Have the Inhabitants of France, Great Britain, Spain, and the US Been Secularized? An Analysis Comparing the Religious Data in These Countries (original) (raw)

Abstract

This paper carries out a comparative analysis of the religious beliefs and practices of residents in France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, using two waves of the World Values Survey. The main objective is to investigate the impact that secularization has had on the religious experience in these countries. More specifically, the prospection is carried out around the Christian creed in its Protestant and Catholic manifestations, understood as the majority beliefs in these countries. To carry out this task, we compiled a series of data distributed around the following categories: Contextualization: The importance of religion within different aspects of life; level of religiosity and membership in religious denominations; the sphere of beliefs: Belief in God, belief in life after death, belief in hell, and belief in heaven; scope of practices; and the nones. Subsequently, we carry out an explanatory-interpretative analysis articulated around four questions or challenges faced by these religious forms in the context of secularization: 1. The crisis of Christianity; 2. the thesis of European exceptionalism; and 3. the rise of the nones. In conclusion, the data analyzed allow us to affirm—with nuances—the following: 1. The existence of a process of dechurching in the heart of Christianity; 2. the confirmation that the European case is exceptional if we compare it with other trends or other cultural programs of secularization; 3. that the area of greatest dechurching is linked to community practice, something that allows this research to adhere to Davie’s thesis, which defines the current religious situation as believing without belonging; and 4. as a consequence of the process of dechurching, there is a rise of a social group without religious adscription: The nones.

Figures (41)

*P and Q = 0.5, confidence level 95.5%, under the assumption of simple random sampling; Source: (European Social Survey 2022). Table 1. Sample sizes and errors, dates of data collection, and mode of data collection used in this paper.

*P and Q = 0.5, confidence level 95.5%, under the assumption of simple random sampling; Source: (European Social Survey 2022). Table 1. Sample sizes and errors, dates of data collection, and mode of data collection used in this paper.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the data shown in Table 6. Table 2. Sample sizes, weighting coefficients, and sample considered. It has been pointed out that one of the objectives is to compare the information with the situation in the previous decade. In the case of the comparison with the 2005/07 results, the data come from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, conducted between 2005 and 2007 (World Values Survey 2008). Table 3 shows the sample sizes, sampling error, and weighting coefficients used so that each respondent has the same relevance, considering a sample of 1001 cases in each country. The last column of this table shows the dates of data collection, so this study will be called “Study years 2005/07”.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on the data shown in Table 6. Table 2. Sample sizes, weighting coefficients, and sample considered. It has been pointed out that one of the objectives is to compare the information with the situation in the previous decade. In the case of the comparison with the 2005/07 results, the data come from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey, conducted between 2005 and 2007 (World Values Survey 2008). Table 3 shows the sample sizes, sampling error, and weighting coefficients used so that each respondent has the same relevance, considering a sample of 1001 cases in each country. The last column of this table shows the dates of data collection, so this study will be called “Study years 2005/07”.

*P and Q = 0.5, confidence level 95.5%, under the assumption of simple random sampling; Source: (World Value: Survey 2008). Table 3. Sample sizes and errors, weighting coefficients, and dates of data collection.

*P and Q = 0.5, confidence level 95.5%, under the assumption of simple random sampling; Source: (World Value: Survey 2008). Table 3. Sample sizes and errors, weighting coefficients, and dates of data collection.

Figure 1 presents the consideration of the residents of the countries under study with respect to six aspects of life, with the possibility of answering ‘very important, ‘rather’, ‘not very’, or ‘not at all important’. Family is ‘very important’ for nine out of ten respondents, being the aspect that reaches the highest degree of importance: Nine out of ten define it as ‘very important’.

Figure 1 presents the consideration of the residents of the countries under study with respect to six aspects of life, with the possibility of answering ‘very important, ‘rather’, ‘not very’, or ‘not at all important’. Family is ‘very important’ for nine out of ten respondents, being the aspect that reaches the highest degree of importance: Nine out of ten define it as ‘very important’.

Note: These are average scores calculated by multiplying ‘very important’ by 4, ‘rather’ by 3, ‘not very’ by 2, and ‘not at all important’ by 1.

Note: These are average scores calculated by multiplying ‘very important’ by 4, ‘rather’ by 3, ‘not very’ by 2, and ‘not at all important’ by 1.

