FS60 The Pakistan Army (original) (raw)
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The Latent Operational Sway of Modern Indian Conventional Weapons on the Armed Forces of Pakistan
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Attaining and maintaining operations security remains the primary objective of armed forces on modern battlefields. Due to their flexibility in employment, conventional weapons are the true weapons of war and warfare, and in turn, significantly affect the operational environment based on their offensive as well as defensive capabilities. South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint is still characterized by conventional weapons. This paper intends to investigate the traditional weapon modernization undertaken by India and the likely impact of systems such as the Russian-built T-90S Main Battle Tank and S-400 Missile System, French-built Rafale Omni-role aircraft, and the Indian Navy aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya on the Armed Forces of Pakistan. The paper aspires to examine how and why these weapons and their acquisitions and deployments are likely to affect the operations security of both rival armed forces and recommend several conventional responses to enhance it, with special regard to Pakistan
Inside the Pakistan Army: Moves on the Chessboard
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On April 9, 2015, Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) put out two short press releases. The two-line press releases gave the names of the officers promoted from the rank of Maj. General to Lt. General and details of key new postings. This was the second major reshuffle that has taken place in the higher echelons of the Pakistan Army after General Raheel Sharif took over as the 15th Chief of the Pakistan Army in November 2013.
Operation Grand Slam, 1999
11 Cavalry (FF) three days short of being launched hamhandedly by inept higher commanders into Chamb jaurian battle while in concentration area in Gujrat Kashmir border -28 August 1965 July 2023 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23488.30729 Agha H Amin 11 Cavalry (FF) three days short of being launched hamhandedly by inept higher commanders into Chamb jaurian battle while in concentration area in Gujrat Kashmir border -28 August 1965 * July 2023 * DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23488.30729 *  * Agha H Amin Photograph most graciously shared by most respected elder brother major general sohail Aziz son of the great colonel Abdul Aziz who was commanding 11 Cavalry in operation grand slam and at chawinda. AZIZ was an outstanding officer but sadly under command officers who were naive and clueless as far as handling of armor was concerned. HAM HANDED EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR IN OP GRAND SLAM HAM HANDED EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR IN OP GRAND SLAM Employment of Armour Armour was not correctly employed on 1st September 1965. Slam’s brilliance, armour was under-utilised and poorly employed. The vast numerical advantage of six to one in armour, was partially nullified by dividing the two tank regiments between two brigades who in turn dished out each tank squadron to one infantry battalion. Thus instead of using the armour as a punch it was used like a thin net, as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced while the Indians were able to engage tank squadrons made to charge them in a piecemeal manner! Thus while the Pakistani victory, thanks to tank numerical and qualitative superiority was a foregone conclusion, the cost in terms of equipment and loss of manpower was too high as the following figures prove. 11 Cavalry lost 19 killed alone in Grand Slam and all 19 of these brave men were killed on 1st September 1965!107 The readers may note that this figure exceeds killed casualties of all regular infantry units which fought the Grand Slam battle from 1st September till ceasefire except 9 Punjab which lost 24 killed. But then the total effective strength of an armoured regiment is around 400 while that of infantry battalion is around 800. The reader, however, is cautioned not to jump to false conclusions about Grand Slam from this single example. Some units like 14 Punjab lost as few as 3 killed while the total killed of all regular infantry and tank regiments did not exceed the figure of 104 killed.108 The reader may note that the casualties of the 10 Indian Division were 246 killed and 240 missing most of whom were killed.109 On the other hand the fighting on 1st September was in prepared defences and far more difficult than later. Armour’s mishandling was affordable on 1st September 1965 and was improper but not lethal as was the case with change of command on 2nd September. Concentration of Resources and All Arms Cooperation The advantage of overwhelming superiority in armour was, however, not utilised in the initial plan by distributing armour over two axes under infantry brigades who in turn dished out squadrons to their infantry battalions for the dirty work of close support! This meant that artillery fire could not be concentrated and the artillery general Shaukat’s caustic but accurate observation that artillery fire on 1st September 1965, although initially concentrated, was naturally distributed into targets spread over a 30,000 yards front 98 after the Pre-H-Hour bombardment. There is a discrepancy in accounts of Shaukat Riza and Amjad Chaudhry about utilisation of artillery .Shaukat claims that artillery fire after the H-Hour was distributed and thus relatively ineffective, however, Chaudhry states that even after H-Hour some Indian strongpoints were “attacked with as many as 13 batteries of all calibre” 99. It is true that armour was not properly employed on 1st September 1965 but the superiority in tanks when combined with overwhelming artillery support even then was so immense that the 191 Brigade was no longer a fighting force by the night of 1st September 1965.
