Kant's Theory of Radical Evil and its Franciscan Forebears (original) (raw)
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The Contingency of Evil: Rethinking the Problem of Universal Evil in Kant's Religion
Rethinking Kant: Volume 3
In this paper I explore how three seemingly incompatible Kantian theses–a libertarian notion of freedom, the inscrutability of one’s fundamental moral maxim, and the ubiquity of evil–can each be maintained without contradiction. I do this by arguing against the popular notion that in his 'Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,' Kant attributes 'radical evil' to all human beings.
Nature Without Evil: The Missing Term in Kant's Moral View of the World
In this paper I examine the challenge evil poses to Kant’s moral view of the world in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Radical evil, as he conceives of it, poses a unique problem for moral philosophy, since it inheres universally in humanity (and thus belongs to human nature in some sense) but is at the same time imputable to agents (and is therefore freely chosen). Kant attempts to resolve the problem, but only at the cost of separating radical evil from any rational origin. By means of an antinomy that demonstrates the difficulties of coherently attributing evil either to nature or to freedom, I argue that understanding the problem of evil in Kant involves recognizing the origin of radical evil in diabolical evil, which must ultimately be excluded from the system of practical philosophy as incomprehensible. Thus, contrary to readings that see Kant grappling with the problem of evil in order to resolve inadequacies in either the notion of freedom or the empty formalism of the good, I argue that the real difficulty for Kant lies in understanding pure evil as an inconceivable causality outside the domain of causal law. Finally, I draw on this analysis to explain why diabolical evil does appear to sometimes play a role in human behavior.
Kant's Anatomy of Evil: Introduction
2009
Contemporary debates in moral philosophy have primarily been focused on meta-ethical questions about the justifi cation of morality, disregarding the ease with which perfectly justifi ed norms are displaced by non-moral considerations. 1 Given the scope, magnitude, and inventiveness of human wrongdoing, this philosophical trend seems utterly misguided. The challenge does not lie so much in how to justify morality, but in understanding how perfectly justifi ed judgments are so easily disregarded by self-serving calculations. 2 Kant's doctrine of radical evil has much to tell us about this. Against the widespread tendency to explain evil in terms of the pernicious power of natural inclinations, Kant believed that evil represented "an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence [is] all the more dangerous" (R 6: 57). The enemy is invisible, for "no matter how far back we direct our attention to our moral state, we fi nd that this state is no longer res integra " (R 6: 58n.). And it is exceptionally dangerous, for the corruption in question is self-imposed: "genuine evil consists in our will not to resist the inclinations when they invite transgression" (ibid.). Since this type of volition rests on a maxim, and maxim formation in Kant always takes place under the constraints of
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Every Man Has His Price: Kant's Argument for Universal Radical Evil
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the much-debated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant's argument from his affirmation that we all have a price-we can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant's view, we are thus responsible for having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil.
Kant’s Theodicy and its Role in the Development of Radical Evil
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2018
In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that rational beings should want to have no inclin ations. But in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, he asserts that the inclin ations are good in themselves. While many commentators hold that Kant simply wrote hyperbolically in the Groundwork and the second Critique, I argue Kant was sincere, and changed his mind about the worth of the inclinations between the second Critique and the Religion. This is because he changed his mind about the source of immorality: whereas in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason Kant took our inclinations to be tempters, starting in "Miscarriage of All Phil osophical Trials in Theodicy" and concluding in the Religion, he posited a selfim posed propensity to evil as the source of immorality. Kant's reason for changing his mind about the source of immorality was partly theological: if our inclin ations were to blame for immorality, then God would also be to blame for creating us with them. The only way God could not be to blame is if our immorality were selfimposed. But Kant also concluded that looking for theoretical explanations of our immorality-whether theological or naturalistic-was itself problematic: such explanations ended up exonerating us for our immorality. Because they had this effect, I contend that Kant saw the offering of such exculpating theoret ical explanations as itself motivated by immorality. This understanding of Kant makes sense of the approaches he takes in both "Miscarriage" and Religion.
A Kantian Response to the Problem of Evil: Living in the Moral World
Religions
James Sterba has presented a powerful and existentially sincere form of the problem of evil, arguing that it is logically impossible for God to exist, given that there are powerful moral requirements to prevent evil, where one can, and that these requirements would bind an all-powerful and good God, who would indeed be able to prevent such evil. The ‘Kantian’ argument that I set out, if accepted, would undermine the following stage of Sterba’s argument: Significant and especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions do obtain all around us, which, if God exists, would have to be through his permission. The Kantian argument will hold that we are able to believe that, in some sense, such horrendous evil consequences do not really obtain, although they appear to. The claim is not that the Kantian argument is ‘persuasive’, but that if some Kantian assumptions are granted, we do have a response to Sterba, which throws open a different way of looking at things. I conclude with ...
Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility
Kantian Review, 2013
The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant’s moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act – a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant’s moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant’s theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one’s freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.