The Scottish Feminist Judgments Project: A New Frontier (original) (raw)
Related papers
Methods, Impact, and Reach of the Global Feminist Judgments Projects
2018
English Abstract: This collection of essays is the product of the workshop Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Legal Perspectives on Judicial Decision Making and Gender Justice held at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law (Onati, Spain) in May, 2017. The papers explain and explore the multiple global projects that attempt to rewrite judicial opinions by incorporating feminist legal reasoning or methods. Each essay grows out of the authors’ experiences working with projects based in a particular socio-political, geographical, historical and jurisprudential context: Canada, England, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and a multi-jurisdictional international law project. Collectively, the essays bring new insights, methods and challenges to the study of the feminist project of equal justice across the boundaries of culture, race, nation and gender. Spanish Abstract: Esta coleccion de articulos es producto del seminario Feminist Judgments: Comparative Socio-Leg...
Social Science Research Network, 2016
6 West, above n 2 ('progressive constitutionalism') 651. Although West is speaking here in the US context, this framing applies well to Fletcher J's engagement with the Irish Constitution. views law as an open set of possibilities, and thus a vehicle for change, growth, and authenticity, rather than the static product of an unambiguous past historical process, and thus a vehicle for obedience. 7 In her re-visioning of the decision, Fletcher J harnesses the disruptive potential of the Constitution to address the power imbalances perpetuated by Article 40.3.3. Contrasting her judgment to the original 'expose[s] the contingency and biases of existing decisions and disrupt[s] the unique authority of the courts and legal decisionmaking'. 8 In my commentary I bring together the work of Fletcher J, the feminist judge, and Ruth Fletcher, the feminist academic, to critique the existence and impact of 40.3.3. Reading the judgment in light of Fletcher's academic work merges aspects of critique and law reform which are central to the feminist judging methodology. The Emergence of Article 40.3.3 In order to understand the decision in Attorney General v X it is necessary to consider the historical and jurisprudential context within which the case arose. At that time abortion in Ireland was regulated within a web of Constitutional, legislative, and common law provisions originating with the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA), sections 58 and 59, which prohibit procuring or attempting to procure a miscarriage. 9 Sections 58 and 59 of the OAPA were reaffirmed in the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979. 10 In England, the OAPA was interpreted to allow for an exception to the general prohibition when the life or health (physical or mental) of the pregnant woman were likely to be severely impacted. 11 However, it is clear that even prior to the insertion of 40.3.3 into the Irish Constitution, such an interpretation was unlikely to be permissible in Ireland. 12 Evidence for this proposition can be traced through the statements of Kenny J in Ryan v Attorney General 13 to its clearest exposition in the judgment of Walsh J in G v An Bord Uchtála, when he held that a child: has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded against all threats directed to its existence whether before or after birth The right to life necessarily implies the right to be born… 14 Notwithstanding the prevailing jurisprudence, a concern emerged that the Constitution could provide an avenue through which abortion would become
Feminist legal theory manifests through writing and speaking about 'law' and 'women,' in an effort to promote and improve understanding about justice. Feminist legal theory is a set of ideas, an activity engaged in by thinkers in and outside academia, and an intellectual and political movement. Developments in feminist legal theory emerged through engagement with problems rooted in inequalities, experienced by individuals and communities, at the hands of people, corporations, or the state. This article draws out key areas of tension within the field of feminist legal theory, focusing on English-language feminist legal theory and spanning the field of national jurisdictions and international human rights.
Seeing Things Differently: Art, Law and Justice in the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project
2020
This paper illustrates how turning to art rather than focusing solely on legal reform can form part of an alternative response to gender inequality that allows for deeper understandings of social (in)justice. We show how the Scottish Feminist Judgments Project – a collaborative endeavour by legal academics, practising lawyers, judges, artistic contributors and representatives from the third sector – can offer those who engage with our art the experience of hearing and seeing law in different ways. More specifically, we explore how art can open law up to scrutiny, render vivid the impact of legal decisions, and create richer and more democratic communities of understanding. At the same time, by discussing knowledge differentials and the quandaries of creating art ethically, we also highlight some of the challenges involved in engaging in artistic-legal collaboration.
