The Influence of Institutional Structure on Regulatory Choices and the Impact of these Choices on the Telecommunication Marketplace (original) (raw)
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Regulatory practice in telecommunications markets: how to grasp the 'real world of public action
2015
The regulatory arena in network-based industries In recent years the trend in network-based industries is from state monopoly ownership to operation and management by investor-owned companies. This trend towards liberalisation and privatisation promoting competition changed the roles of and relationships between private and public bodies. New views on the role of government led to a redesign of institutional frameworks in which government involvement was placed at arm's length of regulation and operations, shifting its focus towards policy development. Independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs) were installed to perform the role of monitoring network-based industries. Formal mechanisms were designed to ensure the accountability of these regulatory authorities to the other players in the regulatory arena. Moreover, NRAs are subject to a wide variety of performance assessments. These assessments tend to concentrate on the efficiency and effectiveness of NRAs. The results ...
2000
In recent years the trend in network-based industries is from state monopoly ownership to operation and management by investor-owned companies. This trend towards liberalisation and privatisation promoting competition changed the roles of and relationships between private and public bodies. New views on the role of government led to a redesign of institutional frameworks in which government involvement was placed at arm's length of regulation and operations, shifting its focus towards policy development. Independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs) were installed to perform the role of monitoring network-based industries.
Telecommunications Policies: Determinants and Impact
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices are combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. We find that liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. We also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behaviour of the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of regulatory independence.
Telecommunications Policies: Measurement and Determinants
Review of Network Economics, 2006
This paper presents new data on telecommunications reform for a cross section of countries. We measure telecommunications reform along two dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory independence. This data set is combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze the determinants of telecommunications policies. We find that entry barriers are positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist legal tradition, but they are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find that countries with weak protection of investors' quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger incumbent, are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although the latter is a weaker result.
Services, regulation and the changing structure of mobile telecommunication markets
Telecommunications Policy, 2012
Services, regulation and the changing structure of mobile telecommunication markets The papers in this special issue were presented at the 2010 European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society that was held in Copenhagen, Denmark. The theme of the conference, which occurred between the 13th and 15th September, was 'Telecommunications at new crossroads: Changing value configurations, user roles and regulations'. Although the conference attracted a wide range of papers covering many different issues, this special issue draws on a fraction of these that addressed the mobile telecommunications industry. Having said this, the special issue reflects the diversity of issues that were discussed. Two of the papers included in the special issue examine the diffusion and adoption of mobile telecommunication services, though the methodological approaches adopted and the analytical focus differ considerably. In contrast the focus of a third paper is on a specific regulatory policy, namely, mobile number portability. Of the remaining papers in the special issue, two concentrate on mobile services. The first of these papers examines why consumers pick one mobile operator over another, while the second discusses the challenges associated with mobile gaming. The final two papers both examine the structure of markets, with one exploring first mover advantages across Europe and the other fixed-mobile broadband substitution in Sweden. Each of these seven papers are described in further detail below. The first paper in the special issue is 'Mobile voice diffusion and service competition: A system dynamic analysis of regulatory policy' by Thomas Casey and Juuso Töyli. This paper explores the dynamic nature of mobile telecommunication markets through applying a system dynamics approach. System dynamics seeks to understand the complexity that occurs within a system through modelling the interaction that occurs between variables and actors. Although system dynamics is a well-established methodology, it has not been used that frequently to understand the dynamics of the telecommunications industry. After outlining background literature related to the diffusion of mobile voice services and the methodology to be adopted, Casey and Töyli present a model based on previous research, interviews with experts and market data. By presenting a causal loop diagram of the relationships that exist between those factors that shape the diffusion of mobile voice services, they highlight the complexity