Belief-Forming Processes, Extended (original) (raw)

Perception and Virtue Reliabilism

Acta Analytica, 2009

In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the "perceptual model" of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that 2 þ 2 ¼ 4) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa's arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to reject the perceptual model of intuition, and that we should reject the "perceptual model" of perception as well. Rational intuition and perception should both receive a virtue theoretic (e.g., reliabilist) account, rather than an evidentialist one. To this end, I explicitly argue against the Grounds Principle, which holds that all justified beliefs must be based on some adequate reason, or ground.

Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition

Virtue epistemology—no less than mainstream epistemology more generally—has by and large taken for granted the traditional intracranial picture of the mind, according to which the skull and skin mark the bounds of human cognizing. It is only natural then that intellectual virtues themselves have typically been understood as seated firmly within the biological agent. Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998), however, challenges this traditional account of the mind by suggesting that cognitive processes can criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world, so as to include certain parts of the world which we regularly interact with. But if cognition can extend in such a way that physical, extra-organismic artifacts (e.g., iPhones, smartwatches, tactile-visual substitution systems, etc.) can feature in cognitive processes such as memory, perception and the like, what does this mean for virtue epistemology? The aim here will be to attempt to answer this broad question in two parts. First I outline how the extended cognition thesis interfaces with the virtue reliabilist (e.g., Greco 2010; 2012; Sosa 2009; 2015) and virtue responsibilist (e.g., Baehr 2011; Battaly 2015; Montmarquet 1993) programmes in contemporary virtue epistemology, respectively. Next, I propose and briefly develop what I take to be four of the most important new research questions which arise for virtue epistemologists who welcome aboard the possibility of ‘extended’ intellectual virtues—viz., (i) the parity problem, (ii) the achievement problem, (iii) the cognitive integration problem, and (iv) the autonomy problem.

Epistemic Dependence and Cognitive Ability

Synthese

(forthcoming in Synthese) In a series of papers, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive ability (robust virtue epistemology) is incompatible with the idea that whether or not an agent's true belief amounts to knowledge can significantly depend upon factors beyond her cognitive agency (epistemic dependence). In particular, certain purely modal facts seem to preclude knowledge, while the contribution of other agents' cognitive abilities seems to enable it. Kallestrup and Pritchard's arguments are targeted against views that hold that all it takes to manifest one's cognitive agency is to properly exercise one's belief-forming abilities. I offer an account of the notion of cognitive ability according to which our epistemic resources are not exhausted by abilities to produce true beliefs as outputs, but also include dispositions to stop belief-formation when actual or modal circumstances are not suitable for it (precautionary cognitive abilities). Knowledge, I argue, can be accordingly conceived as a cognitive success that is also due to the latter. The resulting version of robust virtue epistemology helps explain how purely modal facts as well as other agents' cognitive abilities may have a bearing on the manifestation of one's cognitive agency, which shows in turn that robust virtue epistemology and epistemic dependence are not incompatible after all.

Epistemology and Radically Extended Cognition

Episteme

The topic of this paper is the relationship between epistemology and radically extended cognition. Radically extended cognition (REC)—as advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998)—is cognition that is partly located outside the biological boundaries of a cognizing subject. Recently, philosophers have argued that REC is actual; however, even critics allow that REC is at least possible. Epistemologists have now begun to wonder whether REC has any consequences for theories of knowledge. For instance while Pritchard (2010) suggests that REC might have implications for which virtue epistemology is acceptable, Carter (2013) wonders whether REC threatens anti-luck epistemology. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of REC has no systematic consequences for theorizing in epistemology. I illustrate my point by considering the discussion of Pritchard (2010) and Carter (2013). I suggest an alternative relationship between epistemology and REC: epistemology can play a role in diagnosing cases of REC. By establishing that entities partially located outside biological boundaries play certain epistemic roles, one can establish that they play cognitive roles as well. Similarly, by establishing that entities partially located outside biological boundaries don't play certain epistemic roles, one can establish that they don't play the related cognitive roles either. I conclude the paper by illustrating this last point.

Virtue epistemology and the acquisition of knowledge

Philosophical Explorations, 2005

The recent literature on the theory of knowledge has taken a distinctive turn by focusing on the role of the cognitive and intellectual virtues in the acquisition of knowledge. The main contours and motivations for such virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge are here sketched and it is argued that virtue epistemology in its most plausible form can be regarded as a refined form of reliabilism, and thus a variety of epistemic externalism. Moreover, it is claimed that there is strong empirical support in favour of the virtue epistemic position so understood, and an empirical study regarding the cognitive processes employed by medical experts in their diagnosis and treatment of epilepsy is cited in this regard. In general, it is argued that one can best account for 'expert' knowledge in terms of a virtue-theoretic epistemology that retains key reliabilist features. It is thus shown that understanding knowledge along virtue-theoretic lines has important implications for our understanding of how knowledge is acquired, and thus for the philosophy of education.

Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition

Philosophical Issues, 2014

How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge.

Extended knowledge and autonomous belief

Inquiry

Adam Carter has recently presented a novel puzzle about extended knowledge – i.e. knowledge that results from extended cognitive processes. He argues that allowing for this kind of knowledge on the face of it entails that there could be instances of knowledge that are simply ‘engineered’ into the subject. The problem is that such engineered knowledge does not look genuine given that it results from processes that bypass the cognitive agency of the subject. Carter’s solution is to argue that we need to impose an additional autonomy condition on knowledge that excludes such cases of non-autonomous knowledge. In response, two points of criticism are offered. First, that when extended knowledge is properly understood, virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge can already exclude non-autonomous knowledge without the need of an additional epistemic condition. Second, that the cases that Carter offers of putatively non-autonomous knowledge involve the inclusive folk notion of belief rather than the more restrictive notion of belief that is relevant to epistemology (K-apt belief). Once it is recognized that the belief condition on knowledge concerns this more restrictive notion, then we already have the means to exclude cases of non-autonomous knowledge (regardless of which theory of knowledge one favors).