Alberta's oil sands reclamation policy trajectory: the role of tense layering, policy stretching, and policy patching in long-term policy dynamics (original) (raw)
Related papers
Environmental Policy and Governance, 2017
When, why and how do policy mixes change and evolve? Much of the contemporary interest in such mixes is focused on distinguishing simple policies from more complex policy mixes, evaluating the relationships between single and multiple policy tools within a mix, and developing criteria to assess the likely performance of particular mixes. These are important and necessary analytical tasks. However, another required step in understanding policy mixes is to understand how and why mixes evolve and change over time and to determine whether any changes are an improvement. In this paper, we analyse the development of a complex policy mix in the case of reclamation and remediation of the Alberta oil sands from an earlier 'simple goal, single instrument' policy regime to a more complex one. This case study reveals the presence of at least two dynamic processes at work in policy mix development, with significant implications for the nature of the changes that result from them.
Sand in the Cogs?: Power and Public Participation in the Alberta Tar Sands
Environmental Politics, 2013
Public participation in natural-resource management has been theorised as a potential means of slowing or halting the ‘treadmill of production’. We examine the institutional processes for citizen participation in bitumen development proposals in Alberta, Canada, home of the tar sands – one of the world’s largest reserves of fossil fuel. Within the context of economic and ecological impacts of fossil-fuel resource development in Alberta, we chart the active treadmill forces, and examine the legal framework that enables public involvement in the province. We also provide a detailed account of the extent of public participation through the available avenues to date. We conclude, in line with the expectations of the treadmill of production, that the institutionalised processes of participation have been restricted to the point of nullifying the possibility of effective, democratic control over the expansion of the tar sands.
Policy Analysis of the Canadian Oil Sands Experience
2013
Canadian oil sands reserves are located in three major areas, Athabasca, Cold Lake and Peace River, in the Province of Alberta. According to Alberta's government, Canadian oil sands are the second largest source of oil in the world following Saudi Arabia, with proven reserves of over 168 billion barrels 1 as compared to Saudi Arabia's 264 billion barrels. 2 The Government of Alberta expects to increase production from 1.31 million barrels per day in 2008 to 3 million barrels per day in 2018. 3 The Alberta government owns 81% of the province's mineral rights; the remaining 19% are freehold mineral rights owned by the federal government on behalf of First Nations or in National Parks (11%), and by private individuals and companies (8%). 4 By contrast, the U.S. oil sands resource is fairly small. U.S. oil sands resources are spread over several states, with the Utah oil sands resource comprising 93% of the total domestic resource; Utah's oil sands resource is 11.5 billion barrels (of oil equivalent) of proven resources and an additional 20.7 billion barrels of unproven resources. 5 Domestic resources are spread across federal, state, private and tribal lands. 6 1 About 80% of the 170 billion barrels of remaining established reserves are suited for in-2 Government of Alberta, Energy, Facts and Statistics, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/OilSands/791.asp (accessed July 24, 2013). Measured in terms of resource "rent," the difference between the price of oil and the cost of producing it from the given resource, inclusive of opportunity costs, the "size" of the oil sands resource would be somewhat less, but still formidable.
Discontinuation Governance of The Canadian Oil Sands.docx
The Canadian Oil Sands are analyzed under the multi-level perspective, for the purpose of building towards a sustainability transition. Despite demonstrating that the oil sands are experiencing initial transitional phases brought about by landscape level political and climate change pressures, evidence suggests that the oil sands regime is comparable to that of the American Military Industrial Complex and the South African Minerals Energy Complex. Thus, we re-term the oil sands as the Canadian Oil Sands Industrial Complex. Particular focus is given to the landscape and landscape shocks as they have been understudied in previous work. It is suggested that landscape shocks may be useful tools in initiating and accelerating sustainability transitions, and suggestions are provided for both policy makers and future researchers in the implementation of these concepts.
