Second Nature and Recognition. Hegel and the Social Space (original) (raw)

Hegel on the 'Other': introducing the concept of recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology

2009

This paper introduces the notion of Recognition in the section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ‘A. INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELFCONSCIOUSNESS: LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE’ by way of a commentary. Hegel’s view is that in order for any self-consciousness to obtain it must be acknowledged as such by another self-consciousness. For Hegel, acknowledgement emerges as a necessary condition for self-consciousness. As such, Hegel’s account of self-consciousness raises the problem of intersubjectivity, or the account of the relation between more than one self-consciousness and I suggest, without attempting to establish, some intuitive lines of defence of the Hegelian position. I suggest that the dialectic of lordship and bondage, or as it is commonly referred to, the Master-Slave dialectic, cannot be fully comprehended without an adequate understanding of Hegel’s account of Recognition.

Ethicality and the Movement of Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

In this paper, I consider the contribution that Hegel’s discussion of “ethicality” (Sittlichkeit) makes to his account of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit. While the famous relation of lord and bondsman might prompt us to think of all failures of recognition as failures of reciprocity, in his account of ethicality, Hegel shows that it is possible for forms of social life to be structured so that no one is recognized. This failure of recognition is unique since its source does not lie in a lack of reciprocity between individuals, but rather in the absence of an explicit and shared conception of the “self.” I conclude by pointing to the importance of the idea of the self to Hegel’s account of reciprocal intersubjective recognition in the text, contrasting it with Pippin’s recent interpretation.

How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings

"Critical Horizons", vol 13, No 2 (2012), pp. 176-196, 2012

The paper proposes a reconstruction of some fragments of Hegel’s Jena manuscripts concerning the natural genesis of recognitive spiritual consciousness. On this basis it will be argued that recognition has a foothold in nature. Such a reading of recognition will be contrasted with contemporary constructivist interpretations such as those offered by Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard. As a consequence of our reconstruction of its emergence from nature, recognition should not be understood as a bootstrapping process, that is, as a self-positing and self-justifying normative social phenomenon, intelligible within itself and independently of anything external to it.

Second Nature, Critical Theory and Hegel's Phenomenology

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase “second nature” in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures “natural consciousness,” “natural notion,” and “inorganic nature,” in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the “official” version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an “unofficial” version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a “second nature.”

Nature, spirit and second nature: Hegel and McDowell

Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos, 2018

Both Hegel and McDowell make use of the expression ‘second nature’. Furthermore, each philosopher is concerned to connect talk of ‘second nature’ with a larger issue: that of the relation between nature and spirit. According to McDowell, being ‘reminded’ of the perfectly familiar phenomenon of second nature is to do the work of ‘deconstricting’ the conception of nature that bald naturalists operate with. Hegel, by contrast, works in the opposite direction. For Hegel, the phenomenon of second nature is to be understood in light of a prior characterization of the relation between nature and spirit, according to which spirit is the ‘truth of’ nature. This essay attempts to get into focus the difficulties (beginning from the surface grammar of the expressions ‘nature’, ‘second nature’, and ‘first nature’) that must be sorted out before we can properly understand how each philosopher connects the topic of second nature with the wider issue of how nature and spirit are related, and to provide a sketch of the philosophical issues that must be faced once we have the difficulties clearly in view. The philosophical difficulties faced by Hegel differ from those faced by McDowell, as reflects their difference in approach. Those faced by Hegel concern how precisely to spell out the conception of nature – such that ‘spirit is the truth of nature’ – in which his conception of second nature is embedded; those faced by McDowell concern how his ‘reminder’ about second nature is to be understood in the absence of something analogous to Hegel’s attempts to spell out a conception of nature.

On the relation of recognition and Bildung in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

Philosophica, 2023

While Hegel's conceptions of recognition and Bildung continue to attract scholars' attention, the linkage between the two is often ignored. Yet these two conceptions are intimately linked in Hegel's system and thus cannot be properly understood if discussed separately without taking into consideration their close relationship and interconnection. This paper attempts to fulfill this gap by reconstructing the complex interrelation between the two conceptions in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It shows that Hegel uses both recognition and Bildung to develop his concept of the self as the self-cultivating agency capable of achieving self-knowledge only through and within the universal whole. In this sense, the movement of recognition is part of the complex process of Bildung and is its indispensable element. Deriving its significance from its contribution to the formation (Bildung) of the self as active subjectivity, recognition points to the fact that subjectivity is mediated through relations with other people. Recognizing the importance of these relations involves acknowledging individuals' mutual interdependence grounded in intersubjective interactions, only within which the process of Bildung becomes possible.

Is Hegelian recognition second-personal? Hegel says "no"

European Journal of Philosophy, 2020

The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.

The dialectic of recognition: A post-Hegelian approach

European Journal of Social Theory, 2018

This article aims to make two points. First, seeking and granting recognition is an ambivalent process that may lead to results completely the opposite from what was intended. Certain social pathologies, including reification, develop because of the way the desire for recognition is expressed and satisfied. Nevertheless, the concept of recognition remains central to critical theory. A normative concept of recognition is needed in order to identify these pathologies. Second, a critical theory of society that understands itself as praxis must justify the possibility of its 'reception' by members of society. The theory's addressees must 'recognize themselves' in the theory. They must recognize in it the conceptual expression of their own experience of society. Therefore, social theory must account for the emergence of a critical standpoint on society. These two main points are addressed by means of a 'dialectical' approach. The tensions and interactions between global society, states, and value-communities-the dialectic within and between these spheres-account for the diverse and conflicting meanings of the concept of recognition. At the same time, such a dialectic makes it possible to understand the emergence of a critical viewpoint on society. Keywords critical theory, dialectic, feeling of injustice, feeling of meaninglessness, recognition This article's aim is to make two connected points. First, recognition is not merely a response to social pathologies or disrespect, it is a process that generates its own pathologies. In particular, the search for recognition may paradoxically contribute to a process of reification. In order to make this point I will use the distinction between