The Impact of the State-Level Concept on “Newcomers”: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (original) (raw)
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THE IAEA ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL: A NEW VERIFICATION REGIME? PERSPECTIVES FOR UNIVERSALIZATION
IAEA safeguards regime has been instrumental to identify non-compliance cases of safeguards obligations under the NPT and safeguards agreements and to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. However, Iraqi case showed that existing safeguards were not sufficient for thorough verification. In order to strengthen the safeguards system, a new instrument, Additional Protocol has been negotiated. Additional Protocol gives the IAEA a new mandate to verify undeclared nuclear material and activities. The fact that so far there have been no non-compliance cases identified in States with AP in force, explains the increased legal authority of the IAEA, States commitments to abide with norms and follow patterned behavior. AP measures showed that their implementation is sufficient for robust and effective safeguards regime and it makes a great contribution to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, AP is not a legally binding instrument and after 20 years of its adoption the numbers of ratifications are still disappointing. This raised certain questions that this research tried to answer. Based on comparative study of regime analytical elements pertaining to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol as well as operationalizing mainly regime theory assumptions on various features and elements of regime, this dissertation tried to find out whether the last verification standard Additional Protocol is a new verification regime or evolution of the rules of the regime. As IAEA needs more legal authority to carry out its verification mission and to conclude not only on declared nuclear material but also on undeclared material, states having Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements have to sign Additional Protocol. In order to understand the prospects of universalization of AP, which would significantly increase the robustness and effectiveness of the regime, case studies have been carried out. The main findings show that Additional Protocol is not a new verification regime. Analysis of principles and norms of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocol didn’t reveal any changes or new developments in the normative framework of the regime. Evolution of the rules of the IAEA safeguards regime has been observed. Based on theory assumptions changes within the IAEA safeguards regime has been identified only. Though selected case studies show that there are serious difficulties for certain states to join AP, for some states such a possibility is visible. Results of analysis showed that the full potential of strengthened safeguards can be achieved only via universalization of AP, which is now rests with States to demonstrate their willingness to have an effective safeguards regime and with the IAEA to pursue all prescribed measures in all AP States.
IAEA safeguards: patterns of interaction and their applicability beyond the Cold War
Adelphi Series, 2016
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to nuclear non-proliferation or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was rooted in a shared interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, occasional disagreements notwithstanding. It was also characterised by an appreciation of the motives and concerns behind one another's approaches, and a willingness to compromise in pursuit of objectives that were seen as serving both countries' nationalsecurity interests. One of these objectives was to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. The system of safeguards, which is intended to prevent the diversion of 'source or special fissionable material' for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices, is a vital element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Principal safeguards obligations by states parties to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) are contained in Article III of the treaty, which also designates the IAEA as the body responsible for the implementation of that system. The requirement to accept safeguards applies only to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) parties to
Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Osaka University Law Review, 2005
Entering into the twenty-first century and in particular after the terrorist attacks an September 11, 2001, situations surrounding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have come to the central stage of international political and security challenges. In march 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom started bombing an Iraq, the main reason of which was the threatening possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. North Korea withdrew form the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 and has continuously developed its nuclear weapons program. Iran also has been criticized an its clandestinely developed uranium enrichment program since August 2002. Finally, Libya agreed in December 2003 to stop and dismantle all of its programs an weapons of mass destruction. All the four countries mentioned above are/were parties to the NPT and violated their safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since the revelation of Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Gulf War, the IAEA, recognizing the shortcomings of its safeguards system, started * This is a revised and expanded version of a paper "Verification and the Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, including Effectively Verifiable NWFZ Treaties," which was submitted to the IAEA Seminar for the South Pacific Region an the Conclusion and Implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, held in Sydney, Australia an November 10 and 11, 2004. .
The notion of 'nuclear non-proliferation' is twofold. It refers to: (a) reduction of the number of existing arsenals (disarm or vertical non-proliferation), and (b) containment of the number of States that possess nuclear weapons or the control of non-state actors who can use such weapons (horizontal non-proliferation). Different sources of the law exist at the international and regional level for addressing the issue. At the international law level, the main legal text for addressing the issue, both on the side of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation, is the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). For the implementation of the principles contained in the NPT, a 'nuclear safeguards' system has been created, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the role of the nuclear 'watchdog' for the NPT. At the regional level, with respect to horizontal non-proliferation, there are bilateral or multilateral agreements that ban weapons of mass destruction in certain areas (Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, NWFZ, treaties), and denuclearization treaties. They contain norms about verification and compliance, and some of them institute a specific agency that complements the IAEA. Along with IAEA system of safeguards and NWFZ bodies, there are regional safeguards bodies: (a) the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) model is the cornerstone of no-proliferation of nuclear material in the EU, while (b) the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has the function to control nuclear activities developed in Brazil and Argentina. Therefore, this study aims at critically and comparatively analysing the different safeguards systems adopted at the international and regional level.