of these relationships and how four reinforcing loops encourage diffusion. Reinforcing loops have an even number of negative links and thus result in positive feedback that leads to exponential increase or decrease. The growth that results from these four reinforcing loops is, however, restricted by two balancing loops. Balancing loops have an uneven number of negative links that create negative feedback. In the second causal loop showing how mobile voice service competition develops, there are three reinforcing loops and three balancing loops. To understand the effect of technology harmonisation and mobile number portability on mobile voice telephony diffusion and service competition, a quantitative model is developed and analysed. The model is populated with data relating to Finland. Through the quantitative modelling Casey and Töyli find that enforcing technology harmonisation resulted in the faster diffusion of mobile voice services in Finland. They also find that mandating mobile number portability has played a key role in fostering competition, lowering prices and encouraging usage within Finland. In their paper 'Empirical analysis of factors promoting Japanese 3G mobile phone' Yuji Akematsu and Masatsugu Tjuji examine the reasons behind the take-up of 3G in Japan. Along with South Korea, Japan is the country in the world with by far the highest penetration of 3G mobile technology. Moreover, not only is Japan the leading country with respect to the penetration of 3G subscribers, it is also the first country in the world to experience a higher turnover from data communications than from traditional voice services. Japan can thus be considered to be a forerunner in mobile communications and is, therefore, an important country to study. In order to analyse this phenomenon, the authors perform an econometric analysis of the implications of different factors on the uptake of 3G technology. The econometric analysis uses a dynamic model approach incorporating network effects and deals with the endogeneity problem that often face such correlation analyses. The factors affecting 3G take-up examined in the paper are the m-payment/money service FeliCa, One-Seg (mobile TV), data roaming, music downloads, Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Regulation & Governance, 2019
Global diffusion of regulatory reforms in telecommunications has prevailed in many countries, engendering major institutional changes and entailing the establishment and/or reform of regulatory agencies. Although the triggers and timing of such agentification processes have been more or less similar, agency independence displays significant crosscountry variation. Seeking to explain such variation based on a sample incorporating middle-income countries (MICs), this paper examines the impact of political-institutional settings in which the agencies operate, in addition to the impact of economic parameters. Regression analysis reveals that political rights appear as the central parameter, while their impact is more robust in MICs than in advanced countries. The results underscore considerable cross-national variation in regulatory governance, along with a noteworthy decoupling between MICs and advanced countries. Concurring with the regulatory regionalism perspective, the paper delineates distinct regional clusters, albeit remaining agnostic about the determinants of such clusters.
Telecommunications Policy, 2006
In recent decades, major regulatory reforms have changed the role of the state in the liberalised and convergent communications sectors of developed economies worldwide. The central characteristics of this transformed statehood in communications are, inter alia, a rising importance of independent national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and a growing reliance on alternative modes of regulation, i.e. self-and co-regulation. While the advent and activities of NRAs are often analysed in current literature, the institutional variety and regulatory contributions of private actors through self-and coregulation are largely neglected. This article contributes to closing this research gap. A newly developed classification scheme of regulatory modes makes it possible to grasp the numerous and often intertwined contributions of both state and private actors. Furthermore, a case study of Austrian regulatory institutions active in the convergent communications sector demonstrates the potential of this new analytical tool and provides an in-depth analysis of various kinds of self-and co-regulation, which have substantially increased in communications regulation in Austria in the past decade.
Global Markets and Government Regulation in Telecommunications
2013
In recent years, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation have become commonplace in sectors once dominated by government-owned monopolies. In telecommunications, for example, during the 1990s, more than 129 countries established independent regulatory agencies and more than 100 countries privatized the state-owned telecom operator. Why did so many countries liberalize in such a short period of time? For example, why did both Denmark and Burundi, nations different along so many relevant dimensions, liberalize their telecom sectors around the same time? Kirsten Rodine-Hardy argues that international organizationsnot national governments or market forcesare the primary drivers of policy convergence in the important arena of telecommunications regulation: they create and shape preferences for reform and provide forums for expert discussions and the emergence of policy standards. Yet she also shows that international convergence leaves room for substantial variation among countries, using both econometric analysis and controlled case comparisons of eight European countries.