On the memory processes underlying conscious deliberation in complex decision making: the role of verbatim and gist memory (original) (raw)
Related papers
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2017
Previous research showed that the unconscious-thought effect, which refers to an improvement in complex decision making following a distraction period, was moderated by the presentation format of pieces of information about different options. The aim of the current study was to replicate this finding and further examine the memory representations underlying decision making following a distraction or a deliberation period. Results showed that, when the information was presented blocked per option, participants were better able to differentiate the best option from the others after a distraction period than immediately after the information presentation or after a deliberation period. In addition, distracted participants retrieved more gist representations of the options when the information was presented per option. By contrast, participants were better able to differentiate the best option from the others after a deliberation period when the information was presented per attribute. Participants who deliberated also retrieved more verbatim representations when the information was presented per attribute. Finally, mediation analyses indicated that the accuracy of the evaluations of the options depends on gist memory when distracted but on verbatim memory when deliberating. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of distraction or deliberation depends on the memory representations of the different options.
Gist memory in the Unconscious Thought Effect
Psychological Science
The unconscious-thought effect (UTE) occurs when people are better able to make complex decisions after a period of distraction rather than immediately or after a period of conscious deliberation. This finding has often been interpreted as evidence of unconscious thinking. In two experiments, we provided the first evidence that the UTE is accompanied by enhanced memory for the gist of decision-relevant attributes and demonstrated that the cognitive demands of a distraction task moderate its effect on decision making and gist memory. It was only following a low-demand distraction task that participants chose the best alternative more often and displayed enhanced gist memory for decision-relevant attributes. These findings suggest that the UTE occurs only if cognitive resources are available and that it is accompanied by enhanced organization of information in memory, as shown by the increase in gist memory.
The Impact of the Mode of Thought in Complex Decisions: Intuitive Decisions are Better
Frontiers in Psychology, 2011
A number of recent studies have reported that decision quality is enhanced under conditions of inattention or distraction (unconscious thought;. These reports have generated considerable controversy, for both experimental (problems of replication) and theoretical reasons (interpretation). Here we report the results of four experiments. The first experiment replicates the unconscious thought effect, under conditions that validate and control the subjective criterion of decision quality. The second and third experiments examine the impact of a mode of thought manipulation (without distraction) on decision quality in immediate decisions. Here we find that intuitive or affective manipulations improve decision quality compared to analytic/deliberation manipulations. The fourth experiment combines the two methods (distraction and mode of thought manipulations) and demonstrates enhanced decision quality, in a situation that attempts to preserve ecological validity. The results are interpreted within a framework that is based on two interacting subsystems of decisionmaking: an affective/intuition based system and an analytic/deliberation system.
The emergence of coherence over the course of decision making.
Previous research has indicated that decision making is accompanied by an increase in the coherence of assessments of the factors related to the decision alternatives. In the present study, the authors investigated whether this coherence shift is obtained before people commit to a decision, and whether it is obtained in the course of a number of other processing tasks. College students were presented with a complex legal case involving multiple conflicting arguments. Participants rated agreement with the individual arguments in isolation before seeing the case and after processing it under various initial sets, including playing the role of a judge assigned to decide the case. Coherence shifts were observed when participants were instructed to delay making the decision (Experiment 1), to memorize the case (Experiment 2), and to comprehend the case (Experiment 3). The findings support the hypothesis that a coherence-generating mechanism operates in a variety of processing tasks, including decision making.
Walden manuscripts, 2012
Theories abound about how conscious and subconscious processes interact, both subjectively and neurochemically, in order for people to make their decisions. I demonstrate that no physical mechanism need exist for distinguishing between conscious and non-conscious processes (or rational vs. non-rational, explicit vs. implicit, etc.), and that the entire matter can be more easily and accurately explained in terms of more-or-less autonomous personality perspectives’ competing with each other. I present the idea that the so-called “unconscious processes” can be viewed as conscious, each in its appropriate context, just as a ‘fact’ (e.g., “all celestial bodies revolve about the earth, which is flat”) becomes a myth from a different perspective. Therefore, my hypothesis can be stated as: Decisions are made from greater or lesser integrations of personal perspectives; i.e., how much one is in touch with himself, or whether a person’s character has enough room in it to ruminate from conflicting viewpoints. In order to do this, I redefine ‘consciousness’ and “the unconscious” in a more useful way than has been hitherto, and demonstrate why meaningful and useful decisions cannot be made from what has erroneously been referred to as “the conscious state.”
Information presentation format moderates the unconscious-thought effect: The role of recollection
Memory, 2015
The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision making. In two experiments using the unconscious-thought paradigm, we investigated the effect of presentation format of decision information (i) on memory for decision-relevant information and (ii) on the quality of decisions made after distraction, conscious deliberation or immediately. We used the process-dissociation procedure to measure recollection and familiarity. The two studies showed that presenting information blocked per criterion led participants to recollect more decision-relevant details compared to a presentation by option.
Deliberation versus intuition: Global versus local processing in judgment and choice
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2012
Decisions and judgments made after deliberation can differ from expert opinion and be more regretted over time than intuitive judgments and decisions. We investigated a possible underlying process of this phenomenon, namely global versus local processing style. We argue that deliberation induces a local processing style. This processing style narrows conceptual attention and can have detrimental effects on judgment and decision-making. Study 1 showed that intuitive judgments of quality of modern paintings were more accurate than were more deliberate, reasoned judgments. Study 2 showed that local versus global processing style is associated with accuracy of quality judgments of paintings, and Study 3 replicated this finding with an experimental manipulation of processing style. Finally, Study 4 showed that the effect of intuitive versus deliberative decision mode on quality judgments of poems is mediated by processing style.
Expertise Effects on Immediate, Deliberate and Unconscious Thought in Complex Decision Making
In this study we examined the claim that unconscious thought would lead to better choices in complex decision making than immediate and deliberate thought. We doubted whether this would also be true for experts in a domain. Participants were students and experienced real-estate agents with expertise in choosing between houses. In three problems, differing in difficulty and/or task requirements, participants decided upon the best house by rank-ordering and evaluation. No support was found for beneficial effects of unconscious thought, neither for experts, nor for students. In line with our hypothesis we found that experts could take advantage of deliberate thinking in complex decision making. They were also better than students in immediate choices. These results corroborate other studies that question the generalizability of the deliberation-without-attention hypothesis, and provide further evidence that it is helpful to deliberately think when making complex decisions. The advice is to rely on experts or to build expertise, instead of leaving thinking to the unconsciousness.
Thinking about decisions: An integrative approach of person and task factors
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Decisions vary. They vary in both content and complexity. People also vary. An important way that people vary is how much they think about a decision. Some prior research investigating thinking and decision making largely conflicts with most traditional decision theories. For example, if considering an array of products to choose from, thinking more about the different alternative's attributes should lead to a better decision. However, some research indicates that it may also lead to more focus on irrelevant aspects of the decision situation. We propose that this conflict exists because of a failure to consider the interaction between the individual and the decision task. To test this, we used separate methodologies that enhance or attenuate a person's thinking. In Study 1 we selected people who were especially high or low in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and had them complete a robust decision-making inventory, which included both complex and simple tasks. In Study 2 we manipulated participant's level of glucose, which acts as the brain's fuel to enhance or attenuate thinking ability. Both studies support the view that more thought leads to better decisions in complex tasks but does not influence simple decisions, including those that are valence based. These findings show how the individual's thinking interacts with the constructive elements of the task to shape decision choice.