What kind of intelligence is "artificial intelligence"? (original) (raw)
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Intelligence, Artificial and Otherwise
Forum Philosophicum, 2019
The idea of artificial intelligence implies the existence of a form of intelligence that is "natural, " or at least not artificial. The problem is that intelligence , whether "natural" or "artificial," is not well defined: it is hard to say what, exactly, is or constitutes intelligence. This difficulty makes it impossible to measure human intelligence against artificial intelligence on a unique scale. It does not, however, prevent us from comparing them; rather, it changes the sense and meaning of such comparisons. Comparing artificial intelligence with human intelligence could allow us to understand both forms better. This paper thus aims to compare and distinguish these two forms of intelligence, focusing on three issues: forms of embodiment, autonomy and judgment. Doing so, I argue, should enable us to have a better view of the promises and limitations of present-day artificial intelligence, along with its benefits and dangers and the place we should make for it in our culture and society.
On Defining Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Artificial General Intelligence, 2019
This article systematically analyzes the problem of defining “artificial intelligence.” It starts by pointing out that a definition influences the path of the research, then establishes four criteria of a good working definition of a notion: being similar to its common usage, drawing a sharp boundary, leading to fruitful research, and as simple as possible. According to these criteria, the representative definitions in the field are analyzed. A new definition is proposed, according to it intelligence means “adaptation with insufficient knowledge and resources.” The implications of this definition are discussed, and it is compared with the other definitions. It is claimed that this definition sheds light on the solution of many existing problems and sets a sound foundation for the field.
“Artificial Intelligence”: Philosophical Aspects of Understanding
2021
The problem of “artificial intelligence” is becoming more and more relevant today. This topic is also of great interest to philosophers. This article considers primarily a retrospective analysis of the study of the possibilities of artificially created mechanisms that first perform primitive actions and then more complex ones, including thought processes. Then the article provides a particular philosophical analysis of the concept of “artificial intelligence”, its capabilities and potential danger.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATURAL INTELLIGENCE
Introduction Philosophy of mind covers a wide range of topics all of which are united by the strong quest to understand the very nature of the human mind. One of such topics is the mindedness of computers, or computer programs. The question can be stated thus: does the computer have a mind? This issue came up against the backdrop that computers had been developed that could play games, do intelligent calculation and produce the output of such calculations—in a very neat fashion. But intellectual disputes over the nature of computer intelligence, whether it equals human intelligence and can thus be said to have a mind, got a major boost in the twentieth century with the bold attempt by Alan Turing, an influential logician when he proposed that computers are possible that could engage in intelligent conversations which are indistinguishable from typical human conversation. In this regard, the principle upon which to determine the mindedness or otherwise of computers is a behavioural one: when the behaviour of a machine is typically undistinguishable from that of human, it is unwarranted to deny the machine thinks. In this essay, we will examine this debate. We will go straight and look at the central claims and the arguments in support of them. Our position is that artificial intelligence, at least as we have it now, does not equate natural intelligence since it does not contain the significant and indispensable property of natural consciousness.
Towards an interdisciplinary framework about intelligence
Heliyon, 2021
In recent years, advances in science, technology, and the way in which we view our world have led to an increasingly broad use of the term "intelligence". As we learn more about biological systems, we find more and more examples of complex and precise adaptive behavior in animals and plants. Similarly, as we build more complex computational systems, we recognize the emergence of highly sophisticated structures capable of solving increasingly complex problems. These behaviors show characteristics in common with the sort of complex behaviors and learning capabilities we find in humans, and therefore it is common to see them referred to as "intelligent". These analogies are problematic as the term intelligence is inextricably associated with human-like capabilities. While these issues have been discussed by leading researchers of AI and renowned psychologists and biologists highlighting the commonalities and differences between AI and biological intelligence, there have been few rigorous attempts to create an interdisciplinary approach to the modern problem of intelligence. This article proposes a comparative framework to discuss what we call "purposeful behavior", a characteristic shared by systems capable of gathering and processing information from their surroundings and modifying their actions in order to fulfill a series of implicit or explicit goals. Our aim is twofold: on the one hand, the term purposeful behavior allows us to describe the behavior of these systems without using the term "intelligence", avoiding the comparison with human capabilities. On the other hand, we hope that our framework encourages interdisciplinary discussion to help advance our understanding of the relationships among different systems and their capabilities.
