The Metaphysics of Psychopathology (original) (raw)

Philosophy of psychopathology Introduction

Psychiatry is increasingly aware of its own conceptual foundations and the role that philosophy plays in shaping research and practice. This growing awareness is especially prominent in the area of psychopathology, where both philosophers and psychiatrists are actively investigating the basic assumptions and values that influence the science.

Kincaid defensible natural kinds in psychopathology

In this chapter I argue for two main theses in this chapter-: that there are some types of psychopathology that can reasonably and usefully be thought of as constituting natural kinds, given a naturalist take on the latter, and that those kinds are best thought of as categorical rather than dimensional. I also make some arguments about what must be done-but largely has not been done-methodologically to identity psychopathologic kinds of the sort I defend. In section 1, I argue for one picture of natural kinds, theories, and explanation appropriate for the social and behavioral sciences. Section In section 2, I looks at a number of mostly confused arguments that psychopathology must be thought of as dimensional. I either reject them or show how they are compatible with categorical approaches. Section In section 3 applies, I apply the perspective from of section 1 and insights from section 2 to argue that there is a plausible case to be made that certain types of depression constitute natural kinds in my favored sense. 206 8.1 Natural Kinds, Theories, and the Social and Behavioral

VIIe congrès de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences Nantes 4 au 6 juin 2018

The HPC (Homeostatic property clusters) model, introduced for the first time by Richard Boyd in his (1988)'s work as a solution to the species problem, identifies a natural kind as a cluster of properties more or less shared by all members of this kind (see also Boyd 1999 and Wilson et al 2007). More specifically, the HPC model is an anti-essentialist model, because to identify species it does not use neither necessary (a single property is not necessary for identifying a specific kind) nor su cient (a single property is not su cient for identifying a specific kind) properties. As Wilson et al point out, HPC model uses "necessity" and "su ciency" in the cluster in a new manner: " necessity becomes more general " (p. 14) and " su ciently becomes more varied " (ibid ). The reason for this is that single properties are no longer necessary and su cient to identify a specific kind. Consequently, in the HPC model, the identification happens only through the cluster of properties, and in that cluster the necessary and su cient conditions no longer apply. I believe that this plasticity of cluster's properties is a useful tool to classify psychiatric kinds. In a nutshell, properties of HPC clusters are properties that could (a) belong to di↵erent explanation levels (biological, psychological, cultural), (b) be a di↵erent type of entities (processes, mechanisms, dysfunctions, signs, symptoms), and (c) show a heterogeneity in the co-occurrence (namely reciprocal causality between properties). I believe that (a), (b), and (c) -namely the plasticity of properties of cluster -are useful on HPC frame for the classification of psychiatric kinds (my attempt to use that model for psychiatric disorders is not a novelty: Kendler 2012 and Borsboom 2008 have already taken steps in this direction). Mental disorders are represented as entities for which the internal structure is not clear. Furthermore, their relation with each other is also not clear. Are they without discrete boundaries? If so, are they in continuity with each other? Or rather, are they discrete and divisible? This is a well-known debate in philosophy of psychiatry that is called the categorical vs. continuous debate, or discrete vs. dimensional debate (see for e.g. Andrews et al 2007; Bjelland et al 2009; Broman-Fulks et al

Recent developments in philosophy of psychopathology

Current opinion in psychiatry, 2008

To survey recent developments in the English-language philosophy of psychopathology. First, we present books - by Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) and by Thompson (2007) -that integrate phenomenology with cognitive science and neuroscience. This is followed by discussion of critical assessments of the DSM-III operational legacy and practical consequences recently offered by various psychiatrists, including Andreasen, Mullen,and Maj. These very bleak assessments are considered in light of certain new trends in explanatory models of psychiatry and associated metaphysical concerns. Finally, we concentrate on the phenomenological approach to schizophrenia, enjoying a renaissance in psychiatric literature. We emphasize the recent work on the issue of self disorders as a core aspect of psychopathology of schizophrenia and criticize the accuracy of a recent survey (published in this journal) of phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia, thereby rectifying important misunderstandings. The review emphasizes the fundamental importance of philosophy of psychopathology in clarifying concepts, highlighting epistemological problems, and helping to provide adequate distinctions at the phenomenological level for use in empirical research.

Research in psychopathology: Epistemologic issues

Comprehensive Psychiatry, 1995

Etiologic research in psychiatry relies on an objectivist epistemology positing that human cognition is specified by the "reality" of the outer world, which consists of a totality of mind-independent objects. Truth is considered as some sort of correspondence relation between words and external objects, and mind as a mirror of nature. In our view, this epistemology considerably impedes etiologic research. Objectivist epistemology has been recently confronting a growing critique from diverse scientific fields. Alternative models in neurosciences (neuronal selection), artificial intelligence (connectionism), and developmental psychology (developmental biodynamics) converge in viewing living organisms as self-organizing systems. In this perspective, the organism is not specified by the outer world, but enacts its environment by selecting relevant domains of significance that constitute its world. The distinction between mind and body or organism and environment is a matter of observational perspective. These models from empirical sciences are compatible with fundamental tenets of philosophical phenomenology and hermeneutics. They imply consequences for research in psychopathology: symptoms cannot be viewed as disconnected manifestations of discrete localized brain dysfunctions. Psychopathology should therefore focus on how the person's self-coherence is maintained and on the understanding and empirical investigation of the systemic laws that govern neurodevelopment and the organization of human cognition.

Extending disorder: essentialism, family resemblance and secondary sense

Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2013

It is commonly thought that mental disorder is a valid concept only in so far as it is an extension of or continuous with the concept of physical disorder. A valid extension has to meet two criteria: determination and coherence. Essentialists meet these criteria through necessary and sufficient conditions for being a disorder. Two Wittgensteinian alternatives to essentialism are considered and assessed against the two criteria. These are the family resemblance approach and the secondary sense approach. Where the focus is solely on the characteristics or attributes of things, both these approaches seem to fail to meet the criteria for valid extension. However, this focus on attributes is mistaken. The criteria for valid extension are met in the case of family resemblance by the pattern of characteristics associated with a concept, and by the limits of intelligibility of applying a concept. Secondary sense, though it may have some claims to be a good account of the relation between physical and mental disorder, cannot claim to meet the two criteria of valid extension.