Reference and indexicality (original) (raw)
Related papers
In defense of propositions: A presuppositional analysis of indexicals and shifted pronouns
In the tradition initiated by D. Kaplan, two main effects are tied to indexicality: (i) the fact that indexicals cannot be treated as concealed descriptions ("I" is not equivalent to "the speaker in the context of utterance") and (ii) the fact that indexicals are referentially 'rigid' (in the sense that they refer to the same object in all possible worlds). It follows from these two facts that the subjective meaning of indexicals cannot be expressed propositionally. In this contribution we argue that indexicals can be treated as descriptions as long as they descriptive content is presupposed and, as a consequence, the informativeness of indexical sentences can be expressed in terms of (partial) propositions. We also contend that the reading of indexicals associated to context-shifting effects is due to a syntax-driven process of 'local' presupposition resolution. As a strictly intertwined result, we extend the presuppositional analysis of indexical terms to definite descriptions and show that it accounts for attitudes de re in general.
Journal of Pragmatics, 2008
My goal in this article is to compare the behavior of a variety of non clausebound types of indexical expression in English across three texts from different genres, spoken as well as written. A key distinction is the one claimed to exist between the dimensions of text and discourse, and the comparison of the indexical types demonstrates its relevance. In a given text, certain lexically-specific types of indexical bearing an anaphoric interpretation may perform particular strategic, discourse unitdemarcating roles; while others realizing a deictic value may signal a shift in referential perspective, preparing the reader or addressee for a transition to a new discourse unit or sub-unit. Particularly highlighted are the deictic, anadeictic and anaphoric roles of the various indexicals as a function of text genre, utterer's intention and the interlocutive relationships developed throughout the discourse. The article also assesses the neo-Gricean pragmatic account of (non-)coreference in discourse put forward in Levinson's (2000) Presumptive Meanings. The theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature, MIT Press. It argues that, rather than their discourse value being necessarily determined by the possibility of a choice between an attenuated and a prolix indexical type, it is the textual, contextual as well as discourse factors isolated during the earlier comparison which are adequate to describe and account for this.
A NOTE ON THE DEMONSTRATIVE USES OF INDEXICALS
Logique et Analyse, 2022
The paper discusses the answering machine puzzle and cases of non-standard uses of 'I'. It offers an analysis of the phenomena that is conservative with respect to the Kaplanian account of indexicality. The point of departure of the paper is the observation that some proper indexicals have demonstrative uses. It is argued that treating some occurrences of 'now' as cases of such uses results in an intuitive and simple solution to the answering machine puzzle. At the same time, treating some occurrences of 'I' in an analogous manner explains away the impression that some non-standard uses of 'I' enforce a modification of the standard semantics of the first-person pronoun.
How Demonstratives and Indexicals Really Work (Revised)
What determines the referent of a demonstrative or indexical expression on a particular occasion of use? Our answer isn't new, but it's insufficiently appreciated: the referent of a demonstrative or indexical on a particular occasion of use is determined by the speaker's referential intentions as constrained, in a way to be explained, by the expression's meaning. This requires us to say what we take these meanings to be, which in turn requires us to say what we take meanings of expressions of any kind to be. We'll take the meaning of an expression to be the fixed condition that something must satisfy in order to be the content of that expression on a given occasion of use. We take the content of a declarative sentence s on a given occasion of use to be a proposition, and we take the content of a part of s on that occasion to be its contribution to the determination of the content of s on that occasion. For most of this paper we'll operate as if (i) the propositions in question are Russellian, structured entities built up from objects and properties (as opposed to "modes of presentation" of them), and (ii) the content of a demonstrative or indexical on a particular occasion of use is its referent on that occasion, so that, for example, the content of 'She is French' on a given occasion of use is a proposition that can be represented as the ordered pair ⟨x, being French⟩, where x is the referent of 'she' on that occasion of use. 1 Therefore, relative to this Russellian assumption, we can say that the meaning of a demonstrative or indexical is the fixed condition that something must satisfy in order to be its referent (on an occasion of use). 2 We address this assumption explicitly in §VI. 3 1 A Russellian proposition may be represented as an ordered pair of the form ⟨⟨x1, …, xn⟩, R n ⟩, were ⟨x1, …, xn⟩ is an n-ary sequence of things of any kind and R n is an n-ary relation, and where ⟨⟨x1, …, xn⟩, R n ⟩ is true iff ⟨x1, …, xn⟩ instantiates R n , false otherwise (it's customary to drop the brackets for one-member sequences). 2 This assumption allows us to go along with David Kaplan (1989a) as far as propositions and content are concerned. In Kaplan's theory, the role of what we are calling meanings is played by what he calls characters. As will become clear, we see Kaplan's take on the representation of these "characters" as quite ill-suited to natural language semantics. 3 The theory we offer will also be presented relative to other idealizations that we won't be dropping in this article. Perhaps the most important is one that is made in the presentation of virtually every semantic or metasemantic theory: just as Galileo ignored friction in his theories of motion, so, in presenting our theory, we ignore the vagueness of vague expressions and the vagueness of vague speech acts. Whether any semantic or metasemantic theory can be
Indexical reference within a discourse context
2011
The paper consists of an overview of my recent work on anaphora and ellipsis and related issues, intended for an audience of students and staff preparing for the new " lecon d'agregation " in English entitled " Ellipse et anaphore ". This work is presented under 5 main headings: - An approach to anaphora, "anadeixis" and deixis as discourse phenomena, investigating how and in what respect the different types of indexical expressions at issue may realise each procedure. - A (brief) consideration of so-called "topic chains" and the functions performed within them by different types of expressions (i.e. the various "links" in the chains). - Two related areas characterising certain discourse functions which certain indexical referring procedures may fulfil, as part of the construction of discourse itself: * In terms of "micro-discourse", how indexicals contribute to the setting up of local coherence or rhetorical relations ...
2003
Thesis: Indexicals are not essential in the sense of being semantically irreducible; the arguments for the semantic irreducibility of indexicals only apply to referentially-opaque readings of indexicals in the scope of attitude verbs.
Introduction: Reference and Discourse Structure
International Review of Pragmatics, 2010
brill.nl/irp * Th e papers collected here are based on presentations at the International Conference on Reference and Discourse Structure , which was organized by Sofi ana Chiriacescu and Klaus von Heusinger at the University of Stuttgart (January 15-17, 2010). We thank all participants of the conference for the lively and constructive discussion and all contributors for writing up their research results for this special issue of the International Review of Pragmatics. We are grateful to Piotr Cap and Ken Turner for their positive reception of our suggestion to guest-edit this special issue and for their help in editing the issue. Th e fi rst author gratefully acknowledges fi nancial support from the German Science Foundation in the form of a grant to the project C2: Case and Referential context , as part of the Collaborative Research Center 732 Incremental Specifi cation in Context at the University of Stuttgart, and the support of the Fritz Th yssen Foundation and the VolkswagenStiftung (opus magnum).