Feminist Legal Studies: Critical Concepts in Law
2009
Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan Free PDF d0wnl0ad, audio books, books to read, good books to read, cheap books, good books, online books, books online, book reviews epub, read books online, books to read online, online library, greatbooks to read, PDF best books to read, top books to read Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan books to read online. Online Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan ebook PDF download Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan Doc Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan Mobipocket Feminist Legal Studies (Critical Concepts in Law) by Joanne Conaghan EPub
Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments : Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity
2017
6 West, above n 2 ('progressive constitutionalism') 651. Although West is speaking here in the US context, this framing applies well to Fletcher J's engagement with the Irish Constitution. views law as an open set of possibilities, and thus a vehicle for change, growth, and authenticity, rather than the static product of an unambiguous past historical process, and thus a vehicle for obedience. 7 In her re-visioning of the decision, Fletcher J harnesses the disruptive potential of the Constitution to address the power imbalances perpetuated by Article 40.3.3. Contrasting her judgment to the original 'expose[s] the contingency and biases of existing decisions and disrupt[s] the unique authority of the courts and legal decisionmaking'. 8 In my commentary I bring together the work of Fletcher J, the feminist judge, and Ruth Fletcher, the feminist academic, to critique the existence and impact of 40.3.3. Reading the judgment in light of Fletcher's academic work merges aspects of critique and law reform which are central to the feminist judging methodology. The Emergence of Article 40.3.3 In order to understand the decision in Attorney General v X it is necessary to consider the historical and jurisprudential context within which the case arose. At that time abortion in Ireland was regulated within a web of Constitutional, legislative, and common law provisions originating with the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA), sections 58 and 59, which prohibit procuring or attempting to procure a miscarriage. 9 Sections 58 and 59 of the OAPA were reaffirmed in the Health (Family Planning) Act 1979. 10 In England, the OAPA was interpreted to allow for an exception to the general prohibition when the life or health (physical or mental) of the pregnant woman were likely to be severely impacted. 11 However, it is clear that even prior to the insertion of 40.3.3 into the Irish Constitution, such an interpretation was unlikely to be permissible in Ireland. 12 Evidence for this proposition can be traced through the statements of Kenny J in Ryan v Attorney General 13 to its clearest exposition in the judgment of Walsh J in G v An Bord Uchtála, when he held that a child: has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded against all threats directed to its existence whether before or after birth The right to life necessarily implies the right to be born… 14 Notwithstanding the prevailing jurisprudence, a concern emerged that the Constitution could provide an avenue through which abortion would become
FEMINISM(S) AND THE LAW. OLD LEGACIES AND NEW CHALLENGES
In the ongoing debate on the health of feminism, some authors accuse “second wave” feminists, especially European “feminists of difference”, of having weakened feminist claims by abandoning the emancipatory inspiration of “first wave” feminism. “Second wave” feminists are also accused of overlooking the importance of the law. If we delve deeper, however, their perspective on law appears to represent one of their most important legacies. Abandoning it in favor of an acritical enthusiasm for liberal gender mainstreaming or a gendered “politics of identity” would be a mistake. Today’s feminists should instead work to adapt this legacy to contemporary challenges.
American feminist jurisprudence is the study of the construction and workings of the law from perspectives which foreground the implications of the law for women and women's lives. This study includes law as a theoretical enterprise as well its practical and concrete effects in women's lives. Further, it includes law as an academic discipline, and thus incorporates concerns regarding pedagogy and the influence of teachers. On all these levels, feminist scholars, lawyers, and activists raise questions about the meaning and the impact of law on women's lives. Feminist jurisprudence seeks to analyze and redress more traditional legal theory and practice. It focuses on the ways in which law has been structured (sometimes unwittingly) that deny the experiences and needs of women. Feminist jurisprudence claims that patriarchy (the system of interconnected relations and institutions that oppress women) infuses the legal system and all its workings, and that this is an unacceptable state of affairs. Consequently, feminist jurisprudence is not politically neutral, but a normative approach, as expressed by philosopher Patricia Smith: "[F]eminist jurisprudence challenges basic legal categories and concepts rather than analyzing them as given. Feminist jurisprudence asks what is implied in traditional categories, distinctions, or concepts and rejects them if they imply the subordination of women. In this sense, feminist jurisprudence is normative and claims that traditional jurisprudence and law are implicitly normative as well" (Smith 1993, p. 10). Feminist jurisprudence sees the workings of law as thoroughly permeated by political and moral judgments about the worth of women and how women should be treated. These judgments are not commensurate with women's understandings of themselves, nor even with traditional liberal conceptions of (moral and legal) equality and fairness. Although feminist jurisprudence revolves around a number of questions and features a diversity of focus and approach, two characteristics are central to it. First, because the Anglo-American legal tradition is built on liberalism and its tenets, feminist jurisprudence tends to respond to liberalism in some way. The second characteristic is the goal of bringing the law and its practitioners to recognize that law as currently constructed does not acknowledge or respond to the needs of women, and must be changed. These two features can be seen in the major debates in current feminist jurisprudence, which range from questions of the proper perspective from which to understand the problems of the law, to questions of legal theory and practice.