BRITISH LEGACY AND PAKISTAN ARMY 1965 WAR -A DETAILED ANALYSIS-PART ONE
Pakistan Army till 1965, 1999
We have already discussed in detail the impact of the British military tradition on the Judo Pak armies in our earlier chapters dealing with the armies of the English East India Company and the pre 1947 British Indian Army.This was not something confined to Judo Pak subcontinent alone but an all Asia trend.From the late eighteenth century the "European Way of Warfare" was generally borrowed and follow as the gospel truth by many East European and Afro-Asian armies.The trend of "importing the European way of war" started around 1600 when the Ottoman Turks came into contact with the European powers in Eastern Europe and Russia.Till 1500 the Europeans who had as a matter of fact military failed in the Crusades against Asia enjoyed no significant military advantage over Asia.Till the invention of gunpowder the cavalry remained the dominant arm in battle and the infantry was relegated to a secondary role.The ascendancy of European methods of warfare starts with the advent of Gustavus Adolphus(1496-1560) of Sweden who introduced a renaissance in the art of warfare by "harnessing modern technology to a practical military philosophy" .Gustavus principal contribution was the introduction of a relatively superior conceptual framework of integrating military organisation with weapons and tactics.He created an infantry organised in brigades of two to four regiments each of which had eight battalions of four companies etc.He introduced similar reforms in cavalry and artillery integrating artillery with infantry and cavalry
Defence Journal, 2001
Clausewitz states that it is far more difficult to understand strategy than tactics since things move very slowly in strategy and the principal actors are far away from the heat and friction of the battlefield. Thus strategy is a hundred more times difficult to comprehend and conduct than tactics. In this final chapter which sums up all that happened we will endeavour to arrive at a strategic summing up. The first fact that stands out is that the men who dominated the Indo-Pak scene, in the period that we have studied, both soldiers and politicians, were all tacticians, none being a strategist! They, some of whom were great men, were caught in historical currents, which were too strong to be manipulated! On one side was a Jungian situation with deep hatred of communalism firmly ingrained in the unfathomed and mysterious subconscious of the vast bulk of the populace! An irrational albeit substantial hatred that increased with leaps and bounds as ambitious middle and higher classes fought for jobs and legislative council seats! These men were clever in a tactical way, having been to some British University or a Legal Inn and were driven by burning egos to be the successors of the British Viceroys! Initially they borrowed some leafs from Europe's Nationalism and talked about India and India's independence as a country! Politics, however, remained in the drawing rooms of rich businessmen and feudals and chambers of barristers and lawyers till the First World War. The First World War constitutes a watershed in world history! It destroyed five Empires, four i.e the Romanoff, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman totally and one i.e the British who won the war but theirs was a Pyhric victory! They lost the will to retain their empire since the flower of its youth was destroyed on the battlefields of France! This fact was indirectly acknowledged by Alan Brooke the British Warlord once he admitted in writing that Britain lost its best men in the First World War. The First World War aroused great expectations in India and the mild lawyers who dominated the Indian political scene before the war saw far greater opportunities in the near future! If Lenin could mobilize the masses in the name of revolution and Kemal could do it in the name of Turkish Nationalism, why not mobilize the Indian masses too over some slogan! Alas India was only a geographical expression! A mosaic of complicated ethnic groups, castes, religions, sects! Who could be the Indian Lenin or Mustafa Kemal! How to bring a revolution! A Hindu called Gandhi discovered one cheap tactical response! A melodramatic employment of ancient Indian/Hindu slogans and names! This wily man tactically outwitted the outwardly
Pakistan Army from 1965 to 1971
Pakistan Army from 1965 to 1971, 2000
Pakistan Army from 1965 to 1971 October 2000 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35888.37121 Agha H AminAgha H Amin