Figure 3. Evolution of the degree of importance of religion in the four countries under consideration. In short, there has been a decline in the importance of religion among respondents, primarily in the United States, with a grouped decline (very + rather) of 16%, followed by a 5% decline in France. In the United Kingdom, this situation is fainter, showing 2 percentage points, with the Spanish showing a different situation with a slight increase (1%) in the importance of religion.

Figure 3. Evolution of the degree of importance of religion in the four countries under consideration. In short, there has been a decline in the importance of religion among respondents, primarily in the United States, with a grouped decline (very + rather) of 16%, followed by a 5% decline in France. In the United Kingdom, this situation is fainter, showing 2 percentage points, with the Spanish showing a different situation with a slight increase (1%) in the importance of religion.

Figure 4. Religious denomination in the four countries considered. sidered, where we can observe the lower number of religious people in France and the United Kingdom, as well as the high religiosity of North Americans and Spaniards. The United Kingdom also stands out for the high number of people who declare themselves non-religious, at 48%, while the differentiating element in France is that a quarter of its population consider themselves convinced atheists, in line with what has been detected by some experts (among others, Cuchet 2018). The evolutionary analysis since 2005/07 shows a large decline in religious people in the United States, with a decrease of 19 percentage points, a marked increase (13%) in people declared as non-religious, and even more for atheism, which triples in the period analyzed (Figure 5). This is a recent phenomenon that has generated research to find out who they are, where they come from, and to what extent it is a stable phenomenon or whether it will grow over time. Some researchers—Burge, for example—have defined them as nones, a phenomenon that according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study of Harvard University affects 31.3% of Americans; that is, almost a third of Americans have no religious affiliation (Burge 2021).

Figure 4. Religious denomination in the four countries considered. sidered, where we can observe the lower number of religious people in France and the United Kingdom, as well as the high religiosity of North Americans and Spaniards. The United Kingdom also stands out for the high number of people who declare themselves non-religious, at 48%, while the differentiating element in France is that a quarter of its population consider themselves convinced atheists, in line with what has been detected by some experts (among others, Cuchet 2018). The evolutionary analysis since 2005/07 shows a large decline in religious people in the United States, with a decrease of 19 percentage points, a marked increase (13%) in people declared as non-religious, and even more for atheism, which triples in the period analyzed (Figure 5). This is a recent phenomenon that has generated research to find out who they are, where they come from, and to what extent it is a stable phenomenon or whether it will grow over time. Some researchers—Burge, for example—have defined them as nones, a phenomenon that according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study of Harvard University affects 31.3% of Americans; that is, almost a third of Americans have no religious affiliation (Burge 2021).

Figure 5. Evolution of the religious denomination in the four countries under consideration.

Figure 5. Evolution of the religious denomination in the four countries under consideration.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 4. Influential variables in religious denomination.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 4. Influential variables in religious denomination.

significantly in the second generation. There are 30 percentage points of difference in the case of Spain, 20 in France, and 14 in the United Kingdom. Thus, there is a notable change in second generations, at a time when religious wars star in the news in Western countries.

significantly in the second generation. There are 30 percentage points of difference in the case of Spain, 20 in France, and 14 in the United Kingdom. Thus, there is a notable change in second generations, at a time when religious wars star in the news in Western countries.

Figure 7. Do not belong to a denomination, 2017 vs. 2005/07. Religious denomination gives way to religious affiliation, a question asked of all respondents, regardless of the answer given in the previous question. However, it should be noted that one of the response options is ‘do not belong to a denomination’, chosen by 50% of the respondents, no doubt as a kind of “escape route” for atheists or for those whc declared themselves non-religious. This average figure for half of the sample increases by nine percentage points in the French and seven in the UK when compared to the 2005/07 survey. Spaniards and North Americans show a greater upward trend (Figure 7). In any case, it is surprising that “only” 90% of atheists and 69% of those who declare themselves to be non-religious people choose this option. That is, it is striking that 10% of atheists and 31% of those who consider themselves non-religious persons answer the question about their religion.

