Should traditional representative institutions be abolished? A critical comment on Hélène Landemore's Open Democracy (Res Publica 2024) (original) (raw)
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Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the 21st Century
On Method 19 2 The Crisis of Representative Democracy 25 The Crisis of Representative Democracy: Empirical 26 The Crisis of Representative Democracy: Conceptual 33 The Road Not Taken 40 The Realists' Objections 44 Con temporary Solutions and Their Limits 47 3 The Myth of Direct Democracy 53 Rousseau's Mistake 56 Repre sen ta tion, Modernity, and the Prob lem of Size 61 The Myth of Classical Athens as a Direct Democracy 66 Direct versus Open 74 4 Legitimacy and Repre sen ta tion beyond Elections (Part One) 79 The Prob lem with Consent Theory 83 Definitions 85 Lottocratic Repre sen ta tion 89 Self-Selected Repre sen ta tion 93 On the Accountability of Non-Elected Demo cratic Representatives 98 Conclusion 104
The Constitutional Experiment in Iceland
Appearing in: Kalman Pocza (ed.), Verfassunggebung in konsolidierten Demokratien: Neubeginn oder Verfall eines Systems?, Nomos Verlag.
Since the deep economic crisis of 2008, Iceland has seen the emergence of a remarkable, experimental attempt at constitution-making from below. This Icelandic experiment constitutes a rare –- in distinct ways probably unique -- example of a popular or citizen-driven constitutionalism. The Icelandic participatory approach in many ways challenges core assumptions of mainstream, modernist understandings of constitutionalism, such as the idea of constitutionalism as a social phenomenon and practice dominated by legal professionals or that of constitutions as higher laws that are near to impossible to change. At the same time, in particular now that the constitution-making process seems halted, the Icelandic experience brings to the fore many questions that popular or democratic constitutionalism raises as an alternative understanding and practice of constitutionalism, not least related to the modes and effectiveness of participation, the notion of representation in the constitution-making process, the role of deliberation, the role of parliament and other political institutions, as well as the actual, substantive results of participatory constitution-making. In the chapter, we will first discuss the historical background of the 1944 Icelandic Constitution that is still in vigour. In a second step, the grassroots constitution-making process that emerged in 2009, and the reactions it provoked, are analyzed, while in a third step, we assess recent political events that conditioned the status of the constitution-making project -– now largely stalled in Icelandic parliament -- in the first half of 2013.
Grassroots Constitutional Politics in Iceland_Blog version
Iceland has recently embarked on an experimental form of constitution-making from below. Iceland is in this a rare – in distinct ways probably unique - example of a popular or citizen-driven constitutionalism. This participatory approach in many ways challenges core assumptions of mainstream, modernist understandings of constitutionalism, such as the idea of constitutionalism as a social phenomenon and practice dominated by legal professionals or that of constitutions as higher laws that are near to impossible to change. At the same time, the Icelandic experience brings to the fore many questions that popular or democratic constitutionalism raises as an alternative understanding and practice of constitutionalism, not least related to the modes and effectiveness of participation, the notion of representation in the constitution-making process, the role of deliberation, as well as the actual, substantive results of participatory constitution-making.
Participatory Constitutional Deliberation in the Wake of Crisis: The Case of Iceland
Constitutional Deliberative Democracy in Europe Edited by Min Reuchamps and Jane Suiter
A crisis in democratic representation is increasingly evident in established democracies, manifest, for example, in escalating public protest as well as increased volatility between elections and in rising support for populist right- wing parties. One solution targeted at enhancing democratic legitimacy through increased public involvement in politics is the initiatives instigated to bring public decision-making to ad hoc citizens’ panels – often referred to as ‘mini-publics’. One of the most far-reaching of such initiatives is the constitutional-reform process initiated in celand in , in the wake of the global nancial crisis. Indeed, initiatives for political reform are often instigated in wake of crisis (Elster 1995). Just as a crisis in capitalism can open up our imagination to alternative ‘economic imaginaries’ (Jessop 2004), constitutional revisions are usually only embarked upon in the aftermath of severe political or economic crisis (Elster 1995). This is what Ackerman (1998) refers to as a ‘constitutional moment’, when a catastrophe mobilises societal forces for fundamental change Teubner . This chapter will rst brie y set out the context for this celandic constitutional moment in 2009 and then examine the reform process from the perspective of input, throughout and output legitimacy.
2014
In the wake of the financial crisis which nearly bankrupted Iceland, the country began a process to create a new constitution which could maintain the confidence of a public understandably disenchanted with their political elite. What followed was a 'crowd-sourced' project which ultimately fell at the final hurdle. However the experience did show that it is possible to create a kind of constitutional process which is not limited to elites, according to Hélène Landemore. Iceland was nearly home to the world's first "crowd sourced" constitution (Credit: Kris Williams, CC BY NC ND 2.0) Who should write the constitution of a democratic country and, indeed, any country? The answer seems obvious: its people. Yet the constitutions of existing states, including democratic ones, have usually been written by small, rather unrepresentative subsets of individuals. Solon is supposed to have single-handedly laid out the foundations of democratic Athens. The U.S. constitution was penned by a few dozen white men. More recent examples of constitutional processes involve the usual elites: professional politicians and state bureaucrats. But even elected or otherwise democratically authorized constitutional drafters are at best metaphorically "We, The People.
What is a good constitution? Assessing the constitutional proposal in the Icelandic experiment
This paper attempts to answer the question, "What is a good constitution?" by looking at the case of Iceland’s “crowdsourced constitution,” which came close to becoming the new law of the land in 2013. The paper considers various normative criteria by which to assess the quality of a constitution prior to its implementation and uses some of them to evaluate the Icelandic proposal in their light. In order to set a plausible benchmark, the paper also compares the Icelandic constitutional proposal with three other texts: the original 1944 constitution, and two expert-written proposals that served as templates for the members of the Constitutional Council. The idea is to evaluate the quality of a constitution, prior to its implementation, by reference to ex-ante, substantive criteria that are both sufficiently demanding and realistic in terms of what is feasible at any given time.