periphery, banks' sovereign exposures respond positively to increases in yields. When bank exposures are related to the country and common risk components of yields, it turns out that (1) in the periphery, banks increase their domestic exposure in response to increases in country risk, while in core countries they do not; (2) in most eurozone countries banks respond to an increase in the common risk factor by raising their domestic exposures. Finding (1) suggests distorted incentives in periphery banks' response to changes in their own sovereign's risk. Finding indicates that, when systemic risk increases, all banks tend to increase the home bias of their portfolios, making the eurozone sovereign market more segmented. --Niccol o Battistini, Marco Pagano and Saverio Simonelli S y s t e m i c r i s k Economic Policy April 2014 Printed in Great Britain