Figure 7. Do not belong to a denomination, 2017 vs. 2005/07. Religious denomination gives way to religious affiliation, a question asked of all respondents, regardless of the answer given in the previous question. However, it should be noted that one of the response options is ‘do not belong to a denomination’, chosen by 50% of the respondents, no doubt as a kind of “escape route” for atheists or for those whc declared themselves non-religious. This average figure for half of the sample increases by nine percentage points in the French and seven in the UK when compared to the 2005/07 survey. Spaniards and North Americans show a greater upward trend (Figure 7). In any case, it is surprising that “only” 90% of atheists and 69% of those who declare themselves to be non-religious people choose this option. That is, it is striking that 10% of atheists and 31% of those who consider themselves non-religious persons answer the question about their religion.

Figure 8. Responses to the question do you belong to a religion or religious denomination in the four countries. In the responses shown in Figure 8, Catholicism appears as the dominant religion in three of the four countries, albeit with a very differentiated following. In France, 80% of those interviewed declared themselves Catholics, and the rest of the religions—with the exception of Muslims with 11% of those interviewed—are barely followed by 2% of the population? (6). In Spain, the level of Catholicism drops to 62%, with 3% of Muslims and a large number of religions grouped in the “other” category. The rest of the religions, with the exception of Orthodoxy (1.2%), do not reach 1%.

Figure 8. Responses to the question do you belong to a religion or religious denomination in the four countries. In the responses shown in Figure 8, Catholicism appears as the dominant religion in three of the four countries, albeit with a very differentiated following. In France, 80% of those interviewed declared themselves Catholics, and the rest of the religions—with the exception of Muslims with 11% of those interviewed—are barely followed by 2% of the population? (6). In Spain, the level of Catholicism drops to 62%, with 3% of Muslims and a large number of religions grouped in the “other” category. The rest of the religions, with the exception of Orthodoxy (1.2%), do not reach 1%.

Figure 10. Religious disaffection: Percentage of followers of religions who consider themselves “religious people” in the four countries considered!".

Figure 10. Religious disaffection: Percentage of followers of religions who consider themselves “religious people” in the four countries considered!".

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 5. Sociodemographic characteristics of the followers of the Roman Catholic religion in France, Spain and the United States, and of the Protestant religion in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 5. Sociodemographic characteristics of the followers of the Roman Catholic religion in France, Spain and the United States, and of the Protestant religion in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Figure 11. Belief in God, life after death, heaven, and hell in the four countries considered. The country-by-country analysis shown in Figure 11 reveals, in the first place, the higt levels of belief in these aspects in North American society, where eight out of ten believe in God, ten percentage points less in that there is life after death, and two out of three respondents believe that heaven and hell exist. Spain is the second country in terms of the level of belief, with seven out of ten believing in God, and slightly less than half of those interviewed (44%) believing that there is life after death. Belief in the existence of heaver and hell are lower, at 39% and 29%, respectively. In France and the United Kingdom, belie: in God is reduced to half of the population, although the latter has a slightly lower belief ir God and in the existence of life after death.

Figure 11. Belief in God, life after death, heaven, and hell in the four countries considered. The country-by-country analysis shown in Figure 11 reveals, in the first place, the higt levels of belief in these aspects in North American society, where eight out of ten believe in God, ten percentage points less in that there is life after death, and two out of three respondents believe that heaven and hell exist. Spain is the second country in terms of the level of belief, with seven out of ten believing in God, and slightly less than half of those interviewed (44%) believing that there is life after death. Belief in the existence of heaver and hell are lower, at 39% and 29%, respectively. In France and the United Kingdom, belie: in God is reduced to half of the population, although the latter has a slightly lower belief ir God and in the existence of life after death.

Limited to those who reported believing in God: 2938 cases, 63.1% of the sample. among French citizens, who are also the residents who express the highest intermediate scores (37%). It is surprising that approximately 10% of those who believe in God consider him to be of no importance in their lives, a percentage that increases in France and the United Kingdom and decreases in Spain. Figure 12. Importance of God in participants’ lives in the four countries under consideration.

Limited to those who reported believing in God: 2938 cases, 63.1% of the sample. among French citizens, who are also the residents who express the highest intermediate scores (37%). It is surprising that approximately 10% of those who believe in God consider him to be of no importance in their lives, a percentage that increases in France and the United Kingdom and decreases in Spain. Figure 12. Importance of God in participants’ lives in the four countries under consideration.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). * Level of significance <0.1.** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table 6. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe in God.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). * Level of significance <0.1.** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table 6. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe in God.