IAEA Safeguards: Evolution and Current Status
Journal of South Asian Studies, 2013
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Creation of the Model Additional Protocol
2010
In 1991, the international nuclear nonproliferation community was dismayed to discover that the implementation of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under its NPT INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement with Iraq had failed to detect Iraq's nuclear weapon program. It was now clear that ensuring that states were fulfilling their obligations under the NPT would require not just detecting diversion but also the ability to detect undeclared materials and activities. To achieve this, the IAEA initiated what would turn out to be a five-year effort to reappraise the NPT safeguards system. The effort engaged the IAEA and its Member States and led to agreement in 1997 on a new safeguards agreement, the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. The Model Protocol makes explicit that one IAEA goal is to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Model Protocol requires an expanded declaration that identifies a State's nuclear potential, empowers the IAEA to raise questions about the correctness and completeness of the State's declaration, and, if needed, allows IAEA access to locations. The information required and the locations available for access are much broader than those provided for under INFCIRC/153. The negotiation was completed in quite a short time because it started with a relatively complete draft of an agreement prepared by the IAEA Secretariat. This paper describes how the Model Protocol was constructed and reviews key decisions that were made both during the five-year period and in the actual negotiation.
How Well Will the IAEA Be Able To Safeguard More Nuclear Materials in More States
The International Atomic Energy Agency will confront new proliferation risks if its safeguards system must operate in a world with more nuclear facilities in more and riskier places. The usual suggestions for upgrading IAEA safeguards focus on increasing the agency's resources and improving technology. Yet improved technology and more resources for inspections will not help unless the agency can develop standards to gauge the strength of the safeguards system, and unless countries confront the problem of what to do after the IAEA detects a violation.
The IAEA, the NPT and the VIII NPT Review Conference
Since the end of World War II the international community has been building, step by step and with many difficulties, the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime. The purpose of this regime is the prevention of the proliferation of this type of weaponry and to achieve, as one of their final goal, the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and the closure of all nuclear weapon production facilities or the conversion of these facilities for their exclusively use with peaceful purposes in the future. Despite all efforts made by the majority of the international community, the world still is far from achieving this important objective. This article offers to the international community a group of actions for the strengthening of the nuclear weapon non-proliferation regime and for the beginning of multilateral negotiations towards nuclear disarmament.
Politics vs. Protocol: Iran’s Nuclear Archive and the IAEA’s Responsibilities (August 2019)
2019
In an April 2018 press conference, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu disclosed that Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency had conducted a raid on a warehouse in Iran the previous January, removing a half-ton of files cataloguing Tehran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. The covert archive contained a wealth of new information that contradicts longstanding assumptions about Iran’s nuclear program. While a 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate judged “with high confidence” that Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program” in 2003, the archive shows that the program continued, albeit in a more circumscribed and diffuse manner. Specifically, the archive identifies additional nuclear facilities, equipment, and activities previously unknown to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN body tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear program and verifying its key nuclear-related commitments. Israeli officials estimate that the Jewish state seized only 20 to 50 percent of the archive’s contents, suggesting that the IAEA’s knowledge base likely has additional gaps. The IAEA harbors an obligation to remedy these gaps by securing prompt access to the facilities, equipment, and materials described in the archive. This responsibility stems directly from the IAEA’s legal mandate, as established by the multiple non-proliferation agreements that Iran has concluded. A careful review of these accords shows that the IAEA has no pretext for inaction or delay. Further investigation of Iran’s nuclear program remains necessary to ensure that no covert nuclear activity persists today. This report assesses that the IAEA, despite its clear duty, has not demonstrably satisfied its mandate. In the years since the finalization of the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the IAEA has provided insufficient transparency and clarity about its inspections in Iran. This opacity raises questions about the diligence of the IAEA’s investigations – particularly its probe of sites, equipment, and activities documented in the archive. The agency’s approach also invites criticism that political considerations have interfered with its obligation to serve as an objective, technical body. In fact, the actions and public statements of IAEA leaders convey a hesitation to scrutinize key Iranian activities that potentially violate the JCPOA, lest the resulting evidence undermine the accord’s viability. This report begins with an overview of the archive’s contents and their significance, showing that they offer actionable findings relevant to the enforcement of Tehran’s current nonproliferation agreements. The report then presents a survey of these agreements – the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT), the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the CSA’s Additional Protocol (AP), and the JCPOA – and the core legal obligations they impose on Iran, the IAEA, and other countries. This report subsequently examines the IAEA’s pre-JCPOA efforts to inspect and report on Iran’s nuclear program pursuant to the NPT, CSA, and AP. The agency’s actions established a precedent not only for timely responses to disclosures of new information, but also for comparatively detailed reporting and transparency about Tehran’s steps – or lack thereof – to fulfill its commitments. This report then appraises the IAEA’s post-JCPOA efforts, noting both possible failures to inspect key sites and a significant decline in transparency and clarity in reporting. Based on this analysis, the report urges the IAEA to take the following steps, which are indispensable for the fulfillment of its mandate: • Inspect promptly all Iranian sites, equipment, and materials discussed in the archive. • Strengthen its investigation of past and present issues concerning the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. • Issue comprehensive, transparent reports of Iran’s nuclear activities. • Require Tehran to supply the IAEA with all documents in the archive that Israel failed to extract from the warehouse, along with any related documents. The report also urges the Trump administration and Congress to take the following actions: • Demand the IAEA’s implementation of the above steps. • Conduct a public information campaign highlighting the findings in the archive and its implications for IAEA inspections. • Call on the IAEA Board of Governors to exercise greater oversight of the IAEA’s activities.