Twenty years of countering jihadism in Western Europe: from the shock of 9/11 to ‘jihadism fatigue’ (original) (raw)
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Considering Europe's long history of terrorist violence by separatist, leftist and rightwing groups, terrorism by militant Sunni Islamists has until recently been a marginal phenomenon. However, empirical data presented in this chronology suggests it constitutes a growing and increasingly lethal threat, and a worrisome trend in the context of increased tensions between the Muslim world and the West in the wake of 9/11 and the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which needs to be dealt with on many levels-socially, politically, and economically. The current chronology is meant to serve as a tool for conducting academic research on the scope of the threat, and for mapping incidents that might be surveyed in more depth to create a better understanding of its organizational, operational, and motivational patterns.
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This article provides the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis have plotted terrorist attacks in Europe. Drawing on a database of 122 incidents, we review trends in weapon types, attack types and target types in the period 1994-2013. The overall finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack types and weapons are becoming progressively more diverse. The most likely scenarios in the coming three to five years are bomb attacks and armed assaults against sub-national entities, communities and individuals. A majority of the terrorist attacks will be limited in scope, but mass-casualty terrorism cannot be excluded. Foreign fighters from Syria are likely to influence the threat level in Europe, but we do not expect them to alter patterns in modus operandi dramatically.
Utrecht Universiteit, 2020
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons that made European response to jihadist terrorism after 2015 more successful than previous experiences with a similar threat. The research assumes that the roots of this development could be identified in the emergence of a European counterterrorism culture that the thesis introduces to describe: the specific patterns of behavior; the expression of norms and standards; and set of power relations determining EU’s approach to terrorism. The paper contributes to the academic debate by taking a cultural approach to the study of the evolution of European counterterrorism. To validate this hypothesis and to answer the research question, the thesis analyses the development of this sector in two decades: the development of European counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 and the European response to the jihadist threat after 2015. While the former aims to show the formulation of the elements of European counterterrorism culture, the latter has the purpose of further displaying the continuance of the same features in the EU’s response after 2015. The thesis concludes that: (a) there is a security culture present in the sector through the identification of the specific patterns of behaviour, norms, standards and power relations; (b) the security culture contributed positively to the formulation of the European response after 2015.
The challenge of Jihadist radicalisation. In Europe and beyond. 2017
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Today Europe finds itself on the frontline in the fight against terrorism and jihadist radicalisation. Over the past fourteen months, the horrendous terrorist attacks that have taken place in France, Germany and Belgium, as well as in Turkey, Tunisia, and elsewhere around the world, have claimed hundreds of lives. As a Belgian national, the three bombs that were detonated in my country, in the departure hall of the Brussels International Airport in Zaventem, and at the Maelbeek Metro station, a few hundred metres from key EU institutions, was a particularly traumatic moment for me. In many ways, the attacks of 22 March were Belgium’s own 9/11, representing the worst terrorist attacks committed on Belgian territory in the country’s modern history. The attacks demonstrate a clear shift in the resolve and ability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations, and are devised to induce a high state of well-publicised terror
The Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe
Perspectives on Terrorism, 2014
This article provides the most thorough overview yet of how jihadis have plotted terrorist attacks in Europe. Drawing on a database of 122 incidents, we review trends in weapon types, attack types and target types in the period 1994-2013. The overall finding is that jihadi terrorism in Europe is becoming more discriminate in its targeting while attack types and weapons are becoming progressively more diverse. The most likely scenarios in the coming three to five years are bomb attacks and armed assaults against sub-national entities, communities and individuals. A majority of the terrorist attacks will be limited in scope, but mass-casualty terrorism cannot be excluded. Foreign fighters from Syria are likely to influence the threat level in Europe, but we do not expect them to alter patterns in modus operandi dramatically.
Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS-Effect
The article examines the extent to which Islamic State (IS) has affected jihadi terrorism in Europe. We look at the scope of attack activity, perpetrators and their networks, modus operandi and funding. For all the talk of a new threat we argue that, apart from scope, less is new than most assume. IS wants largely the same as al-Qaida did by attacking Europe. Their tactics are similar and their networks overlap in time and space. The core dynamics of the threat endure. It is premature to talk of a new paradigm in recruitment, but more terrorists are instructed online than before. Patterns in funding remain relatively stable, but there is an increase in plots financed from abroad. Despite military setbacks, IS remains a formidable terrorist actor, with territorial control, economic muscle and thousands of Europeans in its ranks. These things, combined with the group's skillful social media usage, are exhausting European security services' capacities. So is the refugee situation, which is exploited by IS to transfer personnel. If IS's territorial control persists, we foresee attempts at large-scale operations, including attempts at using improvised chemical or radiological devices. If IS continues to lose ground, small-scale attacks by single actors will become even more frequent.