Figure 13. Belief in God according to whether one is a first- or secon—generation immigrant, in the four countries considered. It is more interesting to focus attention on the right-hand side of the Figure 14, which reveals that approximately 29% of the non-religious believe in God, a percentage that drops to 27% in the case of Spaniards.

Figure 13. Belief in God according to whether one is a first- or secon—generation immigrant, in the four countries considered. It is more interesting to focus attention on the right-hand side of the Figure 14, which reveals that approximately 29% of the non-religious believe in God, a percentage that drops to 27% in the case of Spaniards.

Figure 14. Belief in God according to religious denomination and belonging or not to a religion'.

Figure 14. Belief in God according to religious denomination and belonging or not to a religion'.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship and level of studies with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 7. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe that there is life after death.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. The relationship and level of studies with activity does not appear because there is no significant term. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. *** Level of significance <0.01. Table 7. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe that there is life after death.

Figure 15. There is life after death, according to religious denomination and belonging or not to a religion. Forty-one percent of the English who declare that they do not belong to a religion believe that there is life after death, a percentage similar to that of the English and Americans. The large drop in Spanish society is surprising, 20 percentage points lower than the marginal percentage shown in Figure 11.

Figure 15. There is life after death, according to religious denomination and belonging or not to a religion. Forty-one percent of the English who declare that they do not belong to a religion believe that there is life after death, a percentage similar to that of the English and Americans. The large drop in Spanish society is surprising, 20 percentage points lower than the marginal percentage shown in Figure 11.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table 8. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe that hell exists.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table 8. Sociodemographic characteristics of those who believe that hell exists.

Figure 16. Belief in hell by first- or second-generation immigrants in countries with significant relationships.

Figure 16. Belief in hell by first- or second-generation immigrants in countries with significant relationships.

Figure 17. Belief in the existence of hell, according to religious denomination and religious or non-religious affiliation.

Figure 17. Belief in the existence of hell, according to religious denomination and religious or non-religious affiliation.

Figure 19. Attendance at religious services in the four countries under consideration. Half of the respondents never attend religious services, and 16% attend once a year or less. The responses shown in Figure 19 qualify these responses by country, indicating that two-thirds of French respondents never attend religious services, a percentage that is reduced by 29 percentage points for U.S. residents. Almost one in five (exactly 18%) UK residents attend once a year and less frequently, and Spaniards stand out as having the highest rate of church attendance on “holy days” (Christmas, Easter, etc.).

Figure 19. Attendance at religious services in the four countries under consideration. Half of the respondents never attend religious services, and 16% attend once a year or less. The responses shown in Figure 19 qualify these responses by country, indicating that two-thirds of French respondents never attend religious services, a percentage that is reduced by 29 percentage points for U.S. residents. Almost one in five (exactly 18%) UK residents attend once a year and less frequently, and Spaniards stand out as having the highest rate of church attendance on “holy days” (Christmas, Easter, etc.).

Figure 20. Differences (2017-2005/07) in attendance at religious services in the four countries considered.

Figure 20. Differences (2017-2005/07) in attendance at religious services in the four countries considered.

Figure 21. Non-attendance at religious services, by first- or second-generation immigrant, in the countries considered. “ * ~ We do not re fer to the changes in t all he regression model when the variables in Figure 18 are introduced because of the coincidence of the situation shown by the belief in hell. Within the group between first- and of those not born in services, as shown in Figure 21. In Euro do not attend religious services, reaching 61% in Spain. Respondents from the United States again show no di the country of residence, there is a large difference second-generation immigrants, with the latter attending fewer religious pe, more than half of second-generation immigrants fference in this regard.

Figure 21. Non-attendance at religious services, by first- or second-generation immigrant, in the countries considered. “ * ~ We do not re fer to the changes in t all he regression model when the variables in Figure 18 are introduced because of the coincidence of the situation shown by the belief in hell. Within the group between first- and of those not born in services, as shown in Figure 21. In Euro do not attend religious services, reaching 61% in Spain. Respondents from the United States again show no di the country of residence, there is a large difference second-generation immigrants, with the latter attending fewer religious pe, more than half of second-generation immigrants fference in this regard.

As for those who say they belong to a religion, at least one in four Europeans hardly attends religious services at all, a figure that rises to 38% in the case of France. North American respondents, as usual, are the ones who attend the most, and only 15% of those who declare a religious denomination do not attend services. The percentages in the second part of Figure 20 are surprising, but it should be borne in mind that within the category of “belonging to a religion”, there are people who—as we have already seen—have abandoned their precepts.

