A different appetite for sovereignty? Independence movements in subnational island jurisdictions (original) (raw)
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Area, 2020
From a comparative political perspective, island jurisdictions stand out as having exceptionally democratic regimes in comparison with mainland or continental polities. Irrespective of their geographical location, levels of economic development or constitutional status (sovereign or nonsovereign), with only a few exceptions, island jurisdictions around the world have democratic political institutions. While some scholars have explained this relationship on the basis of colonial history, international political dynamics or the geographical isolation and remoteness that stem from being an island, others have argued that the smallness of islands explains the correlation, meaning that size is actually the causal factor that explains the prevalence of democratic governance. In this paper, an original account of the relationship between islandness and democracy is provided, foregrounding the informal political dynamics that can be observed in island territories around the world. To do this, the specific nature, dynamics and varieties of democratic governance in island jurisdictions are examined. Most island nations have adopted the political-institutional framework of former colonial powers or metropolitan states, and these have only rarely been modified to suit the (small) island context. Yet due to the greater social intimacy and interconnectedness of island societies, these formal institutional frameworks are likely to be complemented or overshadowed by a set of powerful informal political dynamics, which means that a large part of the political process is conducted outside of the official political channels. These informal politics have mixed effects on the quality of democratic governance, as face-to-face relations offer both opportunities and drawbacks for democratic transparency and accountability. The last analytical section of the paper examines the interaction between formal institutional structures and the prevalent informal political dynamics in island territories, and argues that this interplay perhaps provides the best explanation for the survival of democratic institutions in island territories.
An emerging “Islandian” sovereignty of non-self-governing islands
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 2017
Comparative analyses have found that non-self-governing islands tend to have much better development indicators than sovereign islands. Perhaps unsurprisingly, since 1983 no non-self-governing island has acquired political independence. This paper argues that rather than merely maintaining the status quo with their colonial metropoles, non-self-governing islands are actively creating a new form of sovereignty. This creation of an “Islandian” sovereignty takes place against the backdrop of debates on the relevance of classic Westphalian sovereignty and emerging practices of Indigenous sovereignty. This paper reviews global research on the sovereignty of islands and from this review, develops an analytical framework of five mechanisms that drive the emerging Islandian sovereignty. This framework is tested and illustrated with a case study of the negotiations about sovereignty between New Caledonia and its colonial metropole, France.
Exploring Sub-national Island Jurisdictions
2020
Sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs) manifest diverse expressions of governance within typically asymmetrical relationships with a much larger state. Dubbed 'federacies' in the literature on federalism, these bilateral systems of self-and shared-rule arise almost exclusively on islands. The jurisdictional powers that island federacies enjoy are principally a result of bilateral negotiations between island political elites and a (usually benign) metropole. This bargain is struck against the backdrop of a particular colonial inheritance, a local 'subnationalist' culture, and the varying ambitions of local elites to win jurisdictional powers to advance 'sub-national' territorial interests. At other times, however, island autonomies arise as crafted, deliberate devolutions of central governments eager to exploit islands as 'managed' zones for economic or security-related activity in a globalised economy. In either case sub-national autonomies...
Success without sovereignty : exploring sub-national island jurisdictions
Routledge eBooks, 2009
From the palm-lined road nearby, the mountains of Iran's southern coast are visible. But any shadow cast by Iran's repressive regime barely seems to reach Kish's gentle sand. On this small island, 18 km off the southern coast of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is far easier to find a five-star hotel than a mosque. That's because Iran's dictatorial government is trying to showcase Kish not as a strict Islamic haven, but as an earthly paradise designed to win over the international community. (Roston, 2005, p. 21) 2 G. Baldacchino and D. Milne MAINLAND-ISLAND RELATIONS This 'Mainland Iran-Kish Island' dialectic is not unique. There are many similar examples of 'mainland-island relations' in the contemporary world which, from a surface glance, do not seem to make sense. Yet their logic becomes clearer when seen in the context of states requiring unique offshore spaces outside the strait-jacket of the increasingly restrictive, 'level playing field' rules of global commerce among sovereign states. Islands then provide bounded space for the emergence of ingenious new species of asymmetrical economies and governance. The pattern repeats itself again and again where states make creative use of their small, far-flung and remote island jurisdictions to facilitate activities that would be simply anathema on home ground. Take Batam Island, located close to Singapore, that acts as the exclusive economic zone of Indonesia (Royle, 1997). Or consider Labuan Island, an integrated international offshore finance centre for neighbouring Malaysia (e.g. Fields, 2002). The Maldives, with its small population and convenient archipelagic geography, is another fundamentalist Islamic state that tolerates