From Narrative of Promise to Rhetoric of Sustainability: A Genealogy of Oil Sands
Environmental Communication-a Journal of Nature and Culture, 2016
Since its conception, "oil sands" has been the name of a pro-development narrative seeking to convince skeptics that bitumen saturating the sandstone of Alberta's Athabasca region ought to be extracted and chemically altered into Synthetic Crude Oil (SCO). Over the decades, the nature of skepticism has changed, and thus oil sands (along with its meanings and claims) has been continually reproduced so as to placate new criticisms. This paper offers a discursive genealogy of the oil sands narrative, demonstrating how it has been transformed from what was throughout the twentieth century a materially situated "narrative of promise" aiming to prove that SCO production was physically possible and that it could be commercially profitable, into what by 2015 was at its core a largely reactive "rhetoric of sustainability" aiming to convince a new class of critics that, contrary to their claims, SCO was in fact being produced in an environmentally responsible manner.
Transformism in Alberta : the environmental political economy of the bituminous sands
2018
The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. AVIS: L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats. L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis. While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis. Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse. Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.
Crisis in the Tar Sands: Fossil Capitalism and the Future of the Alberta Hydrocarbon Economy
Historical Materialism
Using a case study of Alberta, Canada, this paper demonstrates how a geographic critique of fossil capitalism helps elucidate the tensions shaping tar sands development. Conflicts over pipelines and Indigenous territorial claims are challenging development trajectories, as tar sands companies need to expand access to markets in order to expand production. While these conflicts are now well recognised, there are also broader dynamics shaping development. States face a rentier's dilemma, relying on capital investments to realise resource value. Political responses to the emerging climate crisis undercut the profitability of hydrocarbon extraction. The automation of production undermines the industrial compromise between hydrocarbon labour and capital. Ultimately, the crises of fossil capitalism require a radical transformation within or beyond capital relations. To mobilise against the tar sands, organisers must recognise the tensions underpinning it, developing strategies that address ecological concerns and the economic plight of those dispossessed and abandoned by carbon extraction.
2009
The Athabasca Oil Sands, located in northeastern Alberta, Canada, were for many years anomalous. Two oil sands operators developed their extraction techniques for 30 years, refining their technology before production became economically profitable. In the last 15 years as oil prices climbed, a tremendous amount of growth has occurred in the oil sands. Dozens of new projects are under construction or awaiting approval, creating one of the largest and most capital intensive mining operations in the world. Curiously there is a significant difference in environmental performance among three companies involved in open pit mining of the oil sands, Syncrude, Suncor Energy and Shell Canada's Muskeg River Mine. Suncor Energy is known for their reputation in stakeholder collaboration and reporting initiatives but has one of the most problematic environmental legacies. Meanwhile, Syncrude is seen as a relative leader in land reclamation but has taken the least action with regard to climate change. Shell Canada's Muskeg River Mine, draws from the resources of their parent company, Royal Dutch Shell, to proactively frame climate change management but has no public indicators of their land reclamation progress. What is the cause of this variation in environmental performance? Is it a result of difference corporate environmental governance strategies or of government policies? I suggest the variation of environmental performance is an organic response to the innate discretionary nature of environmental policymaking in Alberta, the lack of government leadership and the degree of initiative demonstrated by each company. From my research it is clear that the inconsistent and at times vague government policy and regulations, opaque govemment agencies, poor monitoring and enforcement, inadequate incentives and penalties does not effectively encourage stronger environmental performance among oil sands developers. At the same time, internal corporate strategy, often in response to the recent pressure from environmental groups, First Nations communities and international media compels some companies to innovate and others to simply follow the regulations. Maintaining their social license, reducing costs, and anticipating future regulations have all been cited as motivation for innovation. Those advocating the status quo cite the exemplary regulatory framework already in place and the adequacy of existing stakeholder engagement processes; whereas corporate environmental leaders are frustrated by the uncertainty around environmental policies created by the provincial government. Ultimately the responsibility for the environmental management of the oil sands lies with the province. Companies can strive to innovate and compete with other developers, but they are not accountable for the management of cumulative effects in the region. If Alberta is going to improve the environmental performance of oil sands developers then a more transparent, credible and strategic environmental planning process must be created. I conclude with three areas of policy improvements the Province can make to not only improve the environmental performance of the oil sands but also regain public trust in their role as manager of Alberta's natural resources: transparency, monitoring and enforcement, and responsible