As for those who say they belong to a religion, at least one in four Europeans hardly attends religious services at all, a figure that rises to 38% in the case of France. North American respondents, as usual, are the ones who attend the most, and only 15% of those who declare a religious denomination do not attend services. The percentages in the second part of Figure 20 are surprising, but it should be borne in mind that within the category of “belonging to a religion”, there are people who—as we have already seen—have abandoned their precepts.

Figure 23. Non-attendance at religious services, by first- or second-generation immigrants, in the countries considered. ci The second element included in the practices is the frequency of prayer, which reveals hat 48% never do it, 12% less than ‘several times a year’, and 16% every day, representing the highest results. Figure 24 presents the differences in the frequency of prayer among European countries since this question was not included in the North American survey and therefore it is not possible to know its distribution. This figure shows the increase in he number of people who never pray in France, which reaches 57% of those interviewed, as well as in the United Kingdom, where the percentage of people who never pray is just over half of the population. In the analysis of the columns on the left, where those who pray every day appear, it is again the French who pray the least, followed by the residents of the United Kingdom. Approximately 20% of Spaniards pray every day.

Figure 23. Non-attendance at religious services, by first- or second-generation immigrants, in the countries considered. ci The second element included in the practices is the frequency of prayer, which reveals hat 48% never do it, 12% less than ‘several times a year’, and 16% every day, representing the highest results. Figure 24 presents the differences in the frequency of prayer among European countries since this question was not included in the North American survey and therefore it is not possible to know its distribution. This figure shows the increase in he number of people who never pray in France, which reaches 57% of those interviewed, as well as in the United Kingdom, where the percentage of people who never pray is just over half of the population. In the analysis of the columns on the left, where those who pray every day appear, it is again the French who pray the least, followed by the residents of the United Kingdom. Approximately 20% of Spaniards pray every day.

Figure 24. Frequency of prayer, limited to European countries. Some 48% never do so, and barely 16% pray every day, with Spaniards being the ones who pray the most.

Figure 24. Frequency of prayer, limited to European countries. Some 48% never do so, and barely 16% pray every day, with Spaniards being the ones who pray the most.

Note: limited to those who pray ‘several times a year’, ‘less often’ and ‘never’.

Note: limited to those who pray ‘several times a year’, ‘less often’ and ‘never’.

Figure 26. Ratio of self-identified religious people and those who do not belong to any religion.

Figure 26. Ratio of self-identified religious people and those who do not belong to any religion.

Figure 27. Presence of “nones” in the four countries considered.

Figure 27. Presence of “nones” in the four countries considered.

Figure 28. Cont. Other characteristic features (Exemplified in Figure 28) are that the majority are working and were born in the country where they live. These last factors affects not only those interviewees who are the children of residents of these countries but also the children of emigrants born in the countries considered, although to a lesser extent.

Figure 28. Cont. Other characteristic features (Exemplified in Figure 28) are that the majority are working and were born in the country where they live. These last factors affects not only those interviewees who are the children of residents of these countries but also the children of emigrants born in the countries considered, although to a lesser extent.

Figure 28. Demographic profile of nones and non-nones.

Figure 28. Demographic profile of nones and non-nones.

Appendix A. Emigration Status Appendix B. Questions Used (as Formulated). Note: Reproduced from “2017-2021 World Values Survey Wave 7 Master Survey Questionnaire”

Appendix A. Emigration Status Appendix B. Questions Used (as Formulated). Note: Reproduced from “2017-2021 World Values Survey Wave 7 Master Survey Questionnaire”

Appendix C. Supplementary Charts Figure A1. Cont.

Appendix C. Supplementary Charts Figure A1. Cont.

Figure A1. Cont.

Figure A1. Cont.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table A1. Sociodemographic traits of those who believe in God, including religious denomination and non-membership of a religious creed.

Notes: N.S.: No significant relationship. Source: (European Values Study 2022). ** Level of significance <0.05. ** Level of significance <0.01. Table A1. Sociodemographic traits of those who believe in God, including religious denomination and non-membership of a religious creed.

Figure A1. Importance of religion, according to sociodemographic characteristics.

Figure A1. Importance of religion, according to sociodemographic characteristics.

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