Artificial Intelligence and the Notions of the "Natural" and the "Artificial"
Justin Nnaemeka Onyeukaziri, 2022
This paper argues that to negate the ontological difference between the natural and the artificial, is not plausible; nor is the reduction of the natural to the artificial or vice versa possible. Except if one intends to empty the semantic content of the terms and notions: "natural" and "artificial." Most philosophical discussions on Artificial Intelligence (AI) have always been in relation to the human person, especially as it relates to human intelligence, consciousness and/or mind in general. This paper, intends to broaden the conversation, by discussing AI in relation to the notions of "nature" and the "artificial." This intention is to more critically understand the artificiality in and of artificial intelligence. To achieve this, the notion of "nature" in Aristotle's Philosophy of Nature, has been employed as an epistemological tool in interrogating the notion of the artificial and the objectives of the science and technology of Artificial Intelligence.
Special Issue “On Defining Artificial Intelligence”—Commentaries and Author’s Response
Journal of Artificial General Intelligence
Pei Wang's paper titled "On Defining Artificial Intelligence" was published in a special issue of the Journal of Artificial General Intelligence (JAGI) in December of last year (Wang, 2019). Wang has been at the forefront of AGI research for over two decades. His non-axiomatic approach to reasoning has stood as a singular example of what may lie beyond narrow AI, garnering interest from NASA and Cisco, among others. We consider his article one of the strongest attempts, since the beginning of the field, to address the long-standing lack of consensus for how to define the field and topic of artificial intelligence (AI). In the recent AGISI survey on defining intelligence (Monett and Lewis, 2018), Pei Wang's definition, The essence of intelligence is the principle of adapting to the environment while working with insufficient knowledge and resources. Accordingly, an intelligent system should rely on finite processing capacity, work in real time, open to unexpected tasks, and learn from experience. This working definition interprets "intelligence" as a form of "relative rationality" (Wang, 2008), 1. Most striking in these numbers is the glaring absence of female authors. A common reason among female academics for rejecting our invitation to contribute was overcommitment. As a community, we may want to think of new, different ways of engaging the full spectrum of AI practitioners if we value inclusion as an essential constituent of a healthy scientific growth. Self determination and willingness to participate are also essential. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons BY-NC-ND License.
2018
This paper presents an intriguing debate on artificial intelligence and the human person. Science has grown into an unpredictable parlance to the extent that its breakthroughs now re-make creation to reflect man’s desires. This has led, for example, to the attempt to create machines that could work like more competent persons, such that these machines could be equated with human persons or considered as the human counterpart. By implication, the project of artificial intelligence seeks but one thing, that is, to make a ‘prototype man’ or an ‘artificial man’. For, to grant the concept of artificial intelligence is to affirm, without any prejudice, the concept of artificial man. For this reason, this paper argues that there is nothing like artificial intelligence because it is too much of an exaggeration to think of machines that can do things men can do. It maintains that intelligence cannot be assigned to machines and machines do not possess intelligence. Rather, machines merely per...
Artificial Intelligence Debates about Its Use and Abuse
This paper is concerned with the question, "Is what a stored-program digital computer does thinking-in the full human sense of the term?" Several current controversies are examined, including the meaning and usefulness of the Turing test to determine "intelligence." The Lucas controversy of the early 1960s is taken up, dealing with the philosophical issues related to the man-versus-machine debate, and Dreyfus' ideas against Machine Intelligence are explored. Searle's ideas in opposition to the validity of the Turing test are described, as are various interpretations of the Chinese room thought-experiment and its relation to real "thought." Weizenbaum's opposition to the "information-processing model of man" is also developed. The paper concludes with a comparison of the I9thcentury debates over Darwinian Evolution and those in this century over Artificial Intelligence.