a vibrant tourism industry via a scrupulous zoning policy (Baldacchino, 2004a). Even developed metropolitan powers play the same game, if in a somewhat more cynical fashion. The United Kingdom, for example, appeals for curbing low/no-tax regimes via the OECD and the G7, while encouraging British investment to benefit from the very same low/no-tax regimes of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, for whose 'good government' the same United Kingdom remains ultimately responsible. Though a self-professed unitary state, China treats Hong Kong (since 1997) and Macao (since 1999) as 'special administrative regions', where 'the socialist system and policies shall not be practised ... and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years' (Ministry of Justice, People's Republic of China). Kinmen Island for its part acts as a relatively safe clearinghouse for China-Taiwan relations: particularly appreciated at times of tension (Hung-Ta, 2004). The rationale for these metropolitan-island arrangements, however, is scarcely one-sided. From the perspective of small island territories, there are quite plausible reasons to aspire to an 'arm's-length' relationship with a larger, 'mainland' benevolent patron. McElroy and Mahoney (2000) explain how the smaller players in these unequal dyads derive substantial economic advantages from the arrangement. These include: free or concessionary trade with, and export preference from, the parent country; social welfare assistance; ready access to external capital through special tax concessions; availability of external labour markets through migration; aid-financed infrastructure and communications; higher-quality health and educational systems; natural disaster relief; and provision for costly external defence. Autonomy without sovereignty may also facilitate tourism development because of easier terms of access and security. Most of these special conditions have emerged in the context of a history of a relatively benign colonial relationship-typically one dominated by strategic rather than economically exploitative interests. The Economist (2003) has claimed that the island citizens of Aruba, Bermuda and French Polynesia are amongst the world's top ten richest peoples: these three territories are non-sovereign island jurisdictions, benefiting from customized linkages with the much larger states of the Netherlands,
A global comparison of non-sovereign island territories: the search for 'true equality'
Island Studies Journal, 2020
For a great majority of former colonies, the outcome of decolonization was independence. Yet scattered across the globe, remnants of former colonial empires are still non-sovereign as part of larger metropolitan states. There is little drive for independence in these territories, virtually all of which are small island nations, also known as sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs). Why do so many former colonial territories choose to remain non-sovereign? In this paper we attempt to answer this question by conducting a global comparative study of non-sovereign jurisdictions. We start off by analyzing their present economic, social and political conditions, after which we assess local levels of (dis)content with the contemporary political status, and their articulation in postcolonial politics. We find that levels of discontent and frustration covary with the particular demographic, socioeconomic and historical-cultural conditions of individual territories. While significant independence movements can be observed in only two or three jurisdictions, in virtually all cases there is profound dissatisfaction and frustration with the contemporary non-sovereign arrangement and its outcomes. Instead of achieving independence, the territories' real struggle nowadays is for obtaining 'true equality' with the metropolis, as well as recognition of their distinct cultural identities.
Showcasing the sovereignty of non-self-governing islands: New Caledonia
Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 2017
Since 1983, no non-self-governing island connected to a (neo-) colonial European or American metropole has acquired full Westphalian sovereignty and these islands continue to operate within constitutional frameworks that connect them to these metropoles. Large majorities in referendums on several of these islands have rejected full sovereignty. This paper opens with a review of the essential elements of the concept of sovereignty in a historical and global context, before studying how sovereignty is unfolding in new forms in non-self-governing islands in the Pacific and the Caribbean. As a case study, an analysis is presented of how pro-France (loyaliste) and pro-independence (indépendantiste) parties in New Caledonia are negotiating sovereignty with France. Evidence is given of how these New Caledonian parties are creatively using classic Westphalian signifiers of sovereignty normally reserved for sovereign states such as flags, diplomatic representations and international treaties, while still negotiating New Caledonia's sovereignty with France. This suggests that in contrast to Westphalian sovereignty, a unique 'Islandian' concept of sovereignty is emerging. Islands that are not sovereign in a Westphalian sense can creatively disassemble and reassemble signifiers of Westphalian sovereignty to strengthen their continuous negotiations with their metropoles and their neighbours.
Policy & Politics, 2006
English This article focuses on the problems that one small island state has encountered in attempting to reform its political system. Jersey, an Offshore Financial Centre (OFC), has experienced considerable difficulty in responding to relatively modest reform proposals contained within the Clothier Report (States of Jersey, 2000). It is argued that these difficulties are shaped by tensions between regional and international regulatory pressures and domestic strategies to sustain autonomy to meet the perceived requirements of a globally responsive OFC economy. The management of these tensions is explained within the concept of historic marginality (Pizzorno, 1971), as well as the broader implications of political